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A journal designed to catalyze a deeper critical appreciation of the humanities at Otterbein College, Aegis seeks scholarly 
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pages—in twelve point type, double-spaced, in Times New Roman font with standard one-inch margins. 
Aegis is committed to nonsexist language and to wording free of hostile overtones.
Aegis will appear annually during the first week of May of each calendar year.  Essays and book reviews will be received 
on a rolling basis.  The deadline for the coming year’s edition shall be the second Friday of Winter Quarter.  Essays and 
book reviews received after this date will be considered for the following year’s edition—even if the writer is in the 
final year of his/her study at Otterbein.
Submissions, prepared according either to the MLA Style Manual or The Chicago Manual of Style, should be sent in 
duplicate and addressed to Paul Eisenstein, Faculty Advisor, Aegis, 227 Towers Hall, Otterbein College, Westerville, 
Ohio, 43081.  If you are submitting through the U.S. Mail and wish for one copy of your submission to be returned, please 
include a self-addressed envelope with sufficient postage.  Authors’ names should not appear on submitted essays; instead, 
submissions should be accompanied by a cover sheet, on which appear the author’s name, address, and the title of the 
essay.  All essays accepted for publication will need eventually to be submitted on hard diskette in Microsoft Word.
Aegis: Editorial Board
Editors:  Michelle Yost and J. T. Craig
Board Members: 
Christina Amato
Adam Cottrell
Jennifer Roberts
Cassi Smith
Jen Wall
Cover Art:  Michelle Yost (of Stonehenge)
Advisor:  Dr. Paul Eisenstein
Students interested in serving on Aegis’ Editorial Board for the 2006-2007 school year should 
contact Dr. Paul Eisenstein at PEisenstein@otterbein.edu. 
contents
5
9
Editor’s Introduction
Two Essays on Socrates
An Examination of Richard Kraut’s Liberalization of Socrates’ Political 
Philosophy • J. T. Craig
Would King Drink the Hemlock?:  Socrates’ Views on King • Larsa Ramsini
The Not-So “Invisible Hand”:  America’s Role in Haiti’s Endemic Poverty 
• Christina Amato
Philosophizing Disgrace:  Anatomy and Analysis of Dylan’s “Hard Rain” 
• Adam Cottrel
A Priest of the Portrait as a Young Man:  The Path to Stephen Dedalus’s Artistic 
Baptism • Adam Cottrel
The Moral Dilemma of Atomic Warfare • Edward Gunn
Jaingxi Elementary School Explosion:  A Look at Human Rights Abuse 
in China • Rhonda Maynard
A Woman’s Religion:  How Ann Lee Broke Through the Patriarchy • Jen Roberts
Art of Revolution • Jen Wall
Hirohito: Dunce or Duplicitous Leader? • Michelle Yost
Articles
Interview with Dr. Alan Lightman: At the Intersection of the   
Sciences and Humanities
In Brief
Contributors
Book Reviews
13
114
120
35
29
The Body of Brooklyn • Jennifer Roberts
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order • Zach Reat
Collapse • Cassi Smith
Teacher Man • Christina Amato
China Inc. • J. T. Craig
52
45
74
59
88
82
104
108
106
96
112
110
5
ae
gi
s 
2
0
0
6
Editors’ Introduction
Michelle Yost and J. T. Craig
 It is a pleasure to bring you the third edition of Aegis, Otterbein’s Humanities jour-
nal. We have enjoyed providing a forum that embraces a wide spectrum of ideas in which our 
peers can share. Academic work cannot exist within a vacuum; we need to share our theories 
and research, and in turn draw on others, so that our work is well-rounded and relevant to this 
increasingly interdisciplinary world.
 One of the underlying themes in every scholarly field, is the intellectual honesty of 
one’s work. The scholarship involved in the humanities is especially dependent on academic 
honesty, because of the volume and breadth of sources that one can find, and usurp, as one’s 
own. An individual might be tempted to say there is a problem with students and faculty pla-
giarizing the work of others, but that far from being pervasive, this is just a problem confined 
to academia and to scholarship; it is not one indicative or carried over into other aspects of 
life. But this claim would be wrong. Intellectual dishonesty is not only a major problem in 
academia, but is rampant in politics, in governmental and private bureaucracies, in corpora-
tions, and in just about every other aspect of life. The theft and use of others ideas, along 
with adamant denials about the falsity of one’s ideas and work is indicative of a disease, like 
cancer, that starts at one point (scholarship, perhaps, though we would find this point of origin 
debatable) and then races through the cultural bloodstream, permeating all major parts until it 
has become the norm, and not the exception, to be dishonest.
Like many societal problems, the beginnings of intellectual dishonesty seem innocu-
ous, almost innocent. In academia, both as a student and as a professor, there is pressure to 
produce (or, perhaps on the part of many students, there is a view of the college experience 
as a means to an end – the degree in this case being merely a credential). It is this drive to be 
unique and to get ahead (careerism) that leads to small slips in academic integrity. It might 
begin with cutting and pasting sentences from journals, or online sources without a citation 
– after all, it is only one sentence. From there, it is easy to fabricate a source of information 
– after all, the professor wants too many sources, and there are other classes that need atten-
tion. It is these seemingly small things in conjunction with the pressure and exploitation of our 
entrepreneurial culture that leads to essay sites on the web, the buying and selling of academic 
work, or going so far as to hiring someone to write a specific paper for you (at ten dollars per 
page). In fact, there have been moves made by professors and universities to curb this trend, 
by creating web sites that are, essentially, large student databases that can check a particular 
paper against thousands of other documents, papers, journals, etc. And this movement has led 
to student bodies using their Senate to invalidate that practice. As Chantal Brushett, president 
of the students union at Nova Scotia University, states: “Students go to university for a higher 
education. They don’t go to be involved in a culture of mistrust, a culture of guilt.”1 While 
this problem addresses student intellectual dishonesty, it does not address the issue of how 
professors are being monitored. We can see that the problem has jumped from being widely 
perceived as a “student-only” problem, to infecting professional academics (as evidenced 
by plagiarism in works by  Doris Kearns Goodwin, Lawrence Tribe, and Stephen Ambrose) 
and our society as a whole(see Jayson Blair’s work for the New York Times, or James Frye’s 
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“fictionalized” non-fiction book) . 
Even in institutions such as Columbia and Harvard – which is where elite intellectual 
work supposedly takes place – it is apparent that a culture of dishonesty has infiltrated the 
system. For example, this is a quote from Mark Slouka, a former professor at Columbia and 
current chair of the creative writing program at Chicago University, about the pervasiveness 
of intellectual dishonesty at Columbia, whose problems include:
Master’s theses that are routinely passed despite the fact that the level of 
writing exhibited in them is remedial at best and virtually illiterate at worst, 
tenure-track hires of close personal friends of the chair who have, quite 
literally, not a single publication credit to their names and who are hired 
over candidates with two and three books – resulting in a situation in which 
students often have more experience and publications than their instructors, 
and an institutional culture in which those who have done nothing for 10 
or 15 years hire others like themselves in order to make their own lack of 
accomplishment less visible and, for the same reason, discriminate against 
those who are active in their fields.2
While the above passage is not about plagiarism in the purest sense, it points out the lengths 
to which others within academia go to preserve or advance their careers – in this instance cro-
nyism appears to be the manifestation of the disease of intellectual dishonesty. And it is this 
cronyism and careerism that have lead to a culture of ineptitude at Columbia. The problem 
extends to students as well. At Harvard, revelations about one student’s plagiarized fiction 
have recently been made. Nineteen year old Harvard student Kaavya Viswanathan lifted direct 
passages for her New York Times best seller, How Opal Mehta Got Kissed, Got Wild and Got 
a Life, from other popular young adult fiction. Ms. Viswanathan received 500,000 dollars for 
a two book publishing deal. Viswanathan swears that “any phrasing similarities between her 
[Megan McCafferty’s] works and mine were completely unintentional and unconscious.” Just 
as this issue of Aegis was going to press, Random House –Viswanathan’s publisher – an-
nounced the cancellation of the book – and Viswanathan’s contract – if this is the state of 
intellectual honesty at elite institutions, then what of other “less elite” institutions? And, if the 
academy is the staging ground for preparing and sending out the future generation into the 
“real world,” then what is the state of intellectual honesty in the “real world?”
In the past few years alone, there have been scandals involving false claims about 
medical and scientific research – as evidenced by Hwang Woo Suk, who claimed to have 
cloned human embryonic stem cells, and Merck Pharmaceuticals who knew for many years 
about the very negative (potentially fatal) side-effects of their marquee drugs. Just recently, 
several engineering masters’ theses from Ohio University have been discovered to be pla-
giarized. Some papers were copied outright, while others were merely badly cited, hence, 
plagiarized.  One begins to see the problem of intellectual dishonesty spreading through all 
of society. Our academic system, demanding rigorous proof and testability, does eventually 
uncover the frauds; at least, we hope that it does. That system fails us, though, when we stop 
being outraged by the lies. And merely stripping credentials away from students or professors 
is not enough to stop the problem. Finding a few falsified papers does not mean that the battle 
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against the disease of dishonesty should be stopped.
Revelations about professional and amateur athletes using steroids and human 
growth hormone to get an edge on the competition have also been in the limelight. These men 
and women are supposed to be the paragon of athleticism and integrity and sportsmanship. 
Now, many athletic heroes have become causalities of their own careerism, their own personal 
and societal pressure to be “number one.” The intellectual dishonesty and cheating in these 
areas have seriously damaged the credibility of people and institutions.  It seems as though 
we can no longer trust students to work hard, to engage in the struggle to test and expand their 
mental capacities, to truly reach their academic potential. No longer can we trust that the ath-
letes of professional sports are playing by the rules, or that drug companies will provide hon-
est products to advance the life and vitality of humankind. While this, we believe, is evidence 
of some fundamental flaw in our cultural and personal ethos, perhaps the most frightening 
arena that has been infected by intellectual dishonesty is in politics.
 In the years since the Bush administration decided to take a unilateral approach to 
the “war on terror,” their main assertions and justifications for going to war have been proved 
false. Not just false in the sense that they were wrong; rather they were manufactured falsi-
ties, the epitome of intellectual dishonesty. What about Clinton’s public assertions that he 
did not have inappropriate contact with a White House intern? What about the lobbyist Jack 
Abramoff, who has already pleaded guilty and been sentenced to jail for bribing members of 
Congress? The public has mustered its usual self-righteous indignity at the news of a politi-
cal lie, but not to the point where anything in our government has changed. We have opened 
the hood of the car, acknowledged the leak in the radiator, berated the crack, and lowered 
the hood again. The path to war in Iraq was paved with questionable intention, and while we 
know it was a false trail planted by the highest levels of government, we have made no at-
tempt to rectify the situation and find a batter path. 
Is this problem one that can be solved? Even if in the short-term, the answer is “no,” 
we must work towards a long-term goal of rectifying the cultural and personal ethos that have 
led us to this barrenness of intellectual honesty. A good place to start stopping this trend is in 
the university and college system. These institutions, along with preparing young adults to be 
ready for the “real world,” need to instill an atmosphere of collegiality, of good, and honest, 
hard work. This is not just something that will be instilled by building public databases and 
failing students who are caught – those methods only win small battles in the overall war 
– rather, the institution itself, and the faculty and students who comprise its body, need to as-
sess for themselves what the cause of this problem is, and work from the bottom up, and the 
top down to rectify it. It is a hard goal, but one that is necessary if our society is going to ever 
again be able to have faith and trust in other people. If the educated members of this society 
are no better off ethically than uneducated members, there is a serious problem with the sys-
tem. Truth is the basis for the good life, and consequently, the good society. At no other time 
in our generation has our nation’s intentions and trustworthiness been so derided, and it is the 
least we can do, in the wake of our own homegrown intellectually dishonest revelations, to 
attempt to ameliorate the situation, and hopefully, be leaders in the fight to win back a culture 
of intellectual honesty, veracity, and ingenuity that has been assassinated by our culture’s love 
for the easy way out, and for being “number one.” The papers that follow are representative of 
some of the best Otterbein has to offer, an example of the brilliant, original work this student 
body can produce. The Humanities emphasize the examination of self, of what it is to be hu-
e
d
it
o
rs
ae
gis 2
0
0
6
8
man, and knowing our tempestuous relationship with honesty, perhaps together we can now 
find a better way to move forward and solve this problem.
1 “Anti-cheating database banned at N.S. university.” CBCNews, 8 March 2006. <http://www.
cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2006/03/08/plagerism-software060308.html> 3/16/2006.
2 Slouka, Mark.  “University Integrity at Stake.”  Columbia Spectator Online Edition.  
24 April 2006. <http://www.columbiaspectator.com/vnews/display.v/ART/2006/04/24/
444c65f6e911d> 30 April 2006.
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Aegis was presented with the great opportunity to sit down and talk with Dr. Alan Lightman, 
who came to Otterbein College as part of the 2005 “Big Bang Boom” lecture series celebrat-
ing the centennial of Albert Einstein’s publication of the Special Theory of Relativity. We 
asked Dr. Lightman about the connection between the sciences and humanities.
AEGIS: Western civilization has drawn a line between the sciences and the humanities, in 
part, perhaps, because of the evidence that mathematical processes occur in the left-brain and 
creative ones in the right-brain. Being both a physicist and a creative writer, do you lament 
the disconnection between these two subjects?
LIGHTMAN:  I think that the two subjects and the whole worldview they represent have a lot 
to say to each other, and so I believe that the humanities can learn from the sciences, and the 
sciences can learn from the humanities. And, we should have more dialogue between them, 
but I don’t think that we should try to homogenize these worldviews, and say that there really 
is only one worldview, and we really have to try and distill and compress the scientific and 
humanistic worldview into a single worldview.  I think that the scientific way of looking at the 
world, and the humanistic way of looking at the world are complementary. There are impor-
tant differences which should be preserved, and in trying to do away with those differences 
we would lose something the same way as if we tried to make all religions one religion or all 
races one race. There is a cultural diversity that’s very valuable, and it’s valuable to have dif-
ferent ways of looking at the world.
AEGIS: A theme that seems to be recurrent in your writings is a sense of alienation from mod-
ern life, that the abundance of technology and information has overwhelmed the human spirit. 
How did you come to this perspective? What writers, scientists, and philosophers influenced 
you the most?
LIGHTMAN: I think my entire life has molded that perspective. Writers who echoed this 
theme at earlier times, the most prominent influence on me is Henry David Thoreau, and Hen-
ry David Thoreau, one of his famous mottos was “simplify, simplify.” He felt that the world 
was moving too fast, and getting too complex. In his day, the greatest technological advance 
was the railroad, and he made the comment that “we do not ride the railroad, the railroad rides 
us.” I have no opposition at all to technology. I think technology is a wonderful thing that has 
to be used thoughtfully, and we can’t just assume that every bit of new technology improves 
the quality of life; it’s really in how the technology is used. What I am very disturbed about 
is this trend of everything happening faster and faster and faster and there being more and 
An Interview with Dr. Alan Lightman: 
At the Intersection of the Sciences 
and Humanities
Michelle Yost and J. T. Craig
ae
gis 2
0
0
6
1
0
more general noise in the world, and less and less time for quiet reflection on who we are, and 
where we’re going.
AEGIS: Regarding your essay, “In God’s Place,” you closed by stating, “All of it, all the 
centuries of liberation and imprisonment, creation and dread, live together in one house. 
And each new door opened will disturb us. Yet we will keep opening the doors; we cannot be 
stopped.” Are you trying to say that science has no limits and will one day destroy us? Do 
you believe that a greater humanistic influence needs to be placed on science? If so, how can 
science remain objective?
LIGHTMAN: I don’t think that science will necessarily destroy us one day. What I meant by 
that is that science is an intellectual journey, and to me, it’s not the destination, it’s the journey 
to get there. It’s a way of thinking and it’s an intellectual curiosity, a desire to know how the 
world works, and to know what the fundamental principles of the world are, and to know our 
place in it. I think once we stop asking questions like “what is the age of the universe,” or 
“how are the instructions of DNA carried out on a microscopic level,” once we stop asking 
questions like that, we’re dead. There is always a need for the humanities as well as science; 
it’s almost a tautology. The humanities are important in their own right. That’s where our art 
comes from, which is another way of exploring truth and expressing ourselves, but the hu-
manities also help tell us how to live in the world and you can’t have science without humani-
ties. We live in a society, and we have to function as human beings in a society and not just 
intellectual automatons trying to discover the laws of nature.
AEGIS: In your investigation with Jon Miller, “Contemporary Cosmological Beliefs,” you 
found that there is a fundamental lack of cosmological understanding among Americans (such 
as only 37% recognizing that the sun will burn out). Your attempt was to find out why people 
held these beliefs about science, with regard to age, gender, religious beliefs and education. 
Why does there appear to be such a lack of scientific knowledge? Do you feel there is not 
enough being done in schools to educate the next generation about how our universe works? 
Does a future history teacher or phlebotomist need to know that the universe is not static?
LIGHTMAN: I think certainly that science education needs to be improved. I don’t know ex-
actly what the system is of teacher certification right now, but I know that in the past that you 
could go to many high schools — which is where people start forming most of their beliefs, 
sometimes for life — and you could find teachers teaching biology that had not majored in 
biology in college: And so, more care needs to be exercised in determining which teachers can 
teach what subjects. But I think, in addition to that, we just need to continue having more and 
more popular (good popular) expositions of science, there’s a lot now, but you can never have 
too much. Programs on PBS, like Nova, the science sections of various newspapers and maga-
zines, like Discover; you just need a large variety of that in many different forms, because 
some of those magazines and programs will reach some people and some won’t, so you need 
a large variety to reach a large variety of people.
AEGIS: In the interviews you and Roberta Shaw conducted for Origins: The Lives and Worlds 
of Modern Cosmologists, you were again looking for the humanistic reasons behind scientists’ 
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beliefs and investigations. Robert Dicke was asked if “the universe has a purpose?” Do you 
think that the universe has a purpose? Or does humanity need to find its own purpose? Does 
your creative writing allow you to lend a humanistic purpose to the science you study?
LIGHTMAN: The question of whether the universe has a purpose is not a scientific question, 
and so I cannot answer that as a scientist because it’s not a scientific question. There is no sci-
entific experiment you could do that would answer that question — although it’s an extremely 
interesting question. So, are you asking me as an individual whether I think the universe has a 
purpose? 
AEGIS: Yes.  
LIGHTMAN: I would have to say that I do not believe that the universe as a whole has a 
purpose, but I believe that individual people have a purpose. It’s the same questions as “what 
is the meaning of life?” You ask somebody what is the meaning of life, and I think that each 
person has to answer that question in their own way. I do think that it’s important that people 
ask themselves this question, “What is the meaning of life? And what is the meaning of my 
life?” That’s the kind of self-reflection that I’m talking about, an example of it that we need 
to have more time for. What the meaning of life is for me, may not be what it is for you, but, 
I ask myself that question all the time, and I ask myself, what should I be doing with my life 
to make it a satisfying life? When I am on my deathbed, I want to feel that I have lived life, 
and so, sometimes what I do is I play this imaginary experiment, and I imagine that I’m on 
my deathbed. I think to myself, how should I live my life now, so that when I on my deathbed 
I will feel like I’ve lived a good life. It’s really only a small number of things that I feel like 
I need to have done in my life, but to me, that’s closely related to what’s the meaning of life, 
and since I don’t feel that the universe as a whole has a purpose, this is the next thing that 
does have a purpose. Each of us has a purpose, and the purpose could even change in time, 
but each of us could ask him or herself that question, “how should I live my life so that at the 
end of my life I will feel that it was a worthwhile life.”  
AEGIS: How do your writings play into this? 
LIGHTMAN: My writings are an exploration, and I think a lot of writers would tell you this, 
but in writing, you’re not simply putting down things that are already known to you. You’re 
actually discovering in the writing process, you’re actually creating knowledge. And so, my 
writing is one of the ways that I try to answer this question, “what is the meaning of my life?” 
I think about ideas, and even in my novels, there are ideas, and I try to explore those ideas and 
turn them around in my mind, while I’m writing, and that helps me decide how I should be 
living my life.
AEGIS: For those who believe in the strong Anthropic Principle, that only in a “special” kind 
of universe could life arise at any point, a dichotomy seems to be presented. Some see this as 
evidence for a random universe, while others see it as a case for “intelligent design.” At what 
point does science become philosophy, and does it have any place in an investigative science 
classroom? Should scientists keep looking for answers, or at some point will they simply have 
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to throw their hands up and admit the universe is beyond human comprehension? 
LIGHTMAN: The question of whether this universe that we live in is the only possible uni-
verse in which we could exist.
AEGIS: Something philosophers are very obsessed with.
LIGHTMAN: Right. It was Leibniz who said that “this is the best of all possible worlds.” Or, 
whether there could be lots of other universes is something that I think…it may not be a scien-
tific question. We may not be able to do any experiments that could answer that question. 
AEGIS: So that principle (the strong Anthropic principle) is not a testable principle? 
LIGHTMAN: I think you can’t test it. I think that what is testable, I think that you could by 
scientific, and mostly theoretical work, show whether or not life could evolve in other kinds 
of universes. Like if the universe expanded and collapsed before you had time to form the 
stars then it would be hard to imagine any life forming that would have any bearing to what 
we understand to be life. Because, everything we know about life requires a central source of 
energy which a star provides. On the other hand, if the universe expanded too rapidly, things 
would get cold too quickly. Or if the speed of light was very different, maybe atoms would 
collapse immediately, before you could start forming organized systems with lots of atoms 
and organic molecules and so on. I think that that question is answerable. But the question of 
whether there could be lots of different kinds of universes independent of the question of life 
is something that is very difficult to answer. We should keep looking for answers. I mentioned 
that string theory is an example of something very far out on the edge of science in the sense 
that we can’t test it now and may not be able to test it for a long time, but I think that there 
will always be new frontiers of science, and all the sciences, where we will be trying to find 
answers. I just don’t think that the human spirit would allow us to sit on our hands and not ask 
questions.
Dr. Alan Lightman is both a writer and a physicist and is currently an Adjunct Professor of 
Humanities at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His book, Einstein’s Dreams was an 
international bestseller, and The Diagnosis was a finalist for the 2000 National Book Award in 
fiction. In physics, Dr. Lightman focuses his studies on gravitational theory, accretion disks, 
stellar dynamics and relativistic plasmas. 
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In his book Socrates and the State, Richard Kraut interprets Plato’s Crito in a way 
that he thinks will allow it to fit better with its counterpart, the Apology. Traditionally, most 
commentators and early translators (such as Grote1) have interpreted the Crito to be a piece 
of writing that leaves little (or no) room for disobedience on the part of the citizen who feels 
the laws have treated him unjustly. This presents a problem, as it seems to be in stark con-
trast with the Apology, Plato’s version of Socrates’ defense argument at his trial.2 There are 
some parts of the Apology in which Socrates seems to be advocating higher moral principles 
which surpass the orders of law, e.g., not going to capture Leon the Salaminian at the behest 
of the Thirty Tyrants (Apology, 32c-e). Socrates uses the Leon story as a way to show that 
(a) he has an extra-legal code, (b) the extra-legal code does not allow him to commit acts of 
injustice, and (c) he is willing to disobey an unjust law or command. These acts of defiance 
towards the law, and his reasons for showcasing them, would lead one to assume that Socrates 
was not advocating total submission to the laws of the state. The Crito, set after the trial and 
guilty verdict (the punishment is death), is Socrates’ argument that it would be unjust for 
him to accept the offer from his friends to escape from jail. Parts of this argument seem, by 
their very nature, to conclude that one owes more obedience to the state than is set out in the 
Apology, especially in the speech given by the personified Laws of Athens. Kraut believes, 
however, that the “conservative” commentators (like Grote and Woozley) who leave little or 
no room for any disobedience to laws or orders are wrong in their interpretation of the Crito. 
Kraut attempts to interpret the Crito in a liberal way that justifies Socrates’ arguments against 
escape, while still allowing for citizens to disobey an unjust order or law. This liberalization is 
one that I believe fails, and does not fit with the political philosophy set out by Socrates in the 
Crito.
In light of my view that Kraut’s liberalization of Socrates’ political philosophy is 
wrong, I want in this essay to do two things: First, I intend to show that while Kraut’s inter-
pretations of many of the key issues in the Crito – namely, the persuade-or-obey doctrine, the 
principle of just agreements, and his interpretation of the parent/city analogy – are interesting 
attempts to make the Crito fit with the Apology, there are simply too many problems with 
the interpretations to make them stand up. In short, I disagree with Kraut’s liberal interpre-
tation of the Crito. I intend to show that Socrates placed a strong emphasis on obeying the 
laws of the state, even if they caused one to suffer injustice. Second, I will also discuss some 
other interpretations of why Socrates drank the hemlock, and how these interpretations are 
dependent upon how one interprets the political philosophy of the Crito and Apology. In the 
final analysis, I hope to show that while there is some room for disobedience in the Crito, in 
reality there is a stronger argument for “just” obedience rather than for Kraut’s conception of 
Socratic jurisprudence. Kraut’s interpretation allows for much more disobedience than I think 
is present in the political philosophy of the Crito.
An Examination of Richard Kraut’s 
Liberalization of Socrates’ Political 
Philosophy
J. T. Craig
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1.  Arguments against Kraut
A) The Private Club and the Chess Game
Early on in his argument Kraut lays out his conception of the principle of just agree-
ments which is agreed upon by Socrates and Crito: one must do the things one agrees upon 
with another, if they are just. Kraut attempts to show that Socrates would be violating this 
principle by escaping, and that by his tacit acceptance of the Athenian legal system, he is 
making a just agreement to accept the court’s verdict of death, regardless of whether the men 
convicting him are doing so out of just motivations, or whether or not he (Socrates) is suffer-
ing an injustice. Kraut states:
…when someone freely makes an agreement, realizing that it calls upon 
him to suffer an injustice, then he has no right to go back on his word at a 
later point, when it comes time to honor his commitment. (35)
It is Kraut’s goal here to show how this principle of just agreements is not one that lends 
itself to an authoritarian reading.3 That, however, is not necessary for our purposes. What I 
would like to focus on are two examples Kraut lays out in his footnotes.4 Here is Kraut’s first 
example:
Suppose a club I belong to is deciding where to hold its meetings next year. 
Site X is the leading candidate, but I think this is an unfair choice, since it 
makes me travel far more than anyone else. Nonetheless, I voluntarily agree 
to go along with this, and voice no objections. Having made this agreement, 
I cannot justifiably break it on the grounds that the rule I agreed to is unfair 
to me…If I change my mind after the meeting is over, that still does not 
give me a reason to break the rule. (35-36) 
This is Kraut’s example of how it is wrong for someone to back out of an agreement that has been 
justly made, e.g., not coerced, rushed, etc. Kraut argues that one cannot justifiably break the agree-
ment if one had actively and knowingly participated in the process leading up to the agreement. 
Kraut does, however, believe that one may justifiably break one’s agreement if and when new 
information comes to light. To make this point, Kraut invokes a hypothetical chess game:
Of course, agreements can be broken justifiably when new information 
comes to light: if I agree to play three games of chess with Jones, and he 
keeps trying to cheat during the first game, I can legitimately break off the 
match, rather than continue to be the victim of unjust treatment. For I didn’t 
consent to play under those conditions. (36) 
It is apparent that Kraut views Socrates’ plight as analogous to the club example, and not the 
chess case. For instance, if one discovers that one’s chess partner is cheating somehow, then 
one can break off the playing arrangement. This seems to present a problem when used to un-
derstand Socrates’ plight. If one looks at the club analogy, it would seem that, indeed, Socrates 
has always tacitly agreed to the rules and regulations of Athenian law.5 It is my contention, 
however, that Socrates’ plight is more analogous to the chess example. If the conditions for 
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breaking one’s agreement include “new information” coming to light, then perhaps an argu-
ment could be made that Socrates was indeed wronged. 
It would seem that if Socrates was agreeing to the rules of the game (in this case a 
non-biased trial, a reasonable verdict based on the crime accused of, etc.) then perhaps the 
motivations of those who originally brought him to trial should have played much more of a 
factor in his decision to drink the hemlock. The Laws state: “As it is, you depart, if you de-
part, wronged not by us, the Laws, but by men” (Crito, 54c). This idea of motivations matters 
because of the examples Kraut sets out.  If Socrates’ situation is like the club, then the motiva-
tions don’t matter, because everything was decided fairly. If, on the other hand, it is like the 
chess example and Socrates thought that the trial itself was going to be fair, but in reality it 
wasn’t, it changes everything. The motivations of those involved in bringing him to trial then 
matter greatly, because their motivations imply some kind of cheating. I would have argued 
to Socrates that he played by the rules of the state; he went to trial, offered a defense, and at-
tempted to persuade the jury of his innocence, thereby not violating his extra-legal moral stan-
dards, or the principle of just agreements. And so, if there were already biases and malevolent 
intentions, then there is no real destruction in escaping, for his part. It would seem that a fair 
trial relies upon the accuser’s motivations, especially in the Athenian court system, where 
one’s accuser or accusers are on the jury, and setting out the case to others whom they may 
have already influenced. The game was rigged, and so, it would seem to follow that he would 
be justified in making his escape. Socrates or the Laws don’t state this view; this seems to be 
a consequence of applying Kraut’s reading of the principle of just agreements to Socrates’ 
particular case.6 My concern is that, aside from the larger political theory, there is a possibil-
ity that Socrates was truly wronged or cheated into drinking the hemlock. This question of 
whether or not Socrates was “right” to drink the hemlock is something I will return to later.
B) Kraut’s argument that all one needs to do is try to persuade the legal body of 
one’s innocence for one to have fulfilled the persuade-or-obey obligation
The persuade-or-obey doctrine is central to Kraut’s liberal conception of Socratic juris-
prudence. The persuade-or-obey doctrine is set out to explain the citizen’s obligation to the 
state when a law has been broken. Kraut takes the persuade-or-obey doctrine as laid out in 
the Crito to mean “one may disobey, as long as one persuades” (Kraut, 60).The conserva-
tive reading of this doctrine would give little or no leeway for one to disobey in advance, or 
to disobey if one is convicted or punished unjustly. One example of a conservative reading 
comes from Grote, who argues that the attempt to persuade must come through appeal to the 
assembly of Athens, not the courts. If this is the case, then attempting to persuade at a trial has 
no meaning, as it is already too late, and one’s ability to persuade has passed.7 Kraut believes 
that both of these readings are wrong. He sees the persuade-or-obey doctrine as a doctrine that 
creates the ability for a citizen to disobey, and not be acting unjustly.8 He even states that, as 
far as the personified Laws are concerned, one need only be “right,” and attempt to persuade a 
jury of one’s innocence, to disobey an unjust verdict (69):
A citizen will be justified in violating an order issued to him by his parent city 
only if that order is in fact unjust. If the order does him an injustice he agreed 
to accept or risk, then he cannot rightly disobey it… but if he was right yet 
fails in his efforts to show this to the jury, he has done no wrong. (68)
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There are a few things with his argumentation that I think are suspect. First, Kraut has earlier 
asserted that the Laws are ideal Socratic laws, and therefore, a mixture of real laws and moral 
ideals of justice and philosophy that Socrates embodies:
So it would be an error to think that the Laws must always have the same 
opinions as the city and its citizens. Rather, they are ideal observers of the 
Athenian legal scene, equipped with a philosophy of law which no Athe-
nian, other than Socrates, need ever have held. They may therefore appor-
tion praise and blame by means of standards and perceptions that depart 
from those of their flesh-and-blood contemporaries. (66)
Kraut believes that while this distinction exists (between real and ideal laws), it does not 
hurt his interpretation of the Laws because democratic Athens did have institutions where 
one could persuade a jury of one’s innocence, thus fulfilling the persuade-or-obey doctrine. I 
disagree. I think that Kraut is tactfully avoiding the real-life implications of his interpretation 
and application of the Law’s legal philosophy. If Kraut were just arguing about Socrates, then 
I believe his interpretation is fair and correct. As it is though, Kraut is not just focusing on the 
hypothetical Laws; he is attempting to show that there were opportunities in Athens to apply 
the persuade-or-obey doctrine, and he argues from the stance of other people’s hypothetical 
situations under it. The whole chapter is filled with “what ifs” regarding people’s obligations 
under the “Law” when following persuade-or-obey. It seems unclear to me how much of 
this theory would actually apply. I highly doubt that if a law were passed that violated some 
person’s moral code that after their attempt to persuade they would not be forced to submit. 
This is shown when Kraut asserts:
They [the Laws] must mean that if a citizen has violated an unjust order and 
if he has failed to persuade the jury only because it is unpersuadable, then 
he has already done enough; he need not turn to the other alternative, and 
obey the law. (74)
It would seem as though to Kraut “persuade-or-obey” becomes only: persuade if you disobey, 
if that persuasion fails, and one was truly in the right,9 then one may justifiably continue to 
disobey.
 As seen in the passage above, Kraut’s conception of the persuade-or-obey doctrine 
allows that people who do not attempt to persuade must obey, but that those who do attempt, 
and are “right,” can then justifiably defy the state. The problem with this is in distinguishing 
the “right.” I imagine that there were many clean cut cases in Athens—cases where people 
had obviously committed a wrong, attempted to persuade a jury to their innocence, and were 
convicted. This is fine because these people were actually guilty. However, what of those who 
are innocent but convicted? How is the state or jury to know that the person is truly innocent? 
This is when Kraut’s interpretation would come into play. This seems to allow for misuse of 
the system. There would have to be a percentage of people who, if Kraut’s version is correct, 
continue to state their innocence, and “rightness,” in the face of the verdict that are actually 
guilty. These people then could say that they are disobeying the orders of the state because 
they attempted to persuade and failed, but were “right.” In essence, this could justify people 
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becoming fugitives. Kraut assumes too much here, and this reading that he applies to the text 
must leave more emphasis on “obedience”’ if it is to be construed as a realistic situation. 
 I suppose it could be shown that Kraut is arguing for one of two possible forms of 
obedience in his interpretation, willing and non-willing obedience. Suppose Smith commits 
a crime in the eyes of the state, is accused, and given a trial. Smith in this case happens to be 
truly innocent of the charges, and so attempts to persuade the jury of this innocence. Smith 
fails, and is condemned to death. According to Kraut’s argument, Smith, having fulfilled his 
obligation of the persuade-or-obey doctrine, can justifiably disobey this ruling; however, in all 
likelihood, Smith will be forced to submit to the court’s decision unless Smith has the means 
to disobey it. So, the question becomes one of whether or not there is a difference (in the 
larger political theory context of the Crito) between willing obedience and forced obedience 
(submission). Perhaps Smith fights the hemlock, struggling to live while all of it is forced 
down Smith’s throat. I suppose this could mean that Smith did, even though forced to accept 
the punishment, live up to his/her ideal of not submitting to an injustice, but, Smith has theo-
retically been tacitly and explicitly consenting to the legal system and its ramifications his/her 
entire life. And, regardless of the “victory” of Smith’s will that may be shown by fighting to 
the last breath, the victor, in the end, was the state. To my conception, it is the end result that 
matters in the persuade-or-obey doctrine. The reality is forced submission to the state when 
it comes to legal rulings, and this is the same thing (it has the same consequence) as Smith 
willingly abiding by the death sentence. Smith might be personally disobedient, but Smith still 
dies. 
Kraut believes that this would not be the case. In my view, a hypothetical Athenian 
might believe that he/she is in the “right,” and then attempt to arrange escape, or defy the 
sentence to the end. In this sense, perhaps one is fulfilling a personal moral belief, and defying 
the state. This would be a kind of disobedience. However, what is the state’s view of this? 
In modern times a person can appeal their case, and if these attempts at persuasion fail, that 
person, regardless of being “right” is then forced to submit. Perhaps it is of some comfort to 
a person to know that he/she has lived up their moral standards, but the situation is that in the 
eyes of the state they are guilty, and will be submitting to the state. It would seem a cold com-
fort (to me, at least) that I made a jailor force the hemlock down my throat, while I lay dying.
My worry is that Kraut’s conception, while perhaps perfectly fine in applying to 
Socrates, whose conceptions and practice of justice were of some kind of higher standard than 
common Athenians,10 is not truly applicable to a large percentage of the rest of the population. 
Someone might make a case, fail, and be forced to submit: to suffer death or imprisonment. 
That would appear to me to be the reality of the situation when one is in a courtroom. There 
are too many variables involved for one to commence in disobeying an unjust verdict. How 
would one escape the court? What if one didn’t have friends like Crito and Plato willing to 
spend some serious money to bribe officials? In the end, the Laws that are the high philo-
sophical ideal look only to truly apply to the case of Socrates; there may have been opportu-
nities to persuade-or-obey built into the Athenian legal system, but it appears as though the 
application of Kraut’s liberal interpretation would be tough to pull off if one did not have 
the right connections and finances. If this is the case, then Kraut’s argument that the liberal 
interpretation of persuade-or-obey applies to Athenian law in general is wrong, and we must 
accept a more literal reading of the doctrine. Jane has the ability to persuade a jury, or to argue 
for repeal of some law that they consider to be unjust, but, if that persuasion fails, regardless 
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of Jane’s beliefs of the “rightness” of her actions, Jane will be forced to submit to the ruling of 
the state, or, she will willingly obey the ruling of the state. Either way, the consequence is the 
same.
C. The problems with the parent/city analogy
One of the most important parts of the Crito that Kraut must interpret to support 
his liberalization of Socrates’ political philosophy is the part of the Laws’ speech that further 
defines the persuade-or-obey doctrine as analogous to the obligations one has to one’s parents, 
and the obligations one has to one’s parent city. There are many references to the parent/city 
analogy within the Crito; here is Kraut’s cleanest summary of the doctrine:
[If] state X has given person Y, during his childhood, at least as many 
benefits as a good parent should give Y, and if Y has, as an adult, no serious 
and legitimate complaint against X, then when X asks Y to contribute to its 
well-being, Y must comply or explain to X why he will not. (145)
Kraut disagrees with some of the Laws’ statements about the extent of a child’s obligation to 
its parents. He promotes a modern view of debt and obligation between parents and children. 
Kraut believes that children, in particular adult children, have obligations to their parents 
depending upon the benefits conferred on them, and the way in which they were treated dur-
ing their upbringing. A parent couldn’t leave a child in a dumpster at birth, and then reappear 
eighteen years later demanding to be obeyed. To the extent that benefits (above and beyond 
mere biological existence) are bestowed upon children, there is a correlation in the amount of 
explanation one owes one’s parents when one chooses to disobey. If a set of parents have done 
everything right, and give their child benefits even into adulthood, then one may owe a certain 
amount of obedience even into adulthood. And this obedience, to Kraut, consists in respect-
ing the persuade-or-obey doctrine. This conception of parent-child obligations is one that is in 
line with our modern conception of obligation between adult children and their parents. Kraut 
is attempting to liberalize the parent/city analogy by stressing a less conservative reading of 
the Laws. To better understand Kraut’s conception of modern obligations and how they might 
apply to the parent/city analogy let’s look at a brief sampling of some of the modern legal 
obligations that a parent has to a child (as ruled in a court of law): 
“Best interests of the child” means the sum total of the following factors to 
be considered, evaluated, and determined by the court:
(a) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the com-
peting parties and the child.
(b) The capacity and disposition of competing parties to give the child 
love, affection, and guidance and continuation of the educating and raising 
of the child in its religion or creed, if any…
(c) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environ-
ment and the desirability of maintaining continuity…(Robbins, 87)
The passage quoted above lays out a conception of parental obligation that focuses on well-
being. Education, love, and a satisfactory environment are all key components to a parent do-
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ing a good job of raising a child. Kraut is arguing something similar in the parent/city analogy. 
Namely, if parents have provided these things to their child, and raised him/her properly, then 
that child must, upon adulthood, give his/her parents the respect of persuading them when 
they are wrong, or explaining to them why they have been disobeyed. We must also see if the 
Laws condone anything like this in their speech, or if the Laws instead have a more conserva-
tive view of the obligations that a parent owes to its child, and consequently, a more conserva-
tive view of the relationship between citizen and state.
There are problems with Kraut’s conception of the parent/city analogy. First, while 
Kraut’s arguments are reasonable in modern America (and in most modern industrialized na-
tions) there is no reason to accept that the relationship between parents and children in ancient 
Greece was anywhere near this liberal. How liberal the Greek attitude towards raising children 
actually was is important because it is a barometer by which to gauge one’s interpretation of 
the speech of the Laws. If Kraut is correct, then the relationship between a citizen and the 
state is analogous to the relationship between an adult and his/her parents. I do not believe 
that there is any textual evidence for this interpretation.11 I intend to show that most realisti-
cally the relationship between citizen and state is like that of a young adult, not a child, to its 
parents. This reading will allow for a person to have the right to attempt to persuade a court as 
to justice, and save the parent/city analogy from being interpreted as the relationship between 
an adult and a young child, which is too authoritarian, and leaves no room for the persuade-or-
obey doctrine.  
One of the ways in which Kraut has a more liberal interpretation of the parent/city 
analogy is that he believes regardless of the benefits conferred upon a child that the child 
has a right to self-defense if its parents are attempting violence: “If parents do a good job of 
bringing up their child, it does not follow that the child must never intentionally use violence 
against them. If they attack him, he still has a right to self-defense” (Kraut, 144).  It seems 
clear to me that this was not the case in Socrates’ time. Harm towards one’s parents at any 
time in life was construed as one of the worst acts of impiety, as seen at Crito 51c: “It is 
impious to bring violence to bear against your mother or father.” It was, in fact, illegal for a 
child to bear violence against his/her parents no matter what the situation. Kraut cannot admit 
anything like this because it is the beginning of an argument for a very conservative view of 
persuade-or-obey, yet, it exists in the text. Even further than this, the Laws give an argument 
that equates the relationship of a child to his/her parents as one to slave and master:
…could you, in the first place, deny that you are our offspring and servant, 
both you and your forefathers? If that is so, do you think that we are on an 
equal footing as regards the right, and that whatever we do to you it is right 
for you to do to us? You were not on an equal footing with your father as 
regards the right… (Crito, 50d-51)
This passage seems to explicitly state that the relationship of state to citizen is like slave 
and master. Kraut needs to have a solid answer to this passage’s claim that the relationship 
between a citizen and the state is similar to that of the one between slave and master. If the 
slave/master model is indeed representative of how the Laws view one’s obligation to the par-
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ent city, then Kraut’s interpretation fails. Kraut’s response is to read the passage so that the list 
of subordinate relationships given by the Laws is merely proving an asymmetry in the balance 
of power between the state and its citizens:
…violence can justifiably be undertaken by the superior party against the 
inferior, though it can never be justified when done by the inferior against 
the superior… in particular, they (the Laws) never assert or suggest that the 
authority of masters over slaves is a fitting model for the authority cities ought 
to have over citizens. (Kraut,107)
This liberal reading allows Kraut to save the parent/city analogy from an authoritarian read-
ing; however, I believe that the text explicitly states otherwise, and that in this case, Kraut has 
been too charitable with his interpretation.
 While the Laws may not be explicitly stating that the slave/master relationship is the 
ideal governmental style, it appears clear that the relationship between citizen and state can be 
seen as modeled after the slave/master dynamic in many ways. In the passage quoted directly 
above, it seems explicit that the Laws believe that not only does a citizen have an obligation 
to the city like a slave to his/her master, but that those citizens’ forefathers were also in this 
position. It is not necessary to conclude that if the relationship between citizen and state is 
modeled somewhat after the slave/master relationship then a totally tyrannical government 
would ensue. Indeed, the Laws seem merely to be pointing out the fact that in most ways 
all citizens are dependent upon the state. They are, in effect, wards of the state, not only in 
infancy, but throughout adulthood. 
Viewing the Laws’ speech like this, one can begin to see more weak points in Kraut’s 
interpretation. If the citizen/state relationship is like that of an adult child to his/her parents, 
then at some point, as with a parental relationship, the benefits (the major ones: food, clothing, 
shelter, etc.) must cease. This is not the case between a citizen and the state. In that particu-
lar relationship, the state will always provide vital services to the citizen, and the citizen 
will therefore be obliged to obey the laws of the state. It is the moment that this relationship 
changes, and the state no longer provides the vital services necessary to life, that revolutions 
occur. Indeed, there would be no state if there were no vital services provided. This fact alone 
obliges the citizen to always view the state as the superior entity. This is where my interpreta-
tion of the analogy is very different both from Kraut, and from those who would assume that 
the relationship between citizen and state is like that of a young child and its parents. Kraut 
wants to show that as an adult, one has to pay respect to one’s parents, just as one must per-
suade-or-obey the city. This would allow for much more freedom to disobey within the con-
text of the citizen/state relationship. The ultra-conservative reading would take the slave/mas-
ter example, and the lack of authority that a child has with his/her parents, and argue that one 
can never disobey the state. My claim is that the relationship between the citizen and the state 
is like that of a near-adult to his/her parents. There is more opportunity to persuade one’s par-
ents at this age, because one has reached an age of reason. As far as the state is concerned, the 
citizen remains in this state perpetually. It is not the same as the relationship between an adult 
and his/her parents. It is because the state will and must perpetually provide the vital things in 
life that the citizen now owes more allegiance to the state than to his/her parents.12 However, 
this does not mean that the ability to persuade the state has disappeared. It is obvious that the 
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Laws allow for a citizen to have his day in court no matter what, and so, the option for persua-
sion is there, avoiding the totalitarian state that a true master/slave government style would be. 
In further support of this position, I would point out this following passage:
…One must obey the commands of one’s city and country, or persuade it as 
to the nature of justice. It is impious to bring violence to bear against your 
mother or father; it is much more so to use it against your country. (Apol-
ogy, 51c)
For Kraut, this passage is not a problem. He would argue that the duty one has to the city 
is the duty that an adult child has to persuade-or-obey one’s parents. However, he gives no 
mention of the part that I have emphasized.13 I believe that this part is vital in realizing the 
obedience the Laws expect from all citizens towards the state. What needs explaining is 
what is meant by “still more.”14 If one has obligations to persuade-or-obey parents, even into 
adulthood, then there must be even more obligations to the state. If the state is still allowing 
a citizen to live, to eat, and to invest money, then the citizen owes more to the state.  If this is 
correct, then it appears that there is much less room for persuasion than Kraut wants. Indeed, 
it would seem likely that while the attempt to persuade the state exists, that in reality, there is 
much more emphasis on obedience. 
This reading supports my views, as stated above in section B, that the doctrine of 
“attempt to persuade” is too liberal. It looks as though the citizens of Athens would be forced, 
if their attempt at persuasion fails, to submit to punishment. Not to obey, regardless of the 
feeling that one is being wronged, would be a violation of the duty and obligations one has to 
obey the state. And the state would fulfill its right to force submission on the citizen, as it is 
the citizen’s obligation to obey. Let me make it clear that a citizen would still have the right to 
persuade a court, but that the persuasion must succeed. If the persuasion fails, then one could 
continue to disobey, fulfilling some kind of extra legal stand, but that, without the connections 
or money, one would most likely be forced to submit to the penalty. Along with this kind of 
example would be those who would willingly submit to the ruling. In my conception, forced 
submission and willing obedience have the same consequence, and so, in the eyes of the Laws 
amount to the same thing. The ability to attempt to persuade still exists. By “attempt to per-
suade,” I mean that a citizen has the right to a trial and that the state would not just arbitrarily 
and summarily punish and convict people without an opportunity to argue their case. The state 
allows for understanding of involuntary or ignorant disobedience, and so, is nothing at all akin 
to a tyranny that a true master/slave relationship would imply. I believe that merely having the 
opportunity to persuade the state is more than enough (especially in ancient times) to protect 
individuals from most false or incorrect allegations. The more conservative commentary, like 
that of Grote, suggests that no disobedience is allowed:
By his birth, and long residence in Athens, he [Socrates] has entered into 
a covenant to obey exactly and faithfully what the laws prescribe. Though 
the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no right of redress against 
them—neither by open disobedience, nor force, nor evasion…the Laws al-
low to every citizen full liberty of trying to persuade the assembled public: 
but the citizen who fails in persuading, must obey the public when they 
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enact a law adverse to his views. (428)
One can see where Grote and I differ; I do not think that Grote allows for the possibility of 
persuading in courts so much as persuading the assembly of Athens. My conception of per-
suade-or-obey allows one to disobey, but then, one must successfully persuade in court. Kraut 
believes that one only need be “right” and attempt to persuade in order to disobey an order 
or law. Grote and I do have a somewhat similar view on the parent/city analogy: “Their (the 
state’s) rights over him are even more uncontrolled and indefeasible than those of his father 
and mother” (Grote, 428). This falls in line with my view that the relationship between the 
state and citizen is perpetually subordinate because of the benefits the state bestows upon the 
citizen. And so, my reading of the text is not authoritarian along the lines of Grote, but falls 
somewhere in between Grote and Kraut.
2. Connections, Conclusions, and Hemlock
If my reading of the Crito is correct, then Socrates was advocating a political 
philosophy that allowed for the ability to attempt to persuade the courts of Athens of one’s 
innocence. If that persuasion failed, however, it was the person’s obligation to obey the order. 
This obligation could either be willing, as in the case of Socrates himself, or forced, as in 
many imagined hypothetical situations, both with the same outcome of action: submission.  In 
my view, this theory of political obligation has no problems reconciling itself with the Apol-
ogy. In the Apology there are two famous instances in which Socrates speaks of disobedience. 
One is in his defiance of the orders of the Thirty Tyrants, and the other in which he tells the 
jury that if their punishment were to be letting Socrates go free, but forbidding him to phi-
losophize, that he would not follow that order (29d, 31c-d). In the first case, Socrates took a 
moral stand against what he perceived to be an unjust order, but he recognized the fact that at 
any time he may have been imprisoned for this disobedience. He accepted that possibility and 
acted anyway.  I think that if Socrates had been arrested for this, and charged, he would have 
attempted to persuade the jury of his higher moral standards, but that if convicted, he would 
have obeyed their order. This is because of Socrates’ views of his obligation to the state. He 
would not merely have tried to persuade the Thirty and then escaped.15 
The second case is a hypothetical one proposed by Socrates, but it sheds light on 
his views of obligation to the state, and to one’s moral convictions.  It could be argued that 
Socrates simply denies this possibility because of the way the Athenian legal system was set 
up. There were no punishment proposals offered by juries after a guilty verdict; rather, the 
prosecutor proposed a punishment, and then the defendant counter-proposed. So, in light of 
this, perhaps Socrates said he would disobey the order to cease philosophizing because it 
would be proposed by the jury, and hence, itself be illegal. However, it could be proposed 
that if the prosecutor had put forth this scenario as a punishment that Socrates still would not 
obey it. This is for two reasons: 1) It is against his lifelong pursuit of knowledge, and his “ap-
pointed” position as the gadfly of Athens, and 2) it would still be questionable whether such a 
verdict is “legal” in the sense that there was no law against philosophy specifically passed by 
the Assembly of Athens, so the verdict would have no legal weight. Let us suppose that the 
prosecutor had offered this as his proposal, and Socrates had been set free under the condi-
tions it demands. Socrates would have disobeyed the order; he explicitly states so. This lines 
up with my conception of persuade-or-obey, because Socrates would be arrested again, having 
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violated, knowingly, the court’s decree. He would attempt once again to persuade the jury of 
his innocence, and would once again fail. Assuming the punishment for this supposed second 
offence would have been death, then by Socrates’ own views of persuade-or-obey, he would 
be either wiling to accept the punishment, or forced to submit. Most likely he would have 
agreed to it. He would thereby fulfill his belief in obligation to the state after failed persua-
sion, and uphold his moral standards by the act of his disobedience.
Now I will turn to the justifications for Socrates drinking the hemlock, which is a 
separate question in some ways, but also tied to my above arguments. I will focus on what I 
believe are the two strongest arguments for Socrates motivations. These are: 
(a) Socrates wanted to be a martyr 
(b) Socrates wanted to die—but not to be a martyr—because of his advanced age and 
out of some kind of higher religious principle.
It is my assertion that while (b) is an interesting attempt to solve the hemlock question, that 
Socrates drinking the hemlock is best understood if we see him as an intellectual martyr—as 
one who died in defense of his principles as set out in the Crito.
 Let us first examine the possibility that Socrates wished to die because of a reli-
gious principle or because it was “his time” to die. The evidence that I can offer in possible 
support of this would be the very different conception of Socrates’ defense that we have in 
Xenophon’s account. Xenophon’s assertion is that Socrates’ defense and eloquence was rather 
pointless, because he had already decided to die (Xenophon, Apology of Socrates [1]).  Here 
is another interesting argument Socrates gives for his death:
Do you think it surprising that even God holds it better for me to die 
now?…For I have realized that my whole life has been spent in righteous-
ness toward God and man…perhaps, he added, God in his kindness is tak-
ing my part and securing me the opportunity of ending my life not only in 
season but also in the way that is easiest. (Xenophon, [5]-[8])
Now, there are several ways that Socrates’ arguments could be construed in this passage and 
in Xenophon’s version of events in general. The fact that he wants to die could be interpreted 
as being a wish for some kind of lasting legacy, which would support (possibly) the idea 
that he wanted to be a martyr. Although I believe the fact that he was willing to die does not 
necessarily imply martyrdom, and that he need not be seeking martyrdom to achieve some 
political/moral point,16 it is also possible that Socrates was sick of the constant pressure and 
hassle of leading the philosophical life. This might be supported by the mention of ending his 
life “in season.” This view does not seem to line up with the other texts involving Socrates, so 
it’s safe to say that this is probably not his main reason for seeking death. And this possibil-
ity, while perhaps factoring in a human element, does not fit together as well with the political 
obligation arguments in the Crito. 
Albert Anderson argues in “Was Socrates Unwise to Take the Hemlock?” that it was 
possible Socrates was accepting of the hemlock because of a higher religious conviction. 
Namely, and Anderson is borrowing some from Seneca’s essay “On Providence,” perhaps no 
harm can come to the “good man.” Anderson states:
And to argue that, really, no harm can come to the good man is like say-
ing that in some odd sense the justification for Socrates’ death, this alleged 
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tragedy to an indisputably good man, is not so nearly difficult to come by if 
one’s life is supported by convictions, beliefs about true happiness. (Ander-
son, 451)
The argument in short is that Socrates was either wrong (he somehow did commit a wrong 
against Athens), and so the punishment is justified, or, he committed no wrong and so, even 
though he is put to death it does not matter, because he was a truly good man. This seems 
odd, but as I understand it, this is an argument that has some kind of metaphysical/religious 
implications. Anderson does not go into full detail, but he argues that Seneca can supply an 
argument along the following lines: “[the] nature of reality is perfect rationality, and perfect 
morality is the expression of a rational will in harmony with the real but otherworldly order” 
(451). 
So this would be an argument that Socrates was seeking to free himself from the 
bonds of this existence and in doing so attain some kind of higher wisdom/rationality that is 
unattainable in human life. Anderson also has a passage from the Theatetus  in which Socrates 
argues that it is impossible to eliminate evil things, because the nature of good requires an 
opposite, and so “…the evils do not have a place amongst the Gods… therefore we ought try 
to escape from here as quickly as we can; and to escape is to become like a God, so far as that 
is possible; and to become like a god is to become just and pious through wisdom of the high-
est order” (Theatetus, 173a-176b). This makes an interesting case for Socrates’ motivations 
to drink the hemlock. Perhaps Socrates himself recognizes, as might be inferred from this 
passage, that the possibility of gaining any true knowledge of virtues is not possible on Earth 
(maybe this is an admission that his method does not have the desired effect?). If one couples 
this with all the talk of Socrates’ ‘personal’ God, then perhaps this argument for Socrates’ 
recognition of the providence of his death gets stronger. I believe that this option poses the 
strongest alternative to the martyrdom argument. However, the question of religious obliga-
tion, while interesting, is not really at issue in the Crito. I also have trouble accepting this as 
the main reason for taking the hemlock because within the true Socratic dialogues I do not 
think there is textual evidence that Socrates had given up on the elenchus, or on the value of 
his role on Earth (it’s not even all that clear that he believed in an afterlife). In light of this I 
still see Socrates acceptance of his death as one of a higher goal. Namely, to die in defense of 
his beliefs, and to leave a lasting impression on those who followed after him.17
Now I will examine the possibility that Socrates died as a martyr, which is the expla-
nation that connects best with my arguments about Socrates’ political philosophy. In essence, I 
have been advocating a view of Socrates’ thought that promotes intellectual rigor, and disobe-
dience, but at the same time, respect of the relationship a citizen and state have. I have labeled 
this just obedience. To my thinking, Socrates lived a life that promoted unique and insightful 
thought. The elenchus was a method uniquely his own; created and used to sting those who 
stumble through life to some state of awareness. It was this method—the foundation of his  
life—that was the catalyst for revolutions in philosophy, politics, and almost every aspect of 
day-to-day life in Athens (hence, we still feel those reverberations today). This alone quali-
fies his death as one of a martyr. He willingly died defending his method. If one couples this 
with his political philosophy, it becomes apparent that while Socrates life exemplifies one of 
constant examination, it is tempered by respect and understanding for the unique relationship 
between individuals and states. By questioning the man made laws and practices of Athens he 
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was, in essence, advocating a deep rooted democratic principle that we take for granted. He 
might not have been thinking that his questioning should achieve a democratic state, but his 
showing the fallibility of humans and their laws serves as motivation to modify, fix, and ques-
tion our laws. After all, he was not an advocate of anarchy, as I am sure some in Athens might 
have asserted. I believe that the political philosophy of Socrates and the life he led are the best 
evidence of why he chose to die, rather than to flee.  
In summary, I believe that Socrates’ political philosophy was such that there was 
room for disobedience. One could challenge laws both through the legislature, and—if one 
violated a law—in the courts. It is my assertion that, while the possibility for persuasion ex-
isted, a citizen—because of the debt and obligation owed to the state—if ruled against, either 
must willingly be obedient or be forced to submit to the state’s judgment. In the final analysis 
I believe that Socrates took the hemlock because of his political philosophy; because of his 
belief, as I interpret the Crito, in just obedience. Socrates lived a life of intellectual disobedi-
ence. He constantly questioned entrenched beliefs in pursuit of pure knowledge. He gained 
followers, followers with political clout, and they took his teachings onto the political stage. 
By questioning social norms, and by causing dissent, Socrates engaged in public and private 
disobedience. He was charged with corruption of the youth, and worshipping false Gods, 
and rather than escape—which he could have easily accomplished with the connections and 
money of his companions—he chose to stay and accept the state’s judgment. I believe that he 
was an intellectual martyr. He died to defend the political and social assertions he had made. 
It is because of him that men like Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi could see 
the intellectual questioning and rigor involved in changing society. Regardless of whether or 
not Socrates was pro democracy, it was his method of never ceasing questions that gives us 
the framework to examine our lives. People often wonder why philosophy is important, and 
consequently, it might be asked why the issue of Socrates’ political motivations is relevant 
after so many millennia. It is relevant because of the enormity of Socrates’ intellectual impact, 
and that the way in which he influenced those after him have shaped our world. The ideas and 
struggles of Socrates and his students are still playing out today; hence, a modern under-
standing of Socrates is vital to our ethics, our politics, etc. The question of disobedience and 
obligation to the state are just as important today as they were in classical Athens. As I write 
this revelations about state wiretapping practices, and state sponsored torture are all over the 
news—where does our obligation as citizens’ rest? We as a people, as a race, cannot afford 
to lapse into apathy. Socrates’ life is an example of a man who never ceased to question the 
logic, motivations, ethics, etc. of the world at large and of individuals.  With so much turbu-
lence and unrest in the modern world, we must not forget the maxim that Socrates died for; 
we must live an examined life, regardless of the discomfort that such a life might bring.
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Endnotes
1. Some of the authors and texts that assert a more authoritarian interpretation of Socrates’ 
political philosophy: George Grote’s Plato and the Other Companions of Sokrates Volume 1, 
and A.D. Woozley’s Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato’s Crito.
2. All references to Socrates are meant to discuss the Platonic Socrates, not the historical man.
3. Specifically, that there is no obligation to abide by an agreement that is unjust, or coerced, 
etc. Which I suppose someone looking for evidence of less personal freedom from legal obli-
gations to agreements with the state would have to try and argue. Perhaps something like (i) If 
X contracts to abide by doing something for Y (Y being the state), then (ii) regardless of X’s 
feelings about the agreement, X must do as Y commands. This would seem to be a very unjust 
principle of agreements, and I agree with Kraut that Socrates is not advocating anything at all 
along these lines.
4. The footnote number is 16, on pages 35 and 36.
5. I don’t believe it is necessary (nor do I think does Kraut) that Socrates must have actively 
participated in Athenian public life for a ‘true’ agreement (tacit or otherwise) to have been 
reached. Socrates at many points argues against having a public involvement in politics, spe-
cifically Apology 32.
6. Of course, if this view is correct, and the chess game analogy applies to Socrates, then it 
seems to leave much mystery as to why Socrates himself did not argue this. A possible reason 
is that Socrates wanted to die, or that he was so anti-democracy that he took the hemlock out 
of defiance to the state. Some of these possibilities are examined in the last section of this 
essay.
7. Grote states: “Though the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no right of redress 
against them-neither by open disobedience, nor force, nor evasion…the laws allow to every 
citizen full liberty of trying to persuade the assembled public: but the citizen who fails in per-
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suading, must obey the public when they enact a law adverse to his views” (428).
8. Although Kraut is not advocating that the principle of just agreements, the persuade-or-
obey doctrine, and the parent/city analogy are one argument, but rather that they were three 
separate arguments via the Laws to prove that Socrates must drink the hemlock.
9. There seems to be something off about having to be “truly” in the right. Perhaps my 
qualifications for true justice are different than the states. Perhaps while I have continued to 
live in the state, I do not in actuality agree with abiding by its laws. However, this will not 
save me from being forced to obey, even if in my conception I was in the right in committing 
some disobedient act. It seems that by saying that one must be in the right, that there is some 
universal conception of rightness that would make this doctrine fair to all. I don’t think that it 
is so easy to get at a universal ‘rightness.’ Even if this problem is correct, I suppose that there 
is at least still some way of a truly innocent person being able to attempt to persuade, which 
is good. It just seems as though this system could be taken advantage of by people very easily 
(after all, the world is not filled with characters of Socrates’ moral fiber).
10. After all, he was the wisest man, as he himself states many times in the Apology when 
speaking about his divine mission.
11. As Bostock also interprets in his article, “The Interpretation of Plato’s Crito”: “Kraut 
argues that the analogy between parents and cities must be taken as drawing a parallel be-
tween on the one hand cities and their citizens and on the other hand parents and their adult 
offspring…the text nowhere says that the relationship it is concerned with is specifically that 
between parents and adult offspring…” (221).
12. Another passage that seems vital to my interpretation of the parent/city analogy that Kraut 
does not pay as much attention to comes at 51b of the Crito: “Is your wisdom such as not to 
realize that your country is to be honored more than your mother, your father and all your 
ancestors, that it is more to be revered and more sacred, and that it counts for more among the 
gods and sensible men, that you must worship it, yield to it and placate its anger more than 
your father’s?”
13. Kraut does examine the meaning of the term violence, used within the passage, and how 
it is related back to the city. That is not something I am concerned with as it doesn’t have 
bearing on my argument. I am reading this passage as stating that a citizen owes even more 
obligation to the state than a child (young or old) owes to its parents. As such, it supports, 
and makes sense of, all of the statements about slave/master, and owing and honoring the city 
more than one’s parents as seen in Crito 51a-d.
14. Once again, compare Bostock: “…it is much more probable that the relationship between 
the citizen and the city is being compared …to the relationship between a young child and 
its parents, which is in fact similar to the relationship between a slave and his master. In their 
case, obedience is expected, and disobedience is set down as wrong, unless it is justified by a 
successful attempt at persuasion” (222).
15. Of course, it would be possible to argue that perhaps the Thirty, being a ‘tyrannical’ group 
had no legal standing to issue such decrees. But this seems insufficient in the light of the fact 
that most tyrant groups will force decrees by the sword if necessary to enforce their will. This 
will result in forced obedience regardless of legality. And of course, it is possible to argue as 
the Laws do that by staying in Athens when he could have fled, he agreed to obey their com-
mands, just or not. 
16. Grote interprets Socrates’ drinking of the hemlock as reconciliation between his life long 
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dissent and democracy: “yet as reconciling himself with the laws by voluntarily accepting the 
sentence; and as persuaded to do so, moreover, by a piece of rhetoric imbued with the most 
genuine spirit of constitutional democracy. It is the compromise of his long standing dissent 
with the reigning orthodoxy, just before his death (431).” Popper also believes that drinking 
the hemlock was tied to Socrates’ support of democracy, and his uncompromising principles: 
“That he wanted to die, or enjoyed the role of martyrdom, I do not believe. He simply fought 
for what he believed to be right, and for his life’s work. He had never intended to undermine 
democracy. In fact, he tried to give it the faith it needed…he may even have welcomed the 
trial as an opportunity to prove that his loyalty to his city was unbounded (Popper, 194).
Whereas Stone takes an entirely different approach: “The historical, like the Platonic, Socrates 
would have found it repugnant to plead a principle in which he did not believe; free speech for 
him was the privilege of the enlightened few, not of the benighted many. He would not have 
wanted the democracy he rejected to win a moral victory by setting him free. His martyrdom, 
and the genius of Plato, made him a secular saint…this was Socrates’ triumph…Socrates 
needed the hemlock, as Jesus needed the crucifixion, to fulfill a mission (Stone, 230).” I 
do not believe that the hemlock was taken as some kind of reconciliation on Socrates’ part 
to harmonize his views with the many as Grote asserts—he disdained the many. Nor do I 
buy Popper’s version that Socrates was fighting to support democratic principles. It seems 
as though Popper wants desperately to save Socrates from the authoritarianism of Plato. If 
we are to believe that any of the Platonic dialogues are truly Socrates’ views, then Popper 
is refuted by the fact that Socrates disdained the many, and advocated that only those who 
“know” should rule. It was not enough that Socrates argued that he disobeyed the Thirty. If 
he had truly been an advocate of democracy he would have joined the rebels. Stone’s view is 
closer to the truth, but it is tainted by Stone’s belief that Socrates was totally egotistical and 
was essentially a man who used his intellect to punish others, and who sympathized with the 
enemy. This is a highly controversial assertion. I do believe that Socrates died for some higher 
standard or principle, but it remains unclear to me what principle, and I am unwilling to assert 
any kind of definitive opinion as to his motivations.
17. Most of the arguments that ‘Socrates’ gives for the existence of an afterlife come after 
Plato had shifted from being a transcriber of Socrates’ thought to using ‘Socrates’ as a mouth-
piece for his philosophy—this is most evident in the Republic.
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Would King Drink the Hemlock?
Larsa Ramsini
 Socrates, according to the interpretation of Richard Kraut as expressed in Socrates 
and the State, maintained many complex views about the relationship between the individual 
and the state.  He believed that there were certain times when laws could be disobeyed and 
other times when they could not, and he also held opinions about the steps one must take if 
disobedience is justified.  When Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. wrote his “Letter from Birming-
ham Jail,” he ascribed some of his views to the teachings of Socrates.  Plato presents many of 
Socrates’ views about a citizen’s obligations to the state in the Crito, which is where Socrates 
explains his political philosophy, and why he must drink the hemlock the state administers to 
him as punishment for his disobedience.  Through an examination of King’s letter and Kraut’s 
interpretation of Socrates’ views as presented in the Crito, we can discover that these men 
agree on their philosophy of committing an injustice and a citizen’s responsibilities toward the 
state, but disagree on the motives behind some of their actions, and their distinctions between 
harm and injustice
 Socrates believed that one should never commit an injustice, and this includes never 
returning an injustice for one committed against him (Plato 136).  He believed that since 
people must never, under any circumstances, commit an injustice, if they are given a chance, 
they must always choose to suffer an injustice rather than commit an injustice themselves.  
This is because “doing what is unjust harms one’s soul, but the soul is not corrupted if one is 
the victim of injustice” (Kraut 37-38).  King displays his agreement with Socrates when he 
states that “it is wrong to use immoral means to attain moral ends” (King 243).  He discusses 
the differences between just and unjust laws, and explains that his end goal is for everyone 
to be treated justly (King 235).  He wanted blacks to be able to live in a society where they 
would have the same rights as white citizens, and he broke the laws of the state because the 
state was acting unjustly by withholding basic human rights from black citizens.  King also 
vehemently disagreed with people who appeared to be just instead of actually doing the 
right thing.  He says that “it is just as wrong, or perhaps even more so, to use moral means to 
preserve immoral ends” (King 243).  People thought that they were behaving justly by stick-
ing to their “morals” during a time when others were suffering injustice at the hands of the 
close-minded, but they were really the ones behaving unjustly by keeping immoral laws and 
institutions in place.  King completely agrees with Socrates that one should never do injustice, 
and goes even further to say that when people believe they are behaving justly by maintaining 
a neutral position on discriminatory laws, their inaction is simply masked injustice because 
they are helping to keep these unjust laws on the books and in practice.  
 Socrates believed that there is sometimes an agreement made between the state and 
the citizen; and in the case of the Crito, the contract was called the principle of just agree-
ments.  This agreement states that the citizen must obey the laws of the state unless a spe-
cific law requires him to commit an act of injustice.  If the state does ask him to commit an 
injustice, since he/she has made an agreement to obey, the citizen must persuade the state as to 
why he/she cannot, or in some cases, could not obey the law (Kraut 86).  The way by which a 
person comes to have an agreement with the state is not by explicitly stating that he/she agrees 
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to obey the laws or persuade the state as to the nature of justice (what the just action would 
be).  The process is much more drawn out and involves the citizen being given enough time to 
thoroughly examine the laws of the state until he/she understands all of them, and then he/she 
must remain in the state for a sufficient period of time in order to demonstrate his/her satisfac-
tion with these laws (Kraut 156, 168).  George Grote, another critic of Socrates, believes that 
“the Crito requires ‘absolute submission’ to the city’s commands,” leaving absolutely no room 
for disobedience, despite any prevailing circumstances (Kraut 55).
  Kraut disagrees with this stance and contends that Socrates believes that “continued 
residence in [the state] does not signal agreement to obey its laws, since it does not reflect 
satisfaction with these laws” (180).  In order for a citizen to complete his agreement he must 
show his approval through actions that are in compliance with the laws (Kraut 174-175).  
Kraut also explains that one way a citizen can show his satisfaction is by making positive 
statements in public about the state and its laws.  This means, however, that his statements 
“can also be used to show that he is dissatisfied with some of its laws” (Kraut 182).  King and 
his followers made no such agreement with the United States during the 1960s because they 
were not satisfied with the laws of the state, and they vehemently showed their dissatisfaction 
through their various protests, marches, boycotts, sit-ins, and other demonstrations.  They did 
live in the United States for quite some time, but as Kraut interprets Socrates, residence is not 
sufficient evidence to support the existence of an agreement.  King displayed his dissatisfac-
tion to the legislature, the courts, and the people; therefore, he was in no way bound to an 
agreement with the state, according to Socrates’ conception of justified disobedience.1  
 Kraut’s Socrates asserts that if no agreement is made with the state, the citizen may 
still be required to persuade the state that he/she is justified in disobeying the law.  In some 
cases the state provides the citizen with certain benefits, such as education and moral upbring-
ing, and because of these benefits, the citizen is indebted to the state and owes it much respect 
if he/she does not obey a specific law.  Kraut notes that according to Socrates, since the state 
has treated the citizen well throughout his life, he must “honor it, and he must never treat it 
with violence,” and “citizens honor their city either by obeying it or by persuading it as to the 
nature of justice” (Kraut 104).  But he also mentions that “those who have not received these 
benefits have been given no reason to obey or persuade,” even if they continue to reside in 
the state (Kraut 159).  Kraut believes that Socrates would give this response to someone who 
asked him when exactly gratitude is owed to the state:
If my country seriously abridges my rights as an adult, or in some other 
way treats me with disdain, then it loses or at least compromises any claim 
it might otherwise have had to my loyalty.  But if a country has given me 
great benefits when I was a child—benefits comparable to those I received 
from my parents—and if it respects my rights when I am an adult, then it 
has a moral standing that entitles it to an explanation if I turn down the ap-
peals it makes in the pursuit of its legitimate concerns (146).
King had received no such benefits from the United States.  As a result of all the prejudiced 
laws against African Americans during King’s time, the United States in no way acted as a 
parent to King so he was not indebted to it for “his life and upbringing” (Kraut 93).  
As just explained, Kraut’s Socrates contends that if a citizen has made a just agree-
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ment with the state, or has received certain benefits from the state like those he would receive 
from a parent, then he must follow Socrates’ persuade-or-obey doctrine.  Since King was not 
party to any just agreement, nor did he receive any benefits from the state and owed noth-
ing to the government, he did not need to follow the persuade-or-obey doctrine.  However, a 
more authoritarian reading of the Crito would say that continued residence is the only element 
driving the citizen’s duty to persuade or obey (Kraut 161-166).  So, if one does not accept the 
previous statements claiming that no agreement exists between King and the state, we may 
now look deeper into both Socrates’ and King’s views of disobedience to the state to deter-
mine what Socrates would say if King did in fact owe allegiance to the state.  
If a citizen is satisfied with a law, then he/she will obey it, and there are no prob-
lems.  But, Kraut’s Socrates says that if he believes a law to be unjust and wishes to break the 
law, he must, before or after breaking it, attempt to persuade the state that he is right.2  Kraut 
mentions that “persuasion is required of the disobedient citizen because he owes the parent-
city with which he has made an agreement some explanation for his behavior” (60).  He also 
makes quite a point about how Socrates does not view “successful persuasion [as] a neces-
sary condition of justified disobedience” (72).  He is in much disagreement with other critics, 
including George Grote, Glenn Morrow, and Gerasimos Santas, who all affirm that one is 
permitted to try and persuade the state, but when that fails, there is no allowance for break-
ing the law (Kraut 57).  Kraut asserts a much less authoritarian view that holds that the only 
act required of the citizen breaking the law is that he make a legitimate attempt to persuade 
the state that the law is unjust.  If this fails, then the Laws3 “must be willing to excuse [him] 
who breaks an unjust law but fails, through no fault of his own, to show the jury that he was 
in the right” (Kraut 68).  If Socrates is interpreted in this way, then he would approve of King 
continually breaking the law even though the state convicted him of the charges, instead of it 
doing the right thing by changing the law.  King consistently argued against the unjust laws, 
but he failed to convince the segregationists in the government that he was right.  This was 
not his fault though, and he would be justified, according to Kraut’s Socrates, in continuing to 
break the law since he was in the right.  
Kraut also mentions that in Socrates’ time, “no Greek ever thought that illegal be-
havior might itself be a form of speech or persuasion” because “the Greeks had no tradition 
or notion of protesting against a law by violating it” (75).  Since Americans in the 1960s had 
a conception of civil disobedience and knew that when King broke a law it was because he 
believed it to be unjust, King actually went above and beyond the call for persuasion since his 
disobedience itself involved a form of persuasion.  He was attempting to convince the state 
that it was wrong before, during, and after his lawbreaking, because he believed that to be 
“the very purpose of direct action” (King 233).  King wanted to “create a situation so crisis-
packed that it [would] inevitably open the door to negotiation” (233).  He was not trying to get 
out of speaking to people and explaining why he believed a law to be unjust; he wanted the 
laws changed and believed that breaking the law was the only way to do it, since the whites 
had consistently refused to negotiate.  So even though Socrates would have approved of King 
not persuading the state as to the nature of justice, King still would have persuaded since his 
motive for breaking the laws in the first place was to convince the state of what was just and 
what was unjust.
 Kraut’s Socrates believed that when a citizen breaks a law, the just thing to do is to 
break that law openly and not attempt to hide the act from anyone, because “the persuade-
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or-obey doctrine has teeth only when it is combined with a prohibition against concealed 
disobedience” (122).  The reason Socrates is against secretly breaking the law is not the se-
crecy in and of itself, but the fact that keeping the lawbreaking hidden from the state will most 
likely lead the lawbreaker, who is either in a just agreement with the state or indebted to it by 
benefits received, to not persuade the state as to the nature of justice (Kraut 123).  King agrees 
with this when he says that “one who breaks an unjust law must do so openly” (236).  His rea-
son for breaking a law out in the open is different from Socrates’ though, since King was not 
obliged to persuade anyone.  Since his main focus in breaking the laws was to get those laws 
changed, he wanted as many people as possible to know about his actions so that they would 
see how unjust the laws actually were.  King was open in his lawbreaking because he wanted 
the attention it would give to the issues against which he was fighting, and not necessarily 
because of the fact that it was the just thing to do, as Socrates believed.  
 Even though Socrates and King both believed that one should never commit an 
injustice, they both put harm in a different category and claim that not all harm is unjust.  It 
is very difficult to say in which circumstances Socrates would have approved of using harm 
against another.  He was certainly not a pacifist, as shown by the fact that he “was proud of 
his military service,” and believed that violence and harm are sometimes justified; but the 
line between harm and injustice is fairly difficult to distinguish (Kraut 44).  Kraut believes 
that Socrates wouldn’t expect people to determine what they should do based on what will 
cause the least amount of harm to others, but this only applies when the person has no way of 
knowing that any harm will occur as a result of his action and has no way of preventing the 
harm from happening (Kraut 140).  Kraut’s Socrates would not “accuse people of recklessness 
or wrongdoing merely because an alternative that imposed fewer risks was open to them,” but 
they must be truly ignorant of any harm that would occur as a result of their actions.  Socrates 
also believed, according to Kraut’s interpretation, that a person can take steps to avoid being 
treated unjustly, because in none of the dialogues does Socrates give a “reason to accept a phi-
losophy of passive submission to injustice” (Kraut 38).  Kraut gives the Crito a more liberal 
interpretation than others, mainly by saying that a citizen should examine the content of each 
law individually to make sure that it is just before he obeys it; no law, according to Kraut’s 
Socrates, “is to be obeyed blindly and unconditionally” (Kraut 86).  
King took the same approach as Socrates and did not rush into any lawbreaking 
before he collected all the facts to determine whether those specific laws were unjust and 
needed to be broken (King 231).  However, unlike Socrates, King was a pacifist and believed 
that “nonviolence demands that the means we use be as pure as the ends we seek” (King 
243).  But even though he was a pacifist, he did believe that some nonviolent harm could 
be committed against certain people when negotiation fails to eradicate the injustice.  Since 
King thought that letting an injustice occur when you can do something about it is worse than 
committing an injustice to gain justice in the end, he absolutely believed that some harm is 
at times necessary in order to stop injustice from continuing any longer.  He states that “it is 
wrong to urge an individual to cease his efforts to gain his basic constitutional rights because 
the quest may precipitate violence” (King 237).  This sounds almost like Socrates, but is quite 
different because according to King, a person can know that his action will result in violence 
not initiated by him and still commit the act; because he knows that this certain act will help 
rid the community of an injustice.  As King was planning a boycott on certain companies, he 
decided that since “a strong economic-withdrawal program would be the by-product of direct 
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action, [he] felt that [Easter] would be the best time to bring pressure to bear on the merchants 
for the needed change” (King 232).  This type of action causes financial harm to a group 
of people, which King believed to be justified, since it would help rid the community of an 
unjust law.  In this case, he did not break a law, but simply organized a mass boycott of certain 
products.  Socrates did not discuss the justification of committing certain actions that cause 
harm but aren’t actual acts of lawbreaking, so it’s hard to tell what he would say to King in 
this situation.  Socrates did not place much value on money and thought that a person’s need 
for it can overtake him and cause him to act unjustly, but this doesn’t necessarily mean that 
he would condone preventing someone from obtaining more money (Plato 130).  What can 
be said is that both Socrates and King approve of using harm in some cases, but not others.  
Where to specifically draw the line with all of the varying circumstances that could arise is 
not easy though, since neither Socrates nor King discusses what they believe to be just and 
unjust harm.  
 Both Socrates and King do discuss, however, their views on what acts are justified in 
accepting or rejecting the punishment of the state when a citizen breaks an unjust law.  When 
a citizen who has an agreement with the state disobeys the state for just reasons, Kraut’s 
Socrates believed that if he fails in his persuasion of the courts that he was justified in break-
ing the law, then “he may refuse to accept the court’s punishment if and only if that punish-
ment requires the doing of injustice or the leading of an unjust life” (Kraut 86-87).  He made 
the just agreement knowing that the state could at one point be unjust to him, but he never 
promised to commit an injustice himself since one can never do an injustice.  Kraut also notes 
that “by making oneself available for trial and punishment, one shows that destroying the le-
gal system was not the motive behind one’s act,” and this would be another reason for accept-
ing the judgment of the courts (139).  Whether or not one says he made an agreement with the 
United States to accept unjust convictions, King affirms that “one who breaks an unjust law 
must do so…with a willingness to accept the penalty” (236).  He maintained this stance partly 
because he desired the effect it would have on the community who would see people willingly 
spending time in jail for a cause in which they truly believe.
  He hoped this would spur more people to actively participate in the Civil Rights 
Movement so that the unjust laws could be changed sooner.  But King also made sure that 
all of his men who broke a law were willing to “endure the ordeal of jail” because he wanted 
to show the state, as well as the public, that they loved democracy and respected the court 
system; what they were fighting against were the unjust laws that the people working in these 
systems had implemented (King 232).  He states that “an individual who breaks a law that 
conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order 
to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the high-
est respect for law” (236).  This coincides with Kraut’s interpretation of Socrates in that by 
obeying the judgment of the courts, one is showing the public the real motive behind breaking 
the law.  When one examines King’s lawbreaking strategies, one must look at the two dif-
ferent types of laws discussed in King’s letter.  He disobeyed many unjust laws, while at the 
same time obeying the law of accepting the punishment that the court hands out; he had much 
respect for the court system, but not the unjust laws.  
After all this, we now know that both Socrates and King believed that one should 
never commit an injustice, and that there is a certain degree of responsibility that the indi-
vidual has to make sure unjust laws are not kept in practice, while all the while making sure 
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one adheres to the rules of obedience and respect owed to the government, which includes 
following the orders of the court.  Both also agree, albeit for different reasons, that one should 
be open and not keep secret any lawbreaking that is committed against the state, but they also 
differ on what constitutes just and unjust harm.  One of the many things we are still not sure 
of, however, is whether or not King would have accepted the punishment of death, as Socrates 
did in drinking the hemlock.  If he followed his political philosophy precisely, which was to 
accept whatever punishment the courts handed out so as to show that it was not the court sys-
tem he was attacking but the laws of the state, then it seems that he would have been willing 
to die from the hands of the government for his cause.  It is obvious that he was willing to die 
for his beliefs, since he continued in his fight for civil rights for African Americans, knowing 
that his death could be a result, as revealed to him by the numerous death threats to him and 
his family.  But it is still questionable whether he would have approved of letting the govern-
ment take that into its own hands, when he knew the reason for why they were killing him 
was definitely unjust.    
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Notes 
1. An extremely liberal view of Socrates could say that King does not even have a responsi-
bility to obey the laws of the state.  Socrates says that if there is an agreement, a citizen must 
either obey the laws or persuade the state as to the nature of justice.  But if there is no agree-
ment, as in King’s case, since Socrates does not mention anything about situations without 
agreements, one could say that King is entitled to disobey any law of the state with which he 
is dissatisfied without explanation.
2. He must truly be right about the unjust nature of the law if any of this is to follow through.  
This means that the Laws, which represent Socrates’ legal philosophy, must be on his side 
(Kraut 66, 81).
3. Kraut makes a distinction that the text of the Crito does not actually make, but one which 
he believes to be important in discussing Socrates’ views.  He says that there are two different 
types of laws present in the Crito.  The laws, with a lowercase “l,” are the “statutes that were 
actually in force at the time of Socrates,” and the Laws, with the capital “L,” represent the 
“legal philosophy” present throughout, making these two “an artful mixture of the real and the 
ideal” (Kraut 81).   
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The Not-So “Invisible Hand:” 
America’s Role in Haiti’s 
Endemic Poverty
Christina Amato
“We have for once learnt to see the great events of world history from below, from the per-
spective of the outcast, the suspects, the maltreated, the powerless, the oppressed, the reviled-
in short, from the perspective of those who suffer.”
—Dietrich Bonhoeffer
 As Otterbein’s “Common Book,” Mountains Beyond Mountains has inspired an 
animated dialogue on the conditions and quality of life in Haiti; Tracy Kidder illuminates 
the tiny island nation and its incredible poverty, suffering and domestic strife.  While Kidder 
mentioned that actually seeing Haiti was like seeing “the end of the earth,” many who read the 
book keenly felt his vision simply through the experience of reading about Haiti (20).  Images 
of treacherous mud-swelled roads, emaciated children dying of largely eradicated diseases, 
and decaying rubbish and trash heaps left their indelible imprints on readers, too.  
What is sprinkled less obtrusively through the book, though, are references to the 
accountability of Americans for the tragic state of suffering in Haiti.  Kidder subtly recounts 
events like the construction of a dam, influenced by American agri-businesses, which wreaked 
so much misery and destruction among the families living in the villages of Haiti.1  He dis-
cusses the awkwardly hatched plan to substitute Iowa farm pigs for Creole pigs, an ill-fated 
venture devised by the American pork industry.  There are multiple references to the inter-
mittent Marine occupations of Haiti throughout their unstable history.  These seem hardly 
damning in isolation, but the shadowy presence of America, both industrial and governmental, 
in Haiti inevitably leads to the question: how involved has the United States been in Haiti’s 
affairs? Why should Americans care?  
The answer is in the details, the historical facts, to be precise. Today, Haiti barely 
registers on the radar of the American national conscience except for the occasional news 
morsel showcasing “humanitarian” efforts to restore stability to a backward, uncivilized 
nation.  The truth is that America’s history is very much intertwined with Haiti’s, with the 
United States playing a much more significant role in all of Haiti’s affairs than the sporadic 
news coverage might suggest.  In fact, the United States, through aggressive business ventur-
ing and incessant government intrusion, stands to blame for a good deal of Haiti’s suffering.  
While the nature of American interest has evolved through our two-centuries old relation-
ship with the first black republic, a freed slave republic no less, one truth always resonates: 
America remains firmly entrenched in Haiti’s sovereign affairs, shaping and impacting all sec-
tors of Haitian life.  To understand this complex, entangled history and how we, as Americans, 
must acknowledge and respond with this knowledge, we must first venture to Haiti’s nascent 
beginnings and subsequent decline.   
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Hopeful Origins: Haiti’s Slave Revolution
 Ayiti, as Haiti was known when Columbus first reached its shores in 1492, seemed 
fated for misfortune from its earliest brushes with the Western world.  Within thirty years of 
Columbus’s “discovery” of the island, the native Arawak Indians were virtually extinct from 
“imported infectious disease, slavery, and outright murder” (Farmer 60).  The burgeoning 
African slave trade provided a ready substitute for the thousands, if not millions, of indig-
enous Indians that had died by 1540, leaving the Spanish bereft of their free labor to cultivate 
soil, mine gold and build settlements.2  The French began to settle the island around this time, 
interested in the prospect of slave labor for agricultural settlements. A French-Spanish treaty 
ceding the island to the French in 1697, and the import of 30,000 African slaves, packed “spoon-
fashion” into squalid slave ships would be the humble beginning of Saint Domingue (Logan 2). 
This notoriously brutal slave colony would eventually generate massive profits for France and 
build the “all-important European port-cities” with the vitality and lives of thousand of African 
slaves (Farmer 62).  According to Paul Farmer, by “the eve of the American Revolution, Saint-
Domingue…generated more revenue than all thirteen North American colonies combined” (63).  
 The tempestuous revolutionary atmosphere of the late eighteenth century stretched 
to all corners of the world, with the American and French Revolutions disseminating new 
worldviews about “values, sensibilities and ideology” (Matthewson 7).  These new attitudes 
extended to slave societies which had resulted in “the image of [slave societies as] social and 
cultural wastelands blighted by an obsessive pursuit of private profit” (Davis qtd. in Mat-
thewson 7).  This didn’t prevent plantation owners and slave holders from desperate attempts 
to hold on to their exceedingly profitable venture. Abolition movements stormed the United 
States as well as Britain, with “their liberty and autonomy serv[ing] as dangerous doctrines in 
Saint Domingue and the other Caribbean islands” (Matthewson 8).  When the French became 
embroiled in troubles of their own during the French Revolution, they were ultimately dis-
tracted from their most profitable slave colony.  Seizing the opportunity, the slave insurrection 
of Saint Domingue in 1791 “placed as many as 100,000 Africans in confrontation with about 
40,000 whites” (Matthewson 19).
 The slave rebellion of 1791 would ultimately invite Haiti’s fledgling democratic 
neighbor, the United States, directly into the middle of the conflict.  While the United States 
was knee-deep in its own ambivalence about slavery, French colonial agents pressured the 
southern U.S. states for help, preying on fears of “similar commotions” in the U.S. and else-
where (Matthewson 22). Abolitionists of the north sympathized with the slaves, claiming “it 
would be inconsistent on the part of a free nation to take measures against a people who had 
availed themselves of the only means they have to throw off the yoke of atrocious slavery” 
(qtd. in Matthewson 23). Yet, the ultimate U.S. stance on the slave rebellion came from 
America’s own president, George Washington, who eventually authorized the sale of arms to 
France to quell, in his own words, “the alarming insurrection of Negroes” (qtd. in Matthewson 
25). Washington also authorized “$750,000 in military aid, as well as troops, to defend the 
white colonists” (Farmer 68). France continued to heavily pressure Washington for signs of 
good faith, due to fears that the United States would exploit the rebellion for trade purposes 
(with the United States in turn claiming they feared Britain would do the same).3  In short, 
Haiti’s status as a pawn to be parceled up between the major industrial powers of the world 
had begun.  This first of squabbles over Haiti’s fate would establish a precedent that carries 
into present day: the bid for control of all Haiti’s resources, both material and human.  
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   Victory for the slaves of Saint Domingue seemed imminent as French coffers and 
military resources were drained in post-Revolution France, and in fact, after Napoleon’s 
troops were pulverized (by both the slave forces and yellow fever) in late 1803, the slaves of 
Saint Domingue declared independence.  Haiti became the second independent nation of the 
Western hemisphere, next to the United States. 
Post-Liberation Haiti: The Scramble for Power 
According to Tim Matthewson, the idea of an independent nation of liberated slaves 
“had profound repercussions throughout the Americas, encouraging belief that the world had 
been turned upside down and the slaves had become masters and masters slaves” (113).  No 
wonder, then, that the U.S. scrambled to impose an embargo on the new nation of Haiti, send-
ing a “symbolic gesture” that the black republic would not serve as inspiration for slaves in 
the United States (Matthewson 119).  Haiti found its efforts to establish legitimacy thwarted 
at every turn by its jittery northern neighbor, who aided in a “diplomatic quarantine” to deny 
Haiti’s autonomy (Farmer 75).  The United States, enmeshed in its own slavery controversy, 
refused to recognize Haiti as a nation, going so far as to block their presence at the Western 
Hemisphere Panama Conference of 1852, almost fifty years after independence.4  R.W. Logan 
aptly observes that “Haiti remained a constant reminder that slaves might revolt” in the U.S. 
(210).  Racism was at the heart of America’s rejection of Haiti, as evidenced by the remarks of 
a Missouri senator during the debate about the Panama Conference:
the peace of eleven states in this Union will not permit black Consuls and 
Ambassadors to establish themselves in our cities, and to parade through the 
country, and give their fellow blacks in the United States, proof in hand of 
the honors which await them, for a successful revolt on their part. (Benton 
qtd. in Logan 226) 
Ironically, while the U.S. didn’t recognize Haitian sovereignty until 1862, American 
merchants grew exceedingly wealthy from exporting their products to Haiti.  According to 
Farmer, by 1821 “45 percent of imports to Haiti came from the United States” (78).  This did 
not by any means indicate reciprocity; indeed, Haiti was forced into an economy in which 
they were entirely dependent upon foreign goods, but due to the embargo, were unable to ex-
port anything and make a profit.  Apparently, while most Americans found repugnant the idea 
of an emancipated black nation, nobody raised any moral qualms about profiting from that 
country through the farcical embargo.  Such inconsistencies would characterize the relation-
ship between Haiti and the United States well into modern times.
By the turn of the twentieth century, military intervention in Haiti had become a 
staple of a U.S. foreign policy no longer overtly driven by racism. Future relations with 
Haiti would be much more publicly polished to diminish the appearance of racism, with the 
same damaging result for Haiti: total domination and control by foreign powers. With the 
close of the Civil War, and a long and shameful chapter in America’s history of slavery, the 
United States embraced the emerging imperial worldview (essentially, racism with a nation-
alist twist).  In the scramble between the emerging imperialist powers of Europe and North 
America, the United States intended to dominate Haiti, whether by market share or military 
intervention. Farmer observes that “it was clear even to charitable observers that the destiny 
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of the Haitian people was under the jurisdiction of foreign powers” (85).  The countries of 
France, Britain, Germany and the United States saddled the vulnerable, struggling Haitian 
government with crushing debt, amounting to “80 percent of national revenue” for “protect-
ing” Haiti’s citizens (Farmer 88).  According to Farmer, U.S. military historians claim:
The United States Navy had been compelled to send warships into Haitian 
waters to protect the lives and property of American citizens in 1849, 1851, 
1857, 1858, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1868, 1869, 1876, 1888, 1891, 1892, 1902, 
1903, 1904, 1905, 1906, 1907, 1908, 1909, 1911, 1912, 1913, and during 
1914, 1915 had maintained ships there almost without interruption. (89)
There seems hardly any doubt as to just how much control Haiti had over its own affairs well 
into the early twentieth century.  Haiti was a sovereign nation, and yet the United States per-
petually interfered in their domestic affairs, all while maintaining the pretext of a “diplomatic 
quarantine” to the rest of the world.  
It could hardly come as a shock, then, that in 1915 the United States began an armed 
occupation of Haiti that would last nineteen years.  Although U.S. intervention was justified 
under the guise of “instability,” Farmer accurately points out that Haiti’s instability was in 
reality the result of the “penetration of foreign capital, coupled with almost continuous inva-
sion by U.S. warships” (90). In essence, the United States, along with its European partners 
in the throes of imperialist zeal, had shaped the very conditions in Haiti they later used as an 
excuse for invasion.  Haiti’s 1918 constitution granted the United States full control of Haiti’s 
financial affairs, with a provision that “Haiti could not undertake any foreign debt” without 
United States permission5 (Farmer 93).  When Haitians protested, the U.S. Marine occupiers 
responded by dissolution of the Haitian parliament and a requisite public vote, in which par-
ticipants were handed a ballot marked “OUI,” signifying approval of the Constitution (Farmer 
93).  As James Gaffney points out, “that an alternative slip, marked Non, could be obtained by 
special request was not greatly emphasized” (2).
One of the most significant amendments to this new constitution was the abolition 
of Haiti’s laws prohibiting foreign ownership of land, as this would fuel Haiti’s economic and 
humanitarian crises even into modern times. This more “accommodating” constitution opened 
the floodgates for U.S. corporations, eager for cheap land and more importantly, cheap labor 
(Gaffney 2).  North American companies scrambled to lease over 266,000 acres of Haitian land 
for “plantations of rubber, bananas, sugar, sisal, mahogany and other tropical produce” (Farmer 
94).  An article from the November 28, 1926 edition of Financial America reveals much about 
the blasé American attitude toward Haitian exploitation: “Haiti offers a marvelous opportunity 
for American investment…the run-of-the-mill Haitian is handy, easily directed, and gives a hard 
day’s labor for 20 cents, while in Panama the same day’s work cost $3” (qtd. in Farmer 95).   It 
was apparent that Americans still had little regard for the only freed slave nation in the world.
Post-Imperialist Era: The Reign of Corporate America
The Marine occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934 perhaps seems like the last holdover 
from an era marked by “Big Stick” and “Dollar Diplomacy” tactics.  In any event, the United 
States would never again make such obvious, public interventions in Haiti’s sovereign affairs.  
Heinl and Heinl, the U.S. Marine Corps historians, claimed the occupation a success, saying 
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“in 1934, the country was modernized, solvent and thriving,” although they didn’t include 
Haiti’s $40,000,000 debt to the United States in their solvency calculation, or the fact that the 
national treasury and national bank were owned by United States corporations (Farmer 101-
102).  Essentially, the actions of the United States and the imperialist powers of Europe for the 
first 150 years of Haitian independence left the country in shambles, crippled by debt—with 
no ability to sustain their economy, and no autonomy to sort through their finances. The seeds 
for an unparalleled humanitarian crisis had been sown.
The reign of the Duvalier family took the country on the verge of catastrophe in the 
post-American occupation years, and sent it careening over the edge. Francois Duvalier was 
“elected” in 1957, by an “army-organized” campaign, which was characterized by irregulari-
ties, such as 7,500 votes for Duvalier from the tiny region of La Tortue, which had only 900 
voters6 (Farmer 107).  As Gilbert Loescher and John Scanlan observe, “every effort (including 
disqualifying candidates and strict censoring of the media prior to the election) was made to 
ensure his victory” (315). 
The horrifyingly corrupt thirty year reign of “Papa Doc” and subsequently his son 
“Baby Doc” destroyed any shred of hope Haiti may have had for improvement.  It seemed 
impossible that things could get worse in Haiti, but by the 1980s, in the decline of the father-
son Duvalier reign, Haiti’s poverty and oppression reached endemic proportions. The army 
was regularly used for the intimidation and torture of Haitian citizens, and though no exact 
numbers are known, it is believed that Duvalier senior killed “tens of thousands” of Haitians 
(Farmer 108). Nonconformists were “denied the right to organize, [and] union activity and po-
litical expression [were] closely monitored; prison, torture and exile [were] used to suppress 
dissent” (Loescher and Scanlan 314).  Francois Duvalier implemented “the first widespread 
use of ‘disappearances’ in the western Hemisphere, [in which] Duvalier’s paramilitary forces 
wielded wide discretionary power to arrest, imprison, torture or put to death any Haitian citi-
zen without even an order in writing” (Loescher and Scanlon 317-18). 
By the 1980s, already paltry Haitian wages declined by 56%, relegating Haiti to 
the title the “Taiwan of the Caribbean” (Chomsky 20).  Even Haiti’s soil was exhausted, 
by “deforestation and concomitant erosion,” with thousands of acres spoiled by alkalinity 
(Farmer 120).  Haitian soil “could only produce .90 units of rice per hectare whereas the 
Dominican Republic produced 2.67…the U.S. 5.04” with corn units in Haiti produced at .67 
units compared with “the Dominican Republic’s 2.10, Canada’s 5.38, the U.S.’s 6.35” (Abbot 
qtd in Farmer 120).  It seems almost unfathomable that Haitians were unable to produce even 
meager crops to support their starving country, while their shamefully inadequate wages sup-
ported some of the wealthiest countries in the world.
  With no visible U.S. government presence during the Duvalier reign of terror, it may 
be tempting to assume the United States had recovered from its racist, imperialist fervor of 
centuries past.  The truth is that behind the appalling suffering of the Haitian peasantry stood 
U.S. policies, both advertent and inadvertent, that contributed to and instigated Haiti’s troubles. 
Behind the tremendous decline in wages stood U.S. tax dollars bankrolling assembly plants 
in Haiti for U.S. manufacturers, “who were able to benefit from such advantages as enormous 
unemployment…no unions, ample terror, [and] workers at wages of fourteen cents an hour” 
(Chomsky 20). Behind “Papa Doc” Duvalier stood President Kennedy, offering aid in exchange 
for “the Haitian vote to expel Cuba from the OAS” (Chomsky 19). Most appalling, Papa Doc 
received over $40 million in U.S. aid in his first four years in power, during the height of his 
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tyranny (Farmer 108).  According to Loescher and Scanlan, between 1946 and 1972, the U.S. 
sent a staggering $120 million in aid to the Duvalier government (321).  When Baby Doc seized 
power in 1971, the transition was seamless, thanks in part to a very public visit by the vice-presi-
dent of the United States.  Robert Lawless claims Baby Doc’s cost for this visit was 
support [of] a new economic program guided by the United States, a pro-
gram featuring private investments from the United States that would be 
drawn to Haiti by such incentives as no customs taxes, a minimum wage 
kept very low, the suppression of labor unions, and the right of American 
corporations to repatriate their profits. (Lawless qtd. in Farmer 114) 
The U.S. no longer appeared to be physically present in Haiti’s affairs, but they were very 
much financially entangled in Papa and Baby Doc’s business of murder, oppression and 
tyranny.  Aid money continued to channel into Baby Doc’s government, even as the U.S. State 
Department noted in 1979 that “corruption is traditional at all levels of society, and significant 
amounts of domestic revenues usable for development continue to be diverted to personal 
enrichment” (qtd. in Loescher and Scanlon 317). When Haitian oppression reached endemic 
proportions in the mid-1980s, the international community began to take notice and raise 
protest, pressuring the U.S. to respond.  Baby Doc ultimately fled Haiti in 1986, compliments 
of a U.S.-chartered plane (Farmer 124).
From Tyranny to Populism…And Back Again
The democratic election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991, while shocking to the 
international community, ushered in an era (albeit short) of hopeful anticipation in the eyes of 
the poorest Haitians.  Aristide proposed a Haiti in which every person could “sit at the table” 
of prosperity, and even commenced his presidency with a breakfast for the hungry at the presi-
dential palace.7 Aristide also “declined his $10,000 monthly salary, terming it ‘scandalous in a 
country where most people go to bed hungry’” (Farmer 165).  
While Aristide must have appeared as a savior to the broken and oppressed seg-
ments of Haitian society, his populist philosophies gave Haitian elites and foreign investors 
cause for apprehension.  The kind of redistribution of wealth Aristide seemed to be advocating 
threatened the “establishment,” both domestic and international, who had profited from Haiti’s 
oppression for almost two centuries.  According to Jane Regan, during Aristide’s first seven 
months of office, “the Haitian economy was beginning to turn around. Literacy programs 
were starting up. The radio was alive with news, denunciations [and] popular opinion” (“Haiti 
on the Brink” par. 7). For the first time in Haiti’s history, it looked as though forward progress 
might be on the horizon, but not the kind of progress foreigners and wealthy Haitians desired.
What Aristide could have accomplished as Haiti’s president will never be known 
now. On September 30, 1991 Aristide’s government was overthrown in a coup by a three-man 
military junta, led by one General Raoul Cedras.  Angry Haitians filled the streets in the hours 
after the coup, only to find soldiers of the new military regime waiting with loaded rifles.  Any 
attempts at gathering by the citizens resulted in indiscriminate firing.  In the months following 
the coup, Cedras and the army would effectively eliminate pro-Aristide sentiment in the coun-
try by torturing, killing or driving out anyone associated with Aristide or his political tenden-
cies: peasants’ groups, student groups and the press were among the early victims.  According 
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to Farmer, “over 100,000 Haitians were believed to have crossed the Dominican border…tens 
of thousands left the country by sea” (190).
Indeed, in the fifteen years since Aristide’s original coup Haiti has strayed into a state 
of poverty and corruption the international community thought impossible.  Life expectancy 
and wages are at an all-time low, worse even than the years of the Duvalier reign.8 It took a 
full three years after the 1991 coup to reinstate Aristide as Haiti’s president again, and this oc-
curred only with the help of 20,000 U.S. troops.9  Aristide was elected again in 2000, only to 
be forcibly removed from office by yet another coup shortly after.  
While the most visible role the U.S. has played in Haiti’s recent woes is deployment 
of U.S. troops in 1994, there is, predictably, more to the story.  U.S. involvement in Aristide’s 
1991 coup has now been revealed in the financial paper trail: according to both Regan and 
Farmer, ample evidence has surfaced that coup leaders were “CIA assets,” or recipients of 
federal money from the United States (Regan, “In Bondage” 4).  According to Regan,
In 1991, AID allotted $26 million to elite business groups that worked 
openly against Aristide’s economic reforms. The CIA set up and funded a 
secret-police unit, the Service d’Intelligence National, which oversaw brutal 
repression from 1986 until at least 1991. For years, the CIA has had many 
high-ranking Haitian army officers, including the coup leader, Lieutenant 
General Raoul Cedras, on its pay-roll. (“Haiti on the Brink” par. 14)
There seemed to be little doubt that the U.S. took a more active role in Aristide’s opposi-
tion than it publicly acknowledged. Additionally, the “awkward silence” of President George 
Bush senior in the months surrounding the coup gave a sort of silent “green light” to the rebel 
regime to repress any opposition (Farmer 190; Regan, “Haiti on the Brink,” par. 11). After all, 
when Haiti’s biggest and most influential neighbor fails to weigh in on an illegal government, 
silence can be construed as a passive approval of sorts.  If the rebel regime had any doubts 
about the U.S. stance, another leaky embargo reminiscent of the nineteenth century removed 
all doubt.  While publicly denouncing the illegal regime in Haiti with an embargo, American 
president George Bush proceeded to exempt “some 800 of its firms and increased its trade 
with Haiti by about 50 per cent” (emphasis added, “The Truth About Haiti” 1).  The result 
was that essentials became unbearably expensive for the poorest of Haitians, while American 
corporate profits soared.  
 The situation in Haiti today, it seems clichéd to say, has surpassed almost anyone’s 
worst projections.  Regan outlines a picture of a desperate country: there is perpetual gunfire 
that forces Haitians to cower in their homes, and there are fires and decapitations in broad 
daylight (“In Bondage” 4). According to The New Statesman,
Life expectancy for men is 48; one child in ten dies before its fifth birthday; 
85 per cent of the people live on less than a dollar a day; unemployment is at 
70 per cent. Nearly all the raw materials are controlled by US corporations, 
and companies such as Disney use it as a source of cheap manufacturing. 
(“The Truth About Haiti” 1)
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According to Regan, statistics like these wholly qualify Haiti as a “failed state” (“In Bond-
age,” 5).  Human rights-advocate Jean-Claude Bajeux notes, “What is going on is literally 
insane… It is what we call in philosophy a ‘death march.’ If we can’t stop this, we are looking 
at the destruction of the Haitian nation” (qtd. in Regan, “In Bondage” 5). In short, Haiti seems 
closer to total collapse than it ever has been in its precarious history of independence, with the 
world largely unaware and unconcerned.   
  Meanwhile, the interim government has the enjoyed backing and favor of “the 
private sector [Haitian elite], as well as the United States, France and Canada” while the 
popularly elected Aristide waits for word in South Africa on his possible return (Regan, “In 
Bondage” 4).  U.S. aid dollars continue to pour into Haiti’s borders by the millions, as long 
as Haiti remains open to “foreign imports and investment,” or in other words, the accepted 
exploitation of American business (“The Truth About Haiti” 1). American trade and profit is 
booming, amid the backdrop of murder, oppression and misery. 
Why It Matters
 It may be tempting to watch the evening news and ponder why exactly Americans 
should care about the tiny island nation of Haiti.  It may be even more tempting to take the 
news reports at face value, where they “treat [Haiti’s] problems as a series of random events, 
with voodoo somewhere in the background and the US cavalry riding to the rescue” (“The 
Truth About Haiti” 1).  While Americans may be aware of some of the ambiguities of our 
government’s involvement in Haiti, it is simply easier to shuffle off feelings of obligation or 
accountability because they could lead to a sense of guilt—which isn’t a popular emotion in 
the American repertoire.  Indeed, as Noam Chomsky points out, Americans pride themselves 
on certain “plain truths,” which include the idea of the U.S. as a beacon of freedom and values 
(Chomsky 20).  America has come to identify itself as the face of democracy, the promulgator 
of liberty and democratic ideals.  The invasion of the sovereign nation of Iraq, after all, was 
bolstered on precisely such ideals.  Presidential speeches and news conferences daily rein-
force the notion that America has an obligation to bring democracy and freedom to those who 
are unable to help themselves.  So what happened to Haiti? 
American identity (both perceived and actual) is precisely the reason that Haiti 
matters so much.  When we confront the “uncomfortable” truths, as Chomsky deems them, 
we find that American motives may need to be examined a little more closely, which means 
a greater level of introspection into our own lives and motives, and those of our government 
(13).  The ramifications of such introspection ripple into all sectors of American life, and cast 
shadows over American financial and military presence in various areas of the world. If we 
aren’t the humanitarian savior of countries like Haiti (and by extension, Iraq), what are we? 
The factual record tells us that there is something much more sinister, but predictable, behind 
our continual interference in countries like Haiti.  The historical record paints a constella-
tion of racism, greed and an all-consuming bid for power in countries that are incapable of 
defending themselves.  How else can the ventures of the Disney Corporation (an American 
icon of family values) be explained, in a country where the minimum wage is less than a 
dollar a day?  How do we justify American policies that result in the starving of the world’s 
poorest populations of medicines and basic necessities, while the country of Haiti continues to 
be the playground of some of the richest international corporations? How do we explain that 
America stands for freedom and democracy when we give millions of dollars in aid to tyran-
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nical despots bent on repressing those very values?  The sum of these facts is that America 
stands not for humanity in tiny, invisible countries like Haiti, but for exploitation and greed.
The point of acknowledging America’s true motives and responsibility in Haiti’s 
suffering is not simply to be ashamed, but to let that shame be a catalyst for action.  When we 
recognize that our lavish and comfortable lifestyle is still supported with the lives and vitality 
of humans reduced to near slavery, it is impossible to turn away.  It would be reprehensible to 
acknowledge such suffering, and our place in that suffering, and do nothing.  As James Gaff-
ney observes, the “human voices wake us,” calling us to action (3).   
Tracy Kidder reveals in Paul Farmer what the empathy and work of one human be-
ing can accomplish in righting a centuries-old wrong.  While it may be impossible to aspire 
to such lofty and self-sacrificial heights of public service, we can still make an impact as 
individuals, and collectively as Americans.  We can begin with vigilance in our government’s 
affairs, and take that knowledge to the voting booth.  We can caution ourselves against blindly 
following publicized agendas involving humanitarianism and the “spread of democracy” by 
simply asking: what are the real motives? What do the historical facts reveal?  We can pres-
sure our elected officials to stop the flow of U.S. tax dollars to undemocratically installed 
governments.  We can educate ourselves on U.S. corporations that exploit Haiti’s deplorable 
working conditions, destabilized economy and tax loopholes (American Airlines, Citibank, 
Disney, and Texaco are a few10) and make our views known, through letter-writing or boycott.  
We can contribute through volunteering or financial donation to organizations like Partners-
in-Health, who bring health care to the poorest population segments in Haiti, sick and dying 
from malnutrition, tuberculosis, AIDS, and even measles.  The options for involvement are 
many, and while the impact may seem small, it does matter.  It means we have internalized 
Tracy Kidder’s Haiti, and acknowledged the inextricable threads that bind us to the suffering 
of fellow humans.  The point is: do something.  
Notes
1. For Kidder’s discussion of the dam construction and pig swapping, see pp. 36-39 of 
Mountains Beyond Mountains.
2. R.W. Logan notes that the Indian population has been estimated at over a million at the turn 
of the sixteenth century, with the entire population wiped out by 1540.
3. See Matthewson’s discussion of French fears about American trade motives and American 
response, pp. 24-28.
4. For Farmer’s discussion of America’s intolerance toward the Haitian nation, see The Uses 
of Haiti, p. 75.
5. Farmer also points out that Franklin Roosevelt claimed to have actually written Haiti’s 
constitution while serving as Secretary of the Navy. 
6. See Farmer’s explanation of Duvalier’s sham election, pp. 106-107.
7. For a fascinating discussion of Aristide’s activities in his first days in office, see Farmer, pp. 
164-65.
8. See “The Truth About Haiti” for staggering statistics on the quality of life for the poorest 
Haitians. 
9. See both Regan, “Is Haiti in Bondage to History,” and Farmer for their enlightening 
discussions on eventual U.S. intervention after Aristide’s deposition.
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10. See the U.S. state department’s website, http://www.state.gov/e/eb/ifd/2005/42043.htm for 
more information
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[Dylan] has consistently improved whatever he stole, and his lies have been more revealing than 
the truth. Dylan came to the public as a vortex of selfishness with a carefully hidden self. He 
freed the characters of archaic America—Sweet Marie, the Jack of Hearts, Mrs. Henry, Napoleon 
in rags—into the screech of rock and roll, deepening both in the process.
        —John Leland
 The poetic quality of Bob Dylan’s lyrics has been described as everything from 
“the perfect role model to present aspiring artists” (Paglia 262)1 to “silly without the music” 
(Christgau 63).2  While they may very well stand as the former, they most assuredly cannot 
be construed as the latter, if only because the proposition has never actually been tested.  Up 
to now, Dylan enthusiasts and detractors alike have tended to elaborate—and recently with 
great detail—on the question “How do his lyrics rank amongst the great poetry of the past?” 
and have assumed they are either the best of his generation or simply irrelevant.  To the extent 
that anyone has seriously bothered to tackle the question in recent years, the answer usually 
resembles the one put forward by Christopher Ricks, who declares quite confidently, “Dylan 
has always had a way with words. He does not simply have his way with them, since a true 
comprehender of words is no more their master than he or she is their servant” (11).  To this 
one might well ask: but how does one decipher quality in poetry, and how must we read and 
eventually come to an understanding of his lyrics?  It is my contention that there is a know-
able, unequivocal, and essentially irrefutable answer to the question, and that this answer is 
found when one is inclined to juxtapose his lyrics with those of Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of 
Criticism.  
 To begin it is surely acceptable to believe that literature can be studied, criticized, and 
placed into a ranking order of quality.  The difference with Frye and the critics who preceded 
him are that while the past has been infatuated with the fashionable, Frye tries to clear a path 
in critical response to the experience.  He regards this process as one that must separate the 
primary source, from its critical commentary.  Frye states, “Art, like nature, has to be distin-
guished from the systematic study of it, which is criticism. It is therefore impossible to ‘learn 
literature’: one learns about it in a certain way, but what one learns, transitively, is the criticism 
of literature” (11).  This leaves the critical response—or secondary literature—to be “studied” 
and the poem—or primary source—to be experienced.  Frye admits, “literature is not itself 
an organized structure of knowledge, the critic has to turn to the conceptual framework of the 
historian for events, and to the philosopher for ideas” (12).  This does not diminish literature 
vis-a-vis its peers though; it merely leaves it open to be experienced in a way solely unique to 
other varied disciplines.  In doing so, Frye has built a literary map of critical interpretation.  His 
efforts spawned the second essay of four contained within Anatomy that speaks directly to this 
investigation.  Frye’s concern lies in the fact that literature is without set of technical vocabulary. 
Which poses two problems: 1) there is no word for a work of literary art that supersedes a trivial 
preference in definitions, and 2) the use of word “symbol,” which Frye uses as meaning “any 
literary structure that can be isolated for critical attention” (71).  
Philosophizing Disgrace: Anatomy & 
Analysis of Dylan’s Hard Rain
Adam Cottrel
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Frye proceeds when he distinguishes critical analysis and art by saying “value-judg-
ments are founded on the study of literature; the study of literature can never be founded on 
value-judgments” (20).  What is determined here is the separation between the excellent poem 
and the less excellent poem as a futile search of a non-existent system.  To ensure the critical 
study of literature, the reader must come to the conclusion “that just as there is an order of 
nature behind the natural sciences, so literature is not a piled aggregate of ‘works,’ but an or-
der of words” (Frye 17).  The criticism of literature, then, is one that must be multi-tiered and 
what Frye proposes amounts to a complex, systematic approach that places literature in one 
of five distinguishing groups.  Frye’s five distinguishing sections are divided as the Literal, 
Descriptive, Formal, Archetypal, and Anagogic phases.  
As my study of Dylan proceeds, so too will Frye’s system be unveiled as one that lit-
erature must correlate between inductive experience and deductive principles (Frye 22).  It is 
necessary to consider then that literary criticism is not a rudimentary progression of meanings, 
but rather a progression of contexts or relationships in which the summative end of the work 
can be placed, categorized, and understood.  This final destination sets critical assessment 
apart from the mere application of a social attitude and places literature’s study as a methodi-
cal, almost scientific innovation.3  
 On the contrary the most impeditive quality of Dylan’s lyrics has been their strong 
connection to social attitude.  Dylan was hailed as the “voice of his generation” early in his 
career playing largely acoustic numbers with lyrics that appeared to be topical on the situ-
ations of the time.  But in 1965 Bob Dylan left his kingdom of folk groupies for an electric 
guitar and backing band.  This changed everything concerning Dylan and his fandom; and the 
old guard of folk musicians that saw all their dreams come true two years before - the pro-
liferation of a politically active youth - now saw it fade away in a crown of self-indulgence.  
“As far as they were concerned, [Dylan’s manager] was the money changer at the gates of the 
temple” (Goodman 42).4  In turn many of his lyrics that were previously hailed, were imme-
diately cast aside as “empty” or “nonsensical.”  And subsequent lyrics to songs were met with 
an equal vigor of spite regardless of their poetic quality.  Thus, in choosing a precedent source 
one must bear in mind that the systematic and individualized response outlined by Frye is es-
sential in not being caught up in the debate of social attitude.
 One of Dylan’s most endearing songs—and subsequently praised set of lyrics—is “A 
Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall” (from henceforth I will refer to this song in abbreviated form as 
“Hard Rain”).  This song is one of Dylan’s most particularly challenging, but I think equally 
rewarding set of lyrics.  One reason—which is supported by Ricks—is that it refuses to be a 
poem studied under allegorical contexts.  The lyrics conjure time, setting, and the individual 
but its reader (or listener) is never quite sure on what grounds.  The song begins with the 
opening stanza:
Oh, where have you been, my blue-eyed son?
And where have you been, my darling young one?
I’ve stumbled on the side of twelve misty mountains,
I’ve walked and I’ve crawled on six crooked highways,
I’ve stepped in the middle of seven sad forests,
I’ve been out in front of a dozen dead oceans,
I’ve been ten thousand miles in the mouth of a graveyard,
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And it’s a hard, and it’s a hard, it’s a hard, and it’s a hard,
And it’s a hard rain’s a-gonna fall.
If someone were to ask, “What does it mean to have been ten thousand miles in the mouth 
of a graveyard?” one might easily reply—with what Frye calls the “literal” sense—that it 
means what it says.  It has been noted that T.S. Eliot was once asked what a line of “Ashe-
Wednesday” meant, “Lady, three white leopards sat under a juniper-tree” (Ricks 329).  Eliot 
answered: “Lady, three white leopards sat under a juniper-tree”.5  This could be seen now as 
the “literal” response in the tradition of Frye.  Frye though is careful to note that when we 
read our attention moves in two opposite, yet intrinsic directions.  One direction is what Frye 
calls the centrifugal, or outside the individual words on the page to the things our memory 
associates with them.  The second simultaneous response is centripetal, or inward, in which 
we try to distinguish the words in the larger verbal pattern they accumulate in (Frye 73).  This 
explains to some extent why there has been so much misinterpretation of Dylan’s lyrics.  The 
answer lies within the artist writing for one purpose—the centripetal—and the reader inter-
preting with another—the centrifugal.  As the reader reads these lines, he inherently consumes 
them and reaches an understanding that is largely external.  This external reading usually 
devolves into a guessing game of allegorical devices that have never been accepted by Dylan.  
Dylan, like Eliot, is not writing for anyone let alone an image easily conjured in this centrifu-
gal reading.  The artist is often misunderstood and Dylan is no exception.  Frye states this idea 
simply in saying, “in all literary verbal structures the final direction of meaning is inward” 
(74).  
 Hence, the “literal meaning as simple descriptive meaning will not do at all for liter-
ary criticism” (Frye 76).  This first step in understanding a poem is not sufficient on its own.  
While reading a poem literally is a necessity of natural inquiry, it cannot satisfy our search for 
why such lines—as noted above—are of a quality of writing that few have surpassed.  The 
words of “Hard Rain” don’t apply clearly and simply to people, places, and time of when they 
were written.  Those allegories won’t suffice and Dylan won’t let them be pigeonholed so eas-
ily.  Dylan was concerned instead with a timeless quality, one that defies external definition.  
Dylan responded best when he said, “I always admired true artists who were dedicated so I 
learned from them.  Popular culture usually comes to an end very quickly. It gets thrown into 
the grave. I waned to do something that stood alongside Rembrandt’s paintings” (Hilburn 72).
 From the literal we fall into the descriptive on the basis of Frye’s system.  The de-
scriptive purpose is to paraphrase a poem into a collective summation.  Frye makes the point 
directly that “literature in its descriptive context is a body of hypothetical verbal structures. 
The latter stand between the verbal structures that describe or arrange actual ideas or represent 
physical objects, like the verbal structures of philosophy and science” (79).  By this he means, 
I take it, that descriptive writing found in poetry and the didactic writing in poetry are neces-
sarily distinct forms.  Frye makes a point to say that our vocabulary is limited concerning the 
study of poetry and thus certain words like “plot” or “story” are necessary evils when trying 
to make summative points in the descriptive stage (79).  So the plot then of the poem is the 
finite paraphrase.  The “paraphrases abstract a secondary or outward meaning. Understanding 
a poem literally means understanding the whole of it, as a poem, and as it stands” (Frye 77).  
But one must not take these words to mean that the literal is therefore the descriptive, and 
finally the meaning.  One would be hard pressed to say that the line “I saw ten thousand talk-
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ers whose tongues were all broken” is literally about ten thousand people with broken tongues 
and thus deduce from here that broken tongues is a necessary part in reaching a point of 
clarity in “Hard Rain.”  As Frye says, “a poem is literally a poem” but suggests that is where 
the literal meaning ends (78).  For if a poem is “a flow of sounds approximating music on one 
side, and an integrated pattern of imagery approximating the pictorial on the other” then the 
unity of the poem as the literal descriptive is the mood of a poem, or its movement of words, 
not the meaning of the words in themselves (Frye 78).  
 Dylan echoes this sentiment very clearly when he recalls, “I had read a lot poetry by 
the time I wrote a lot of those early songs. I was into the hard-core poets. I read them the way 
some people read Stephen King. Poe’s stuff knocked me out in more ways than I could name. 
Byron and Keats and all those guys. John Donne” (Hilburn 74).  And more revealing yet, 
“Byron’s stuff goes on and on and on and you don’t know half the things he’s talking about or 
half the people he’s addressing. But you could appreciate the language” (Hilburn 74).
 Returning to the line “I saw ten thousand talkers whose tongues were all broken,” 
one can relate the meaning to the rhythm of delivery and the effect it carries as we listen, or 
experience it.  Frye even makes the point explicit (and echoes Dylan’s thoughts on poetry as 
language) when he claims a poet’s intention “is directed towards putting words together not 
towards aligning words with meaning” (86).  No other line in Anatomy of Criticism is more 
accurate concerning Dylan.  Placing a literal meaning to lines in order to find a descriptive 
meaning has been the bane of Dylan’s career as a writer.  In one such case Dylan found him-
self in this exchange when he was told:
Your songs are supposed to have a subtle message 
Subtle message?
Well, they’re supposed to.
Where did you hear that?
In a movie magazine
Oh my God! Well, we don’t discuss those things here6
This type of exchange was not uncommon for the young Dylan.  Time has proven that such 
misinterpretation can be partly the result of an overly exuberant media, and partly due to 
Dylan’s youthful petulance. 
 Which is largely why the mystery of “Hard Rain” must then be given its first seri-
ous analysis in what Frye calls the “formal” phase.  The formal phase implies “form” and as 
such a combination of what Frye has called the literal meaning, or unity of structure.  On the 
subsequent side it implies such terms as content and matter, which expresses those qualities it 
shares with external nature (Frye 82).  This dichotomy of components can be recombined—
the literal with the expression of external nature—into a single poetic component—aesthetic.  
The aesthetic, or what may qualify as the beauty, of “Hard Rain” is this combination that Frye 
calls on.  While that component can leave its listener with satisfaction, it cannot answer our 
more probing question of coming to an understanding of the song.  Frye states quite forwardly 
that the “subtleties are really there, and as the audience can hear everything that is being 
played, it gets them all as part of a linear experience, the awareness is less conscious, but not 
less real” (86).  I take this as meaning our subconscious is invaded and creates an experi-
ence that we cannot always perceive consciously and on the verbal level.  Listening to “Hard 
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Rain,” one may be very much inclined to say that yes, they enjoyed the song but altogether 
incapable of explaining why.  This is most essentially Frye’s formal phase. 
 In using the formal phase though—if used to interpret correctly—one must recognize 
that all commentary is allegorical interpretation.  In that one is in constant need to place ideas 
to the poems imagery.  Frye states quite bluntly, “The instant that any critic permits himself 
to make a genuine comment about a poem he has begun to allegorize” (89).  One stanza from 
“Hard Rain” that may help illuminate just this idea reads:
And what did you hear, my blue-eyed son?
And what did you hear, my darling young one?
I heard the sound of a thunder, it roared out a warnin’,
Heard the roar of a wave that could drown the whole world,
Heard one hundred drummers whose hands were a-blazin’,
Heard ten thousand whisperin’ and nobody listenin’,
Heard one person starve, I heard many people laughin’,
Heard the song of a poet who died in the gutter,
Heard the sound of a clown who cried in the alley,
And it’s a hard, and it’s a hard, it’s a hard, it’s a hard,
And it’s a hard rain’s a-gonna fall.
Looking over some of these lines, we can start to find a path of direction that leads to under-
standing of why the centrifugal has been dominant and the centripetal largely ignored.   For 
instance, the line “Heard ten thousand whisperin’ and nobody listenin’” is a line that has been 
largely read as the populace’s lack of initiative in working towards an answer for social injus-
tice.  Surely this is a logical inference but Frye reminds us—and Dylan would surely second 
—that while this reading has merit it is secondary to the artist’s centripetal focus (Frye 74).  
Again we read the next line “Heard one person starve, I heard many people laughin’” as a ral-
lying cry against the disparity between the rich and poor of the world.  The poor being ignored 
and the rich indulging in unnecessary pleasures is a problem, but is that Dylan’s meaning?  
The answer may lie somewhere between yes and no.  A reading of the line cannot be wrong in 
the same sense that a mathematical sum is either right or wrong depending on its exponents.  
It can be wrong on the basis of assumption.  The final direction of the poem is always cen-
tripetal, always a movement inward that is contemplative and that is universally suggestive.  
Dylan has argued much like Eliot’s response to “Ashe-Wednesday” and he, as the artist, is 
right in doing so.  Reading “Hard Rain” as this or that is never wrong in its terminal sense, but 
it is limiting, and once we have limited a work—“Hard Rain” to America, in the 1960s—we 
have misinterpreted, or rather missed, the meaning.    
 The problem with leaving “Hard Rain” as merely an exercise in the aesthetic, and 
such is the case with the formal phase, is that the song is too lyrical and too powerful for its 
listener to accept such simplicity as a plausible answer.  Dylan himself becomes the labyrinth 
in question, perhaps more so than the song.  Accepting “Hard Rain” as beautiful or aestheti-
cally pleasing is certainly a justifiable reason to enjoy the work, but it does not answer why 
this song and Dylan’s work transcends his contemporaries.  It is important to note that while 
Dylan has never given any answers to the question “What does it mean?” he has hinted that 
they are not meaningless.  In one 1964 performance of “Hard Rain” he prefaced his perfor-
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mance by declaring, “Hard Rain’s A-Gonna Fall, it means something’s going to happen.”7  
What that something is, is certainly not for Dylan to say and Frye would agree.  Frye makes it 
clear that the writer who produces art is not the best equipped to talk, or even capable of talk-
ing about, the art in question.  Frye even suggests, “that poetry is the product, not only of a 
deliberate and voluntary act of consciousness, like discursive writing, but of processes which 
are subconscious or preconscious or half-conscious as well” (88).  Dylan has declared over 
and over again that he isn’t sure how he produced such work, that it transcends this world and 
“like a ghost was present. Once the song’s over, so too the ghost leaves” (Haliburn 74).
 Historically, what preceded “Hard Rain” was the Cuban missile crisis.  Surely its read-
ing as a song of social protest is not unwarranted.  But the song being a work of art, I think, 
will always be larger than what preceded it historically.  One of the later lines reads, “I met 
one man who was wounded in love.”  The next, “I met another man who was wounded in 
hatred.”  Certainly one can be in love and be wounded by it and certainly one can be wounded 
by or with hatred, but the question remains “who was wounded in hatred?”  That question 
may be answered by its writer who sings in that same stanza late in the song “But I’ll know 
my song well before I start singin’.”  Which I think suggests that the mystery to “Hard Rain” 
resides in Dylan.  Frye would agree with such a suggestion explaining that “poetry is a vehicle 
of morality, truth, and beauty, but the poet does not aim at these things, but only at inner ver-
bal strength” (113).  While the song has been given to the public, the meaning remains private 
with its conceiver.  When Dylan proclaims, “something’s going to happen” that may be taken 
by anyone for whatever reason they feel necessary, but Dylan is merely reassuring himself 
and his own affirmation in what he is singing and leaving the public to transform the meaning 
into what ultimately will suit him or her.  Frye shadows this by proposing, “the conception 
of art as having a relation to reality which is neither direct nor negative, but potential, finally 
resolves the dichotomy between delight and instruction, the style and the message” (93).
 To finally surmount meaning to “Hard Rain” we must acknowledge “the poet’s control 
over his own poem stops with the poem” (Frye 100).  “Hard Rain” then must be examined 
not as the literal (which lends itself to a topical song about nuclear fall-out), or the descriptive 
(which would hardly answer anything more than a series of subtle observations), and not even 
as the formal (which places the song’s meaning as a number of linked verses that resonate 
beauty).  The meaning then is very much what the reader wholly experiences with its presen-
tation, or what Frye calls the anagogic.  T.S. Eliot said, “I would suggest that none of the plays 
of Shakespeare has a ‘meaning,’ though it would be equally false to say that a play of Shake-
speare is meaningless” (“Shakespeare” 107).  This is a fitting observation to place on Dylan 
and “Hard Rain.”  No message is being hammered over the reader’s head, but that does not 
exclude the words from meaning altogether.  In taking Frye anagogic meaning as a means to 
an end for “Hard Rain,” we must be willing to place these words in a “conception of literature 
as existing in its own universe, no longer a commentary on life or reality, but containing life 
and reality in a system of verbal relationships” (Frye 122).  
 This final phase demands not only that the poet leave the poem, but that the critic sur-
render the work as well.  This point of view demands that the critic no longer conceive of po-
etry as a part of life; rather literature has become its own self-contained life (Frye 122).  The 
world of “twelve misty mountains” and “seven sad forests” may very well be derived from 
our own, but the summation of “Hard Rain” read in its entirety places it in its own world, the 
vision of the author, a place only Dylan can ultimately access.  
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 The question then is answered with a higher, more suggestive—rather than instruc-
tive—tone.  We live, as Frye suggests, in a world of a threefold external compulsion: a com-
pulsion of action, a compulsion of thinking, and a compulsion of feeling.  The words of Bob 
Dylan, though, live in an altogether different world, one of imagination and perhaps—as Frye 
suggests—a fourth power where morality, beauty, and truth “presents us with a vision, not of 
the personal greatness of the poet, but of something impersonal and far greater: the vision of a 
decisive act of spiritual freedom, the vision of the recreation of man” (Frye 94)—a place that 
is unequivocally, essentially, and irrefutably the poet’s.
Notes
1. Camille Paglia highlights the social and musical trends that surrounded Dylan’s 1990s 
comeback in her essay that was anthologized in Studio A: The Bob Dylan Reader.
2. Robert Christagau presents a sensible understanding to the hyperbole common during the 
height of Dylan’s popularity in the mid-1960s in his piece “Rock Lyrics Are Poetry (Maybe).”
3. For a further reading of Dylan’s progression from acoustic to electric music, see Fred 
Goodman’s essay “The Mansion on the Hill” which chronicles Dylan’s 1965 Newport Folk 
Festival performance.
4. For a more in-depth reading of Eliot in 1929, recalled by B.C. Southam, see A Guide to the 
Selected Poems of T.S. Eliot (sixth edition 1996), pp. 225-6.
5. Taken from a KQED press conference, December 3, 1965.
6. As heard on “No Direction Home: The Soundtrack. The Bootleg Series vol. 7.” 
7. Shakespeare and the Stoicism of Seneca (1927); Selected Essays, p. 107.
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A Priest of the Portrait as a Young Man: 
The Path to Stephen Dedalus’s Artistic 
Baptism
Adam Cottrel
 It is a fine thing to establish one’s own religion in one’s heart, not to be dependent on tradi-
tion and second-hand ideals. Life will seem to you, later, not a lesser, but a greater thing.
—D.H. Lawrence
 Between the bookends of “Once upon a time” and “Old father, old artificer, stand me 
now and ever in good stead” the reader of James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man 
has witnessed the transformation of Stephen Dedalus from boy to man, oppression to liberation.  
Stephen, modeled after Joyce himself, is a sensitive, thoughtful person who is raised in an Irish 
Catholic family during the early part of the 20th century.  Stephen’s story starts at childhood and 
weaves through adolescence, and into early adulthood.  Joyce creates this story on the basis of 
four distinct transformations.  These transformations create stepping-stones from naïve child, 
to bright student, to rebellious teenager, to ardent Catholic, and eventually to an independent 
individual that holds art as his mantra for life.  This eventual climax is caused by two extreme, 
yet equally unhealthy, stages of Catholic rejection and Catholic acceptance.  Stephen’s journey 
to find happiness and purpose lead him to a variety of places, people, and mindsets that only 
create despair and hardship.  Only when Stephen stands on his own two feet, independent of 
outside doctrine, is he able to find happiness.  Stephen finds strength in his own personal beliefs 
in art and this is what gives him the strength to seek that which he most desires.  After an ardu-
ous self-struggle, art turns into Stephen’s new religion and in art he becomes a priest-like figure, 
spreading the gospel of artistic expression with the aim of finding life purposeful.
 The reader first encounters Stephen in the playful opening lines that capture the in-
nocent perceptions of a young boy.  Joyce writes, “Once upon a time and a very good time it 
was there was a moocow coming down along the road and this moocow that was coming down 
along the road met a nicens little boy named tuckoo” (3).1  Joyce masterfully arranges these first 
lines to coincide with the thought process of a child.  One can plainly see the simplicity of the 
language, which is reinforced by the child-like vocabulary of “moocows,” “nicens,” and Joyce’s 
own childhood nickname “baby tuckoo” (Gifford 131).  Joyce has taken great effort to fashion 
the novel in this manner, with the style imitating the level of awareness Stephen has gained.
 Joyce’s stylistic approach helps to determine the first major transformation of the 
novel.  Stephen, enrolled at Clongowes Wood College, is a promising young student who 
is struggling to study.  Instead, Stephen meditates, “God was God’s name just as his name 
was Stephen.  Dieu was the French for God and that was God’s name too; and when anyone 
prayed to God and said Dieu then God knew at once that it was a French person that was 
praying” (Joyce 12).  The language and motif of such lines are ones best described as childish. 
These are lines that leave the reader curiously questioning the paradigm of childhood logic, 
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but ones that land firmly at the center of Stephen’s lifelong quest of spiritual development.  
Later in that same meditation, Stephen comes to the realization that “God remained always 
the same God and God’s real name was God” (Joyce 12).  This passage shows a stark contrast 
in both vocabulary and syntax.  Stephen is maturing as both a human being and a thinker; one 
can conclude that Joyce’s prose is mimicking this transformation as well.
 This early development is important for two substantial reasons.  The first rests on 
Stephen’s extreme sensitivity and intelligence at such an early age.  These traits are insepa-
rable from the artist.  The second point of substance comes in the way of Stephen’s pre-oc-
cupation with God.  His relationship with God is the driving force for much of the novel.  The 
transformations, as you will note, are judged predominantly with a Christian eye.  This is done 
because Stephen himself, religion or no religion, is unable to escape the notions rooted in his 
upbringing.  Joyce makes this point prevalent early to showcase its importance, and it’s one 
the reader must identify with on her own personal level.  Joyce is not merely commenting on 
a character’s journey, but on a fundamental question of humanity—how is one judged based 
on the actions of their life?
 The first transformation is the most minor, yet it lays the groundwork for Stephen’s 
subsequent transformations that drive him ultimately to his independence through art.  With 
Stephen’s newfound academic potential, he soon becomes aware of the world around him in 
an alarmingly new way.  Stephen’s awareness coincides with a dominating sense of decline 
that is caused by financial and family related struggles.  The first major change is that the 
Dedalus family is forced to move to Dublin because they have fallen into financial disrepair: 
“Two great yellow caravans had halted one morning before the door and men had come 
tramping into the house to dismantle it” (Joyce 68).  Watching the moving crew dismantle his 
house, Stephen is devastated.  In a like manner, this symbolically signals the dismantling of 
Stephen’s naïve childhood world.  Moving to Dublin brings more change that echoes a declin-
ing world surrounding Stephen.  Joyce writes:
Dublin was a new and complex sensation.  Uncle Charles had grown so wit-
less that he could no longer be sent out on errands and the disorder in set-
tling the new house left Stephen freer than he had been in Blackrock.  In the 
beginning he contented himself with circling timidly round the neighboring 
square or, at most, going half way down one of the side streets: but when he 
had made a skeleton map of the city in his mind he followed boldly one of 
its central lines until he reached the custom house. (69)
The first line mentions Dublin as a “new and complex” place that Stephen is trying to un-
derstand.  This passage is important for how perfectly it encapsulates Stephen leaving the 
comfort zone of his childhood and exploring the world residing in Dublin.  Uncle Charles, 
who earlier in this section, was a man Stephen admired for his religious devotion and heady 
political statements, now is seen as physically and mentally debilitated.  Stephen is again 
reminded of a sense of decline.  Uncle Charles is another reinforcement to the impressionable 
view of young Stephen’s world.  
 These struggles permeate Stephen’s vision of the world and eventually create a sensi-
tive mode of self-awareness that is hinged upon moral guilt.  The second transformation finds 
Stephen’s family falling on hard times.  Dublin has not made life easier for the Dedalus’.  The 
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urban center of Ireland has, if anything, opened up Stephen and family to a host of new situa-
tions never encountered in the rural hills of Clongowes.  Stephen, though, soon finds himself 
in an opportunistic situation.  Receiving thirty-three pounds in prize money for his submission 
in a literary contest, Stephen is at a threshold of choice.  His newfound income is a precious 
gift, one that could potentially alleviate the compromises his family has been forced to make.  
But the inexperienced Stephen squanders his money in an epic example of how his life is los-
ing order.  Stephen is quick to spend his winnings in an attempt to buy back his naïve child-
hood world with gifts.  Trying to buy inner happiness with money puts Stephen in a position 
where he is embracing the errant pleasures of the world.  This is a sin in the Catholic eyes 
under which Stephen was raised.  Stephen’s then unchallenged Catholic view is starting to 
waver significantly: “For a swift season of merrymaking the money of his prizes ran through 
Stephen’s fingers.  Great parcels of groceries and delicacies and dried fruits arrived from the 
city.  Every day he grew up a bill of fare for the family and every night led a party of three or 
four to the theatre” (Joyce 104).  Joyce writes of exploration into a world of sinful excess with 
these words, but a few pages later we find him embracing this lifestyle as his new unifying 
force.  Stephen “burned to appease the fierce longings of his heart before which everything 
else was idle and alien.  He cared little that he was in mortal sin, that his life had grown to be 
a tissue of subterfuge and falsehood.  Beside the savage desire within him to realize the enor-
mities which he brooded on nothing was sacred” (Joyce 105).
 These stark words transition into Stephen’s first sexual encounter, which comes 
by way of a prostitute.  The scene solidifies the second transformation Joyce creates.  Joyce 
performs this task flawlessly.  Stephen finds himself immersed in a world far from the one of 
his childhood: “With a sudden movement she bowed his head and joined her lips to his and he 
read the meaning of her movements in her frank uplifted eyes.  It was too much for him.  He 
closed his eyes, surrendering himself to her, body and mind, conscious of nothing in the world 
but the dark pressure of her softly parting lips” (Joyce 108).  Mimicking the ritual of prayer,2 
this encounter thrusts Stephen out of childhood forever and into a life no longer curious about, 
but rather embracing, the failing indulgence of the world.
 It is imperative to realize that even though Stephen has embraced a new direction for 
his life he has not completely left his Catholic beliefs behind him.  Stephen was reared in a 
religious household, around religious doctrine.  That kind of experience has left an indelible 
imprint and it is one that lingers always in the back of Stephen’s mind.  The internal battle 
rages and Joyce writes:
A cold lucid indifference reigned in his soul.  At his first violent sin he had 
felt a wave of vitality pass out of him and had feared to find his body or his 
soul maimed by the excess. Instead the vital wave had carried him on its bo-
som out of himself and back again when it receded; and no part of the body 
or soul had been maimed but a dark peace had been established between 
them. (10)
Stephen is undoubtedly embracing his new lifestyle; yet it is inaccurate to say he is happy.  
Later Stephen thinks to himself that “he had sinned mortally not once but many times he knew 
that, while he stood in danger of eternal damnation for the first sin alone, by every succeeding 
sin he multiplied his guilt and his punishment” (Joyce 110).  So, while Stephen is trying to 
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flee the constraints of Catholicism he is not able to completely breakaway from it either.
 In the third section of the novel Joyce poignantly portrays the doubt that is creeping 
into Stephen’s mind, his return to Catholicism, and the search for that still unattained hap-
piness.  After his teacher speaks of the great saint Francis Xavier, Stephen is overwhelmed 
by Xavier’s monumental work in the name of God.  Guilt overwhelms him and his heart 
“withered up like a flower of the desert that feels the simoom coming from afar.” This leads 
Stephen back to the ideals he thought he had left behind. Father Arnell, a guest speaker who 
comes to preach at Stephen’s school, ensures his transformation back to Catholicism.  In 
a passionate sermon on the realities of hell, Stephen is paralyzed by his own guilt.  He is 
mesmerized by Father Arnell’s words and ultimately with “his tongue cleaving to his palate, 
bowed his head, praying with his heart” (Joyce 146).  
 One finds that this change is not one spawned from the heart; rather, it is rooted in 
fear.  The constraints of Catholic Church forced Stephen to change.  The change for Stephen, 
though, was one based in inexperience, youthful folly, and clouded judgment.  Like a scale 
tipping between left and right, Stephen had pushed both ends to the extreme without the 
thought of breaking from the construct of traditional thought and partaking in a self-explora-
tion into the depths of what life has to offer.  Foregoing this insight, Stephen marches on back 
to the life he had left as a child.  This transformation includes a daily schedule based upon 
daily prayers before a holy image.  Each day of the week is additionally devoted to a specific 
aspect of his faith, and intense reading of religious texts.  Stephen, though, is unsure, and his 
sense of religious vigor is lessened by the fact that his newfound devotion will competently 
combat his past sins.  Joyce suggests that “the spiritual triumph which he felt in achieving 
with ease so many fabulous ages of canonical penances did not wholly reward his zeal of 
prayer since he could never know how much temporal punishment he had remitted by way 
of suffrage” (Joyce 159).  In this passage we find Joyce playing with two powerful emotions 
simultaneously.  Joyce writes of Stephen trying to redeem himself from the sins of his recent 
past.  Yet, Stephen is never quite sure if his actions of devotion and repentance are worthy.  
This uncomforting reality sets Stephen in the awkward realm between salvation and happi-
ness, where neither sensation is being exercised.  Stephen is still tempted by sin despite his 
efforts to re-embrace Catholicism and find happiness.  Stephen, confused, starts to question 
whether he has turned his life around: “Where was his boyhood now? Where was the soul 
that had hung back from her destiny, to brood alone upon the shame of her wounds and in her 
house of squalor and subterfuge to queen in it faded cerements and in wreaths that withered at 
the touch? Or where was he? He was alone” (Joyce 185).  This transformation ends in limbo.  
Joyce touches on the now, while contemplating the before and after.  Catholicism has unveiled 
a variety of virtues that Stephen holds dear to his heart.  Yet, Joyce is able to communicate 
how it doesn’t wholly cure what ails Stephen.
 In limbo Stephen leaves his home after being called a “lazy bitch” and decides to 
take a walk around Dublin (Joyce 189).  This marks the beginning of Stephen’s final trans-
formation.  Walking through a rainy Dublin, Stephen quotes line of poetry to himself and 
ponders the aesthetic theories of Aristotle and Aquinas.  At this stage Stephen’s negative 
worldview has spilled over to his thoughts on academia.  While walking through Dublin he 
imagines “the heads of his classmates meekly bent as they wrote in their notebooks the points 
they were bidden to note” (Joyce 192).  Stephen scoffs at the ineffectual classes he takes and 
the disappointment he finds in his peers.  This general disappointment bleeds over to his pro-
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fessors as well.  Making his way to French class, Stephen runs into the dean of studies.  Their 
conversation proves to yet another disappointing venture in a world he thought to be unyield-
ing.  Stephen is searching for honesty, integrity, and advice from a figure he has been taught 
to respect.  The dean evades much of what Stephen is trying to discuss.  The conversation 
leaves Stephen “disheartened suddenly by the firm dry tone” of his superior’s lack of aesthetic 
knowledge (Joyce 205).  Finding no intellectual connection in his family, peers, or school 
superiors, Stephen is driven closer to the edge, rejecting wholly the institutions in his life to 
which he has devoted so much.
 Through this trinity of rejection, Stephen finally abandons the idea of organized unity 
in the traditional sense.  Stephen is guided to art by an epiphany, which leads him to becom-
ing an artist and spreading the word of art as a unifying force.  Joyce exemplifies this with the 
words: 
The personality of the artist, first a cry or a cadence or a mood and then a 
fluid and lambent narrative, finally refines itself out of existence, imper-
sonalizes itself, so to speak. The esthetic image in the dramatic form in life 
is purified in and reprojected from the human imagination. The mystery of 
aesthetic like that of material creation is accomplished.  The artist, like God 
of the creation, remains within or behind or beyond or above his handiwork, 
invisible, refined out of existence, indifferent, paring his fingernails. (232)
The epiphany of Joyce is one rarely matched in all of literature in terms of power, convic-
tion, and severity.  Through this transformation of mind and spirit, Stephen’s perception of 
a spiritual component to life lies in the aesthetic of art.  In his reading of this formal move, 
Joseph A. Buttgieg articulates, “the inseparability of religion and aesthetics is not peculiar 
to Stephen Dedalus’ theorizing. One is not faced here with a case of synthesis whereby one 
set of beliefs is made to accommodate or is grafted upon another” (107).3  For Stephen, God 
has left the realm of men; God is “indifferent, paring his fingernails.”  In these lines Joyce’s 
words resemble those of a man ministering a congregation.  Stephen is preaching his newly 
found religion in a manner that is very close to the Catholic sermons of his past.  Stephen 
often quotes poetry like he once did scripture.  Admiring Yeats, Stephen cradles the opening 
lines to the play Yeats has just finished.  For Stephen, this kind of artistic expression is above 
all divine and creates a “soft liquid joy [that] flowed through the words where the soft long 
vowels hurtled noiselessly and fell away” (Joyce 245).  For Stephen, art has now given him 
the pleasure and purpose to proceed in life with aim, purpose, and passion.  
 It is finally in Stephen’s conversation with his best friend - Cranly - that the trans-
formation is completed.  Unconvinced of Stephen’s new attitude on life and religion, Cranly 
decides to test Stephen’s sincerity.  Stephen proclaims that “I will not serve” when questioned 
about his mother’s wish for Stephen to partake in the Easter rituals of Catholicism (Joyce 
260).  This statement harkens back to the biblical statement non serviam, traditionally as-
signed to Satan in Jeremiah (Gifford 190).  Clearly Joyce is paying homage to the biblical 
reference, but much like Satan, Stephen must still be bound by Catholic dogma even as he 
denounces it.  Cranly observes “how [Stephen’s] mind is supersaturated with the religion in 
which you say you disbelieve” (Joyce 261).  This conversation is important in highlighting 
Stephen’s newly found artistic discipline that is in the mold of his former religious discipline.  
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Stephen is never truly able to leave the structure of organized religion.  A process of submis-
sion and routine is one necessary to the active and open practice of faith.  In this vein it is a 
substitution of the Christian doctrine by one of personal and practical prominence – art.  Art 
as religion is an idea that Stephen has fully realized and subsequently turned into a way of 
life.  His words, thoughts, and actions are all influenced by art.  He speaks of art, consumes 
art, and appears on the verge of creating art.
 As the novel ends, Stephen has yet to produce any work of substantial merit.  Further 
reading of Joyce will uncover Stephen Dedalus in Ulysses,4 Joyce’s other literary masterpiece. 
Ulysess portrays Stephen not as an artistic success, but rather a failure.  In his consideration of 
this theory, Cordell D.K. Yee contends “no education really takes place, and it is not clear that 
he has made much progress toward becoming an artist” (Brady 68).5  This reading completely 
overlooks one important fact.  Stephen Dedalus and James Joyce are inherently interchange-
able, as this novel is largely autobiographical.  With this understanding, one must read Por-
trait as the resulting piece of evidence of Stephen’s artistic expression.  Joyce as Stephen has 
created art; he has created the novel in question.  The last section only further solidifies my 
point.  Here the novel takes a turn almost unheard of for the time.  Joyce changes the narrator 
in this final section to a first-person perspective, in a journal entry form.6  It is my contention 
that this signifies nothing less than the reader being thrust from the past to the present and into 
the head of Stephen (to be read Joyce).  The character in the book becomes the author, the 
author becomes the artist, and the artist finally finds salvation.  
 Portrait is a work of art in its own right.  Flawed or flawless, no one argues its ambi-
tion, or its rank as one of modernism’s champion works.  Stephen, like the novel, is largely 
left up to interpretation regarding his success, or failure in theory and art.  Yet, Joyce is aware 
of this, perhaps even purposefully, unanswered question.  In this unanswered question I find 
perhaps the greatest evidence for artistic achievement yet.  Art should always, above all, raise 
questions, curiosities, and challenge conventional thought.  No serious critic will argue that 
Portrait is not an indelible piece of art.  Therefore, for reasons and evidence stated previ-
ously, the reader, the critic, the skeptic should not question Stephen Dedalus’ artistic baptism, 
and subsequent affirmation.  To put it as only Joyce can, “O life! I go to encounter for the 
millionth time the reality of experience and to forge in the smithy of my soul the uncreated 
conscience of my race” (276).
Notes
1. All quotations are from James Joyce’s, A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (New York: 
Penguin Books, 1992) and shall be cited parenthetically in the text.
2. For further examples of religious imagery in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man see 
C.G. Anderson’s essay “Christian Symbolism in A Portrait.”
3. “The connections between religion and aesthetics goes as far back in intellectual history as 
one would care to go. At the turn of the century, the context within which Stephen develops, 
religion and aesthetics were as inextricably intertwined as they had ever been” (Buttigieg 
107).
4. For further reading see C. G. Anderson’s essay “Baby Tuckoo: Joyce’s “Features of 
Infancy.”
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5. A larger discussion concerning the connection between Stephen Dedalus’ theory and his art 
is found in Cordell D.K. Yee’s essay “The aesthetics of Stephen’s Aesthetic.”
6. Michael Levenson’s essay “Stephen’s Diary in Joyce’s Portrait – The Shape of Life” is an 
interesting look at how this final, yet often overlooked section can, has, and should be read.
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The Moral Dilemma of Atomic Warfare
Edward Gunn
 By the end of World War II, “more than 100 Japanese cities were destroyed by fire-
bombing, and two by atomic bombing, causing one million casualties, including more than half 
a million deaths, the majority being civilians, particularly women and children.”1  The climax 
of these firebombings occurred when the United States of America dropped the most power-
ful weapons ever used in warfare on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  At 08:15, 
August 6, 1945 the Enola Gay dropped the nuclear bomb called “Little Boy” over the center of 
Hiroshima. It exploded about 580 meters (1885 feet) above the city with a blast equivalent to 13 
kilotons of TNT.2   Three days later, on the morning of August 9, 1945, the crew of the Ameri-
can B-29 Superfortress Bock’s Car, carrying the nuclear bomb nicknamed “Fat Man,” found its 
target over the city of Nagasaki.  The bomb exploded 469 meters (1,540 feet) above the ground 
almost midway between the Mitsubishi Steel and Arms Works, in the south, and the Mitsubishi-
Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works), in the north, the two principal targets of the city.3  
 The horrific destruction that resulted from these bomb blasts was unlike any that had 
ever been witnessed before.  According to one source, “at the point of detonation the tem-
perature probably reached several million degrees centigrade.  Almost immediately a fireball 
was created from which were emitted radiation and heat rays, and severe shock waves were 
created by the blast.”4  On the ground, beneath the explosion center (hypocenter), the tempera-
ture rose to approximately 7,000 degrees Fahrenheit. The heat within 1 1/4 mile radius from 
the explosion center burned the clothes that people were wearing.5  The explosion generated 
an ultra high pressure. The wind velocity on the ground beneath the explosion center was 980 
miles per hour, which is five times stronger than the wind generated by strong hurricanes. The 
pressure was equivalent to 8,600 pounds per square foot.6  In Hiroshima, an area of 5 square 
miles was reduced to ashes, and of the 76,000 buildings in the city 62.9% were destroyed and 
only 8% escaped damage.7  
 It is impossible to know the exact number of deaths that resulted from the explosions 
because people continued to die from the effects of radiation for several years after the attacks.  
Most estimates put the number of deaths by the end of 1945 at around 200,000 people.  In ad-
dition to these deaths, many suffered severe health problems from radiation exposure.  Birth 
defects, blindness, and immune system failures continued to affect the victims of the nuclear 
bombs.8  With all of this death and destruction, there can be no question as to the awesome 
power and destruction that was unleashed against Japan.  The atomic bombs had indiscriminate-
ly killed babies, mothers, the elderly, the sick, and many other indefensible people.
 To many people, the actions of the United States were a moral abomination and totally 
unnecessary.  To others, the nuclear attacks were necessary and morally justified.  Who is right?  
The answer depends on how, and by whom, morality is defined.  Nuclear warfare is nothing 
more than an extreme form of “total warfare” which has been practiced since as far back as the 
American Civil War.  Yet there has been no world outcry against the practice of total war.  In the 
final analysis, nuclear war cannot be condemned if total warfare in any form is morally justified.  
 Many books, articles, and web sites address the moral issues of whether or not the 
atomic bombs should have been used.  Some approach the subject as a “strategic justifica-
tion” issue.  In focusing on the strategic justification for using the atomic bombs, answers are 
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sought as to whether the bombings could be justified on the basis of their necessity in order to 
shorten the war and save lives.  If so, then it was moral; if not, then it was immoral.  
Other publications speak to the issues of the morality of warfare in general, and 
particularly when civilian populations are involved.  These types of publications address 
questions of the morality of war itself.  Can warfare be moral?  If so, then how are legitimate 
targets of war identified?  Can it be moral to attack civilian populations in the name of war?  
Again, many publications seek to answer these questions.  None of these sources, however, 
define the moral principles by which these nuclear attacks can be judged.  And further, how 
can the morality of the atomic bombings of Japan be discussed while ignoring the overriding 
principles of total war that permitted the actions?  The outcries over the fate of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki have been heard, and they have spurred many debates.  But where is the outcry over 
the other acts of war that have led to the deaths of untold millions of civilians? 
The Issues
 The issues involved in the decision to use the atomic bombs on Japan have been 
debated virtually from the moment of impact.  Controversy over President Harry S. Truman’s 
decision to use the atomic bombs has been debated, and the issues continue to be argued over 
60 years later.  There are many questions concerning the circumstances that led up to the 
decision.   Were the bombings really necessary, or were there other, less drastic, alternatives?  
Did using atomic weapons shorten the duration of the war and save more lives than would 
have been lost otherwise?    Was Japan already trying to surrender through Russia, and if so, 
did Truman know it?  What motives were involved in Truman’s decision – racism, revenge, 
to make a political statement to Stalin, or simply to justify the 2 billion dollars that were spent 
developing the bomb?  Or, were Truman’s motives based upon military strategy alone?   Were 
the bombings simply overkill of an already defeated enemy?  Knowing that the Japanese 
would not give up their emperor, why did Truman insist on “unconditional surrender” only 
to allow the emperor system to continue after the war?  Why was the second bomb dropped 
so soon after the first with no chance for a response from Japanese leaders?  There are many 
questions for debate, but probably the most important controversy is the moral issue of target-
ing civilian populations.  Is it moral to target civilians in warfare?   
These questions are the subjects of thousands of books, articles, and letters.  Hun-
dreds of Internet web sites are devoted to addressing these and other issues that were brought 
to the surface when Hiroshima and Nagasaki were devastated by the world’s first nuclear 
attacks.  As more and more information continues to be uncovered or declassified, historians 
and scholars have more resources to support their particular view of the atomic debate.  
It seems that with every passing year, more and more people are coming to believe 
that the nuclear attacks against Japan were not necessary to win the war.  Browsing through 
the many books in a library or through sites on the Internet reveal that more people regret 
Truman’s decision than support it.  However, that sentiment is not unanimous.  Whatever the 
controversy concerning the bombs, one can find well-reasoned arguments on both sides of the 
issue.  Many scholars and historians passionately defend their beliefs about the justification 
for using nuclear weapons against Japan.
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Did the Atomic Bomb Save Lives?
The question of whether the atomic bombs saved more lives than would have been 
lost otherwise is still hotly debated today.  Professor Robert P. Newman of the University of 
Pittsburgh has written much to support the notion that the bombs did indeed save many lives, 
both Japanese and American.  Newman claims, “The preponderance of evidence shows that at 
the time of decision the Truman administration believed, with good reason, that invasion plans 
threatened an unacceptable loss of life, to Japanese as much as to Americans.”9  Newman uses 
many facts, figures, and documents to defend his position that many more people on both 
sides would have been killed had the bombs not been dropped.  
On the other hand, a panel that was requested by President Truman to study the 
Pacific war disagrees.  Their report, The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, was issued 
in July 1946. It declared, 
Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by 
the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the 
Survey’s opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in 
all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have sur-
rendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if 
Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been 
planned or contemplated.10 
 
In the question of whether the bombs saved more lives than they cost, people look at the same 
bank of information, but reach different conclusions.  Robert Newman and the members of 
Truman’s panel all use logical arguments to support their opinions and yet reach opposing 
conclusions.
Was Japan Already Trying to Surrender?
  The question concerning Japan’s plans to surrender prior to the atomic bombings 
finds proponents on both sides of the issue.  After considering testimony from many Japanese 
leaders after the war, Robert Newman concludes, “Early surrender?  With no atom bombs, 
no Russians, no invasion?  Careful inspection of the testimony of the surviving Japanese 
leaders involved …shows that Japan would have fought on indefinitely.”11  Again, this is 
the conclusion of a scholar who has researched the issue and gives evidence to support his 
beliefs.  Another scholar, Robert James Maddox, Professor of History at Pennsylvania State 
University agrees with Newman.  Maddox claims that it is a myth that the military (and Tru-
man) believed that Japan would surrender before an invasion was scheduled.  The problem 
with this scenario, he claims, “…is that no one yet has produced any documentary evidence.  
Efforts to create substantiation where none exists have resulted in some gross distortions of 
the historical record.”12  Maddox goes on to quote General George C. Marshall, Navy Chief of 
Staff Admiral Ernest King, General Henry H. Arnold, and others to show that they believed an 
invasion with many casualties would be necessary before Japan would surrender.
 In contrast, it is not too difficult to find other researchers who disagree with Mad-
dox and Newman.  Doug Long, the author of a web site devoted to spreading the truth about 
the atomic bombings, quotes many documents that show that Japan was seeking a surrender 
mediated by the Soviet Union, and that the U.S. military and President Truman knew about it.  
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Long documents many statements from Japanese foreign minister Shigenori Togo to the Japa-
nese ambassador to the Soviet Union, Naotaki Sato, that prove that Japan wanted to end the 
war.13  Long also documents the fact that President Truman was aware of Japan’s intentions.  
Again, whatever the issue, supporters and detractors can be found who give logical arguments 
to support their views.  Is there any way to know the truth beyond a doubt?
Why Unconditional Surrender?
Why did President Truman insist upon Japan’s unconditional surrender?  After 
the atomic bombings and Japan’s surrender, the United States permitted Japan to keep the 
emperor system of government.  Emperor Hirohito continued to occupy his throne for over 
forty years after the war.  It was widely understood that the Japanese revere the emperor as 
a deity, and this attitude toward Hirohito was the major obstacle that prevented Japan from 
surrendering unconditionally.  Mark Seldon, in his introduction to The Atomic Bomb: Voices 
From Hiroshima and Nagasaki, writes, “The evidence suggests that had the United States 
softened the language of unconditional surrender – indeed, had it employed the very language 
that secured Japan’s surrender after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings – surrender could 
probably have been achieved without the atomic bomb or an invasion.”14  So was the uncondi-
tional surrender policy just plain vindictive?
One source states that “[a]lthough unconditional surrender was demanded from 
Japan, the Potsdam Declaration stated that the Allied Powers ‘do not intend that the Japanese 
shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation.’”  The Potsdam Declaration made clear 
that “freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental 
human rights shall be established.”15  The authors go on to say, “These were the terms under 
which Japan was called upon to surrender.  Far from vindictive, they were not ungenerous 
conditions for an enemy caught in the grip of militarists determined to wage a last-ditch battle 
to the death.”16  However, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration mean nothing if Japan was 
not aware of its contents.
Even assuming that Japan was fully aware of all of the terms of the Potsdam Dec-
laration, there was still no guarantee that the emperor would be spared.  There was no clause 
in the declaration stating that Japan could retain the emperor, and the other statements in the 
declaration were subject to interpretation as to how these promises would be fulfilled.  Kyoko 
and Mark Seldon disagree with Freed and Giovannitti about the justification for demanding 
Japan’s unconditional surrender.  The Seldons say that since the critical issue was the emperor, 
and since he was allowed to remain after all, then the United States was wrong not just to say 
so up front.  Freed and Giovannitti state that Japan was aware of the “generous” terms that 
would be granted to Japan.  Again, there is no consensus on the issues.
What Were President Truman’s Motives?
Can it be known for a fact what President Truman’s motives were for resorting 
to nuclear attacks?  Certainly Truman’s diaries and other records can be looked at to find 
evidence concerning his motives.  But does that end the debate?   It does not, because people 
tend to look at evidence that supports their beliefs, and overlook or downplay evidence to the 
contrary.  Robert Newman disputes at length the arguments that the “cultists” (his term) have 
used to show that racism, a fixation on the Russians, or bureaucratic domination (justifying 
the expenditures for creating the bombs) were the deciding motives for Truman.  He believes 
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the evidence shows that
These analyses do not, however, remove the pressure point of 
decision, which lay with the president.  He ordered the dropping of 
the first bombs “as available” as surely as he ordered cancellation 
of the third.  And the White House was fixated on securing Japan’s 
surrender, on terms that would obviate recrudescence of militarism, 
as quickly and with as few casualties as possible.17
In short, Newman believes that Truman’s motivation for using the bombs was solely strategic.  
Newman uses many facts, figures, documents, and interviews to make his points.
 But again, other writers argue that there were other, less lofty, motives for Truman’s 
decision.  Noted historian and author Gar Alperovitz has written extensively to support his view 
that the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan primarily for their effect on the Soviet Union.  
Alperovitz shows that “the new weapon was first explained to the President because of its role in 
diplomacy, not because of its role in the war. In late April—in the midst of an explosive confron-
tation with Stalin over the Polish issue—Secretary of War Stimson urged discussion of the bomb 
because (as he told Truman) it had ‘such a bearing on our present foreign relations.’”18  Alpero-
vitz makes note of another incident that reveals Truman’s motives: “‘If it explodes as I think it 
will’, Truman told an associate (indicating the Russians as well as the Japanese), ‘I’ll certainly 
have a hammer on those boys.’”19  These quotes certainly give reason to suspect that “atomic 
diplomacy” was at least a factor in Truman’s decision to use the bombs.  And as with Newman, 
Alperovitz uses a lot of historical data to defend his position on the topic.
Much information is available to show that there were possibly many motives that 
went into Truman’s decision to use the atomic bombs, and no one can state positively whether 
any given motive was the deciding factor.  When looking at all the issues that were present 
in the decision, one must admit that the choice was multi-faceted, and good arguments are 
made on each side of every issue.  However, even if all sides agree to a stalemate on the issues 
of the motives for, and necessity of, using the bombs, a greater issue is left on the table: the 
morality of the indiscriminate killing of civilian populations.
The Moral Issue
 The moral issues involved in atomic warfare are certainly significant, and the bomb-
ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have certainly stirred a lot of debate.  But the atomic bomb-
ing of Japan did not create any moral conflict that did not already exist.  Despite the awesome 
power and destructive capabilities of atomic weapons, no new ethical issues should arise re-
garding their use.  The moral questions that were applicable to Truman’s decision had already 
been dealt with, and they were already a part of military history even before World War II.  
 Debating the strategy of dropping the atomic bombs will likely continue.  Histori-
ans and other scholars use the information that is available to form and support their beliefs 
about the necessity of it.  No one can prove beyond a doubt whether lives were saved, whether 
Japan was ready to give up, or whether the bombs were necessary to force Japan to surrender.  
Evidence can be argued from many perspectives.  But in a sense, these are not moral issues; 
they are simply questions of military strategy involving numbers and time.  
The only real moral issue involved in the atomic bomb decision is whether or not 
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bombing civilian targets is justified.  One can agree or disagree with the justification, but 
again, this was not a new moral issue created by the existence of nuclear weapons. Civilians 
had been targeted repeatedly by many nations, including the U.S., for many years.    The 
weapon or method used is not a moral question.  Yes, atomic bombs are horrific, but the fact 
that they kill and destroy more quickly than other methods of warfare is not a moral issue.  To 
examine the issue of whether or not the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
morally justified then is synonymous to asking whether bombing civilians is justified.  
The question should then be asked, “Who decides what is morally acceptable and 
what is not?”  Is the morality question to be determined by individual nations?  Is there some 
sort of international standard that can be applied to define what is moral and what is not?  If 
there is an international standard, with whom does the responsibility lie to enforce these stan-
dards of moral conduct?  
Defining Morality
When asking if the atomic bombings were morally justified, it might be helpful to 
determine whose standards of morality will be used to answer the question.  Who defines mo-
rality?  Is morality defined by individuals, communities, nations, or the world?  Further, is it 
the profession of a belief or the actions of an individual or state that defines morality?  As the 
saying goes, “Actions speak louder than words.”  If an individual or country says one thing, 
and then practices another, then what are that individual’s or country’s true moral standards?
The idea of Cultural Relativism insists that morality is defined by individual cultures, 
and the morals of one culture cannot be imposed on another culture.20  In a book on this topic, 
Melville Herskovits makes the point that “[c]ultural relativism, of course, deals with more 
than just morals, ethics and values; it is also concerned with judgments of time and space and 
volume, differences in perception and cognition, as well as of conduct.”21  By this standard, 
any particular action could be interpreted as moral in one culture, and immoral in another.  
For example, in some cultures prostitution has been considered an acceptable practice.  But 
in many other cultures, prostitution is seen as immoral, and laws are enacted in an attempt to 
prevent it.  It may be fine to leave the question of morality up to individual cultures when the 
issues affect only those within that culture.  However, nuclear warfare is not an issue where 
the effects are confined to those of an individual culture.  The implications of it are global, and 
therefore the morality of targeting civilians cannot be defined by any single culture.
Morality: The Individual Perspective
It may be safe to assume that almost all rational people find repugnant the thought 
of killing women, children, and the elderly in the name of war.  If a surveyor went around the 
world asking individuals if they would have a moral problem going from house to house in 
an enemy civilian population and killing the elderly, babies, and women, one can be sure that 
almost everyone would find the whole idea revolting. On an individual basis, even Truman, 
who ordered the nuclear attacks, halted any further bombings because, “He said the thought 
of wiping out another 100,000 people was too horrible. He didn’t like the idea of killing, as he 
said, ‘all those kids.’”22  Although he chose the path of nuclear warfare, Truman had a moral 
problem with the results of his decision.
On an individual basis, President Roosevelt, who ordered the atomic bombs to be 
developed in the first place, found the idea of bombing civilians to be inhuman barbarism.  In 
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a letter to Governments of France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Great Britain, Roosevelt called 
for an immediate halt of all bombing of civilian populations.  In this letter dated September 1, 
1939, Roosevelt stated:
The ruthless bombing from the air of civilians in unfortified centers 
of population during the course of the hostilities which have raged 
in various quarters of the earth during the past few years, which has 
resulted in the maiming and in the death of thousands of defenseless 
men, women, and children, has sickened the hearts of every civilized 
man and woman, and has profoundly shocked the conscience of 
humanity.
If resort is had to this form of inhuman barbarism during the period 
of the tragic conflagration with which the world is now confronted, 
hundreds of thousands of innocent human beings who have no 
responsibility for, and who are not even remotely participating in, 
the hostilities which have now broken out, will lose their lives. I am 
therefore addressing this urgent appeal to every government which 
may be engaged in hostilities publicly to affirm its determination 
that its armed forces shall in no event, and under no circumstances, 
undertake the bombardment from the air of civilian populations or 
of unfortified cities, upon the understanding that these same rules of 
warfare will be scrupulously observed by all of their opponents. I 
request an immediate reply.23
It is clear from this letter that virtually all sides in the European theater of World War II were 
engaging in the bombardment of civilian populations, and that Roosevelt had strong moral 
objections to this sort of activity.  
 Even the scientists involved in creating the atomic bombs had struggled with their own 
consciences over the moral implications of the weapon they were developing.  Although they 
wanted to end the war, many were troubled by the nature of the weapon that they were creat-
ing.24  Leo Szilard, probably the first scientist to conceive of an atomic bomb, opposed the use 
of the atomic bombs on Japan because he believed that “[a] nation which sets the precedent of 
using these newly liberated forces of nature for the purposes of destruction may have to bear the 
responsibility of opening the door to an era of devastation on an unimaginable scale.”25  Sadly, 
the United States of America bears the responsibility of beginning the nuclear age.
Morality: The Collective Perspective
Even though on an individual basis almost everyone, including Roosevelt and Tru-
man, finds it immoral, collectively, as nations, targeting civilian populations had been repeat-
edly practiced.  It seems that on an individual basis, targeting civilians is absolutely immoral.  
However, collectively, as nations at war, it had become routine.  So the question remains, “Is 
it morally wrong to bomb unfortified cities?”  Again, who defines morality? Perhaps some 
common ground needs to be determined that can define morality across all cultures and na-
tions.  One way to find some common ground would be to look at agreements, treaties, and 
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international organizations to determine if a global consensus exists on the morality of target-
ing civilian populations.
The act of targeting civilians was determined to be morally unacceptable by several 
international agreements dating as far back as 1899 with The Hague II convention and The Hague 
IV (1907) convention concerning Laws and Customs of War on Land.26  The United States Senate 
ratified both of these agreements.  The Hague II convention states in Article XXV,  “The attack or 
bombardment of towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended, is prohibited.”27 
The convention further states in Article XXIII, “Besides the prohibitions provided by special 
Conventions, it is especially prohibited to employ arms, projectiles, or material of a nature to 
cause superfluous injury.”   It would be difficult to argue that indiscriminate bombing of cities 
and villages would not result in “superfluous injury,” especially in the case of nuclear bombs.  
Since then, resolutions by the League of Nations (1938) and the United Nations (1961, 
1968) have confirmed that bombing civilians is morally wrong.  But, even if every nation agrees 
to abide by certain standards of conduct in times of war, is the agreement made null and void if 
all participants cease to abide by the rules?  This is precisely what happened during World War 
II.  Through the practice of “total warfare,” nations had given the green light to targeting the 
civilians of an enemy nation.  Walter Schoenberger makes this point in his book, Decision of 
Destiny, when he says, “The morality of total war had already been sanctioned by the require-
ments of national security.  The use of the atomic weapons symbolized the acceptance of total 
war and provided the precedent for their possible use by other governments.”28  Since virtually 
every country involved in World War II had already been practicing total war, it can be argued 
that on a national level these governments had accepted the act of targeting civilians to be morally 
justifiable.  So a dichotomy exists: at the individual human level targeting civilians is immoral, 
but on the national level it is acceptable.
Total Warfare
 The concept of total warfare was not new for the military leaders in World War II.  
Although there is no authoritative definition of what constitutes total warfare, most scholars 
would agree with the definition offered by Roger Chickering in Total War: The German and 
American Experiences, 1871-1914.  Chickering states,   
Total war is distinguished by its unprecedented intensity and 
extent. Theaters of operations span the globe; the scale of battle is 
practically limitless. Total war is fought heedless of the restraints 
of morality, custom, or international law, for the combatants are in-
spired by hatreds born of modern ideologies. Total war requires the 
mobilization not only of armed forces but also of whole popula-
tions. The most crucial determinant of total war is the widespread, 
indiscriminate, and deliberate inclusion of civilians as legitimate 
military targets.29 [emphasis added].   
In total war, civilians are viewed as acceptable military targets because they are seen as insepa-
rable from a nation’s ability to wage war.  
Erich Ludendorff, the supreme German general in World War I, wrote extensively on 
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the topic of total war.  Ludendorff’s idea of total war contained five basic concepts:
War is total; first, because the theater of war extends over the whole 
territory of the belligerent nations.  In addition to this diffusion of 
risks, total war also involves the active participation of the whole 
population in the war effort.  Not armies but nations wage total 
war.  Thus, the effective persecution of total war necessitates the 
adaptation of the economic system to the purposes of war.  Thirdly, 
the participation of large masses in war makes it imperative to 
devote special efforts, by means of propaganda, to the strengthening 
of morale at home and to the weakening of the political cohesion 
of the enemy nation.  Fourth, the preparation of total war must 
begin before the outbreak of overt fighting.  Military, economic, and 
psychological warfare influence the so-called peacetime pursuits in 
modern societies.  Finally, total war must be directed by one supreme 
authority, that of the commander in chief.30
Though some might not agree with all five of Ludendorff’s concepts of total war, the idea that 
all people of a nation are involved in that nation’s ability to wage war is undisputed.  The chorus 
from a popular World War II British song reinforces that point:  
It’s a ticklish sort of job making a thing for a thing-ummy-bob 
Especially when you don’t know what it’s for 
But it’s the girl that makes the thing that drills the hole 
that holds the spring that works the thing-ummy-bob 
that makes the engines roar. 
And it’s the girl that makes the thing that holds the oil 
that oils the ring that works the thing-ummy-bob 
that’s going to win the war.31
Civilians are crucial to any war effort because they are the ones working in the factories making 
war materials, they are the farmers growing food for the soldiers, and they are the ones paying 
taxes to their government to pay for the war effort.  Without the civilian population, no nation 
could effectively wage war.
This concept of total war did not begin with World War II.  As early as the American 
Civil War, the philosophy of total war was practiced.  General William T. Sherman employed 
total war tactics in his march to the sea to divide the Confederacy in half.  Sherman destroyed 
civilian farms and homes as he burned a path through the South culminating in the burning of 
Atlanta Georgia.  Historian John G. Barrett writes in his book, Sherman’s March Through the 
Carolinas, “Considering all the people of the South as enemies of the Union, he [Sherman] 
planned to use his military forces against the civilian population as well as the armies of the 
enemy.”32  Barrett further states that “it was not a sense of cruelty and barbarism that prompted 
Sherman to formulate his theory of total war.  This conception was the outgrowth of a search for 
the quickest, surest, and most efficient means to win a war.”33  Some consider Sherman a great 
military strategist because of his practice of total war.
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 Elements of total warfare also existed in other conflicts before World War II.  These 
conflicts included the French Revolution, the American Indian Wars, The Taiping Civil War in 
China, and World War I. The French Revolution serves as an example of how the total population 
is critical to the war effort.  From an article on the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, the concept 
is explained:
The French Revolution has introduced some of the concepts of 
total war. The fledgling republic found itself threatened by the 
most powerful coalition of European nations to have been formed 
at that point in history. The only solution, in the eyes of the 
Jacobin government was to pour the nation’s entire resources into 
an unprecedented war effort - this was the advent of the levée en 
masse. The following decree of the National Convention on August 
23, 1794 clearly demonstrates the enormity of the French war 
effort:
From this moment until such time as its enemies shall have 
been driven from the soil of the Republic all Frenchmen are in 
permanent requisition for the services of the armies. The young 
men shall fight; the married men shall forge arms and transport 
provisions; the women shall make tents and clothes and shall serve 
in the hospitals; the children shall turn linen into lint; the old men 
shall betake themselves to the public squares in order to arouse the 
courage of the warriors and preach hatred of kings and the unity of 
the Republic.34
The government in France believed that the whole population was critical to the war effort and 
looked upon every man, woman, and child as a resource for war.
 The Native American Indians were vanquished from the United States largely through 
the wholesale slaughter of civilian populations.  The Union soldiers looked upon the civilians as 
part of the Indian war machine, and therefore legitimate targets.35  On the other hand, slaughtering 
of Indian civilians had been going on a long time before the Civil War, as far back as the Pequot 
War, King Philip’s War, the DeSoto expedition, and Christopher Columbus.36
 The Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864), one of the bloodiest wars in human history, claimed 
20 - 50 million lives, many of which were civilians.37  This war, a clash between the forces of 
Imperial China and those inspired by a self-proclaimed mystic named Hong Xiuquan, saw many 
of the elements of total war: large scale conscriptions, attacks on civilian populations, and destruc-
tion of agricultural resources:  “This war truly was total in that civilians on both sides participated 
to a significant extent in the war effort and in that armies on both sides waged war on the civilian 
population as well as military forces.”38  Although this war claimed more lives than World War I, 
and possibly World War II, the mass killing of civilians that took place in this war has not created 
the heated debates that have taken place over the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
 Almost from the beginning of World War II, both the Allied and Axis powers were 
regularly bombarding civilian populations in efforts to limit the enemy’s capacity to wage war. 
The Germans had conducted aerial assaults against cities in Poland, the Netherlands, and against 
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London.  In response, the British began night raids on Berlin, Hamburg, and other cities. Near 
the end of the war, the United States and Britain conducted aerial raids on Dresden that killed at 
least 35,000 civilians.39  Targeting civilian populations was not limited to the European theater 
of the war.  The Japanese also were involved in the targeting civilians in China, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, and Indonesia.40  In Nanking, the capital of China, “Japanese troops, with the help 
and encouragement of their chain of command and the full knowledge of their senior officers, 
killed up to 350,000 Chinese civilians.”41
Conventional bombings took much more time and many more planes to approach the 
level of destruction that the atomic bombings had, but the devastation was just as great.  The 
March 9-10 incendiary bombing of Tokyo brought more casualties and destruction than either 
of the atomic bombs.42  But the moral issue is the same with the Tokyo bombings as it is with 
the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings.  They all involved the bombing of cities with civilian 
targets.  Yet there has been little if any moral outcry concerning the non-nuclear bombings.  It 
would seem that it is not the act of killing civilians but the method by which they are killed that 
causes moral offense. 
An Issue of Hypocrisy
Since almost every nation was guilty of targeting and killing civilians during World 
War II, why were some of the leaders of the defeated nations put on trial for war crimes includ-
ing killing civilians?  It seems to be hypocritical for a country to label as a crime, and to seek 
punishment for, actions for which they are all guilty.  “At the Tokyo war crimes trial of 1948, 
Justice Radhabinod Pal of India issued a dissenting opinion in which he invoked the ‘inhuman 
blasts’ leveled on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and criticized a judicial process in which ‘any crime 
remains available only against the vanquished in a lost war.’” 43  In affect, what this is saying is 
that “[i]t’s only a crime if you lose the war.”  
Perhaps rather than admitting that what was done to Hiroshima and Nagasaki was an 
act of targeting civilians, the victors in the war chose to prosecute the vanquished in an attempt 
to make themselves believe that somehow their actions were different than what the enemy had 
done.  That is not to argue that what the Japanese had done during the war was not barbaric, 
but as the old saying goes, “two wrongs do not make a right.”  The United States leadership 
in World War II cannot claim that they took the moral high ground because in reality they had 
resorted to the same tactics that many Japanese leaders were tried, convicted, and sentenced for 
committing.  For those who believe that dropping the atomic bombs was morally justified and 
necessary to win the war, is it too much to at least admit that it took away the right to claim any 
moral superiority over the enemy?   
 
Conclusion: Living up to a World Standard of Morality
 It should be clear by now that the question of the morality of dropping atomic bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is very complex, and there are no clear answers.  Should the actions 
of the United States in this regard be condemned?  If so, then the actions of many other nations 
before and during World War II must also be condemned.  The moral question is not about how 
big and destructive the bombs are, but about killing unarmed civilians in war.  Most nations had 
stated in one treaty or another that they believed it to be morally unacceptable to target civilians, 
yet virtually all parties involved did so.  So does the international community really believe that 
it is immoral?  Their words say yes, but their actions say no.  Their leaders say yes, but their 
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military actions say it is acceptable.  
With no worldwide authority to define morality, the actions of the United States in drop-
ping the atomic bombs on Japan can be seen by one standard of morality to be an unacceptable, 
barbaric act.  But by another standard of morality, these same actions can be seen as a necessary 
consequence of war that does not violate moral principles.  On an individual level, virtually 
every human being with a conscience would have a moral dilemma in killing unarmed women 
and children.  What kind of person could look into the eyes of a little baby and then snuff out 
that baby’s innocent life?  Certainly no person with any moral conscience at all could do such 
a thing. However if the act is sanitized by labeling it “total war”, and is carried out by bombs 
dropped from the air so that the faces of the victims do not have to be viewed, then it seems a 
perfectly acceptable conduct of war.  
What this world needs is not only a debate regarding the morality of atomic warfare, 
but there should also be a worldwide outcry against all acts of total war.  Nations signing agree-
ments and treaties is not enough—they have done that before and then ignored them.  But rather, 
all nations of the world must utterly refuse to participate in the barbaric acts that have become 
acceptable in warfare, and which have made many believe that there is nothing immoral about 
the mass killing of helpless human beings using nuclear bombs.  The nations of the world must 
live up to the agreements and conventions that almost all them have stated to be their moral 
position.  These agreements—including The Hague conventions, The Geneva Conventions, and 
many other resolutions and treaties—have stated that the nations believe that the indiscriminate 
killing of civilians is immoral.44  And even if one or more nations continue to commit war crimes 
such as targeting civilians, the other nations must not see that as an excuse to lower themselves 
to that barbaric standard.  The nations of the world must begin to live up to their words.  If the 
immorality of total war is understood and believed, then the immorality of nuclear warfare is 
obvious.
The difference between the total war that has become a standard practice of warfare, 
and the atomic bombing of Japan is that with nuclear weapons it is now possible to destroy all 
human life on earth.  Would anyone like to justify the use of nuclear weapons in the next war? 
If nuclear weapons are ever used again, there may be no one left to debate the morality of it.      
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Jiangxi Elementary School Explosion: A 
Look at Human Rights in China
Rhonda Maynard
Introduction 
 On March 7, 2001, thirty-seven children in a small village southwest of Shanghai 
were killed when firecrackers they were forced to assemble at school exploded. The blast 
sparked outrage throughout the world and brought to the forefront, once again, China’s record 
of human rights abuses. The incident presents a unique opportunity to examine human rights 
in China. We can analyze the event to answer the following questions: 1) Which human rights, 
if any, were violated? 2) Does international pressure force change? and 3) How does China 
define “human rights?”
PART I. WHICH HUMAN RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED?
 According to the United Nations “Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” the follow-
ing rights were violated during the course of this event and cover-up. A discussion follows.
Article 23. (1) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employ-
ment, to just and favorable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment…
Article 26. (1) Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, 
at least in the elementary and fundamental stages…
Article 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; 
this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers…
Article 12. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks…1
Free Choice of Employment and Right to Free Education
 According to the standards set forth by the United Nations, the Jiangxi elementary 
school explosion serves as an example of the violation of both free choice of employment 
and the right to free education. Simply put, the children were forced to work; thus, they did 
not have free choice of employment. Moreover, reports stated the school factory was set up 
because of government imposed budget cuts for education. In other words, the students al-
legedly worked to fund the school, which is an infringement on their right to free education. 
After the event, Chinese people expressed shock and outrage on Web sites and Internet chat 
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rooms: “‘how could this happen in China?’ one person wrote. ‘Schools are for learning, not 
for business.’”2
 How could something like this happen? Two reasons: poor economic conditions and 
under-funded schools. In a country of 1.3 billion people, people are willing to sacrifice rights 
in order to make a livin—even in an industrial province like those found in southern China, 
where over forty million migrant workers work and live at the factories. In 2004, Chinese 
workers at one plant made about one-hundred dollars per month, or about fifty-cents an hour.3 
Some companies pay even less. The fact that the blast occurred in a poor rural district is even 
more telling, since rural workers make far less than those in urban areas (see figure 1).
Figure 1.
2003 urban per capita disposable income    $1,028*
2003 rural per capita disposable income    $317*
Persons living in poverty (estimate)     30 million
Persons whose income does not exceed $1* per day (estimate)  100 to 150 million
*Figures in U.S. dollars.
Source: U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices in China, February 29, 2005.
 According to UNICEF, “[a]lthough no accurate statistics are available, the Interna-
tional Labor Organization estimates that in developing countries 250 million children between 
age five and 14 work. More than 60 percent of them live in Asia.”4At the time of the explo-
sion, Jiangxi was “one of China’s poorest provinces.”5 In fact, according to one BBC report, 
“the extent of poverty in the region was emphasized when phone calls to the local fire brigade 
were met with a recorded message, saying the number had been disconnected because phone 
bills had not been paid.”6 The Washington Post Foreign Service reported, “Parents reached by 
telephone said teachers seeking to supplement their meager state salaries forced the children 
to work without pay and set production quotas that had to be met before the children could 
go home.”7 What makes the incident even more terrible was that, according to one villager, 
“‘[t]he parents complained many times to the school and the township government, but noth-
ing happened.’…The bereaved father said children were even fined a few pennies if they 
refused to work.”’8
 At the time of the incident, the BBC reported that human rights workers blamed 
chronic under-funding in rural Chinese schools. “There are reports of teachers having to sell 
semen and tobacco to help fund local schools.”9 The Taipei Times confirmed the report, stat-
ing, “Cash-strapped Chinese schools do sometimes rent out space to businesses to raise mon-
ey…Last month [February 2001], state television reported a room rented out by one Shang-
hai school was used as a gambling den.”10 National Public Radio’s Rob Gifford explained, 
“[s]ubsidies from the central government to the local governments have all but stopped…the 
villages are really being left to fend for themselves. They’ve got to raise their own money in 
order to pay for things like hospitals, to pay teacher’s salaries.”11
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Freedom of Speech and Press and Freedom from Attack on a Person’s Reputation
 Criticism over China’s infringement upon freedom of speech is not new. Perhaps 
the most vivid image that Americans have of China is Tiananmen Square, when the Chinese 
government killed several student demonstrators during an attempt to halt a protest against the 
government. As Rosemary Foot points out in Rights Beyond Borders, “It was the crisis in June 
1989, reported so extensively on our TV screens, that brought China’s human rights record to 
the forefront of global attention.”12
 In the aftermath of Tiananmen Square, Chinese citizens became more outspoken than 
ever about the issue of free speech; therefore, it is not surprising that soon after the Jiangxi 
Elementary School explosion, western journalists received reports from villagers about an al-
leged Chinese government cover-up: “Parents have…accused the government of cover-up,” the 
Agence France Presse wrote, and “survivors of the blast and parents have been warned to keep 
quiet and to stick to the official explanation.”13 United Press International reported, “villagers 
in a small Chinese village have cried foul as state media and government officials changed the 
story of how over 40 of their children died as their school exploded early Thursday.”14
 The cover-up accusation is not without merit. After all, local police first blamed 
an allegedly mentally ill villager named Li Chuicai for the explosion. Local police told the 
People’s Daily that they [police] had found an incriminating note written by Li in which he 
stated he intended “to set off an explosion in a crowded place.”15 Police also matched chemi-
cals from the explosion to those found in Li’s house, and there were four eyewitnesses “who 
saw Li riding in the direction of the primary school carrying plastic pockets obviously with 
something in them.”16 Finally, “autopsy results of Li’s body showed that he was at the very 
center of [the] explosion.”17 The newspaper declared, “Aftermath Well Handled.”18
 As stories appeared around the world criticizing the Chinese government for its 
handling of the case, Premier Zhu Rongji assured the public that it was, in fact, “a lone mad-
man.”19  When asked again nine days after the explosion whether or not he continued to be-
lieve it was “a lone madman with two bags of fireworks,” Zhu replied, “I know overseas me-
dia and media in Hong Kong did not agree with the explanation I gave them. They all chose to 
believe that the explosion was caused by production of fireworks by the students…But up to 
now there is no evidence that can be found to override the conclusion we already drew.”20 Zhu 
did, however, go on to say that there would be an ongoing investigation, and anyone involved 
in a cover-up would be punished (in fact, some local officials were dismissed according to 
a 2001 U.S. State Department report21). A foreign ministry spokesman later reiterated Zhu’s 
comment, saying “investigations had proved a mentally disturbed villager had caused the blast 
in a suicide mission and that journalists had distorted the facts in order to attack China.”22
PART II. DOES INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE FORCE CHANGE?
 The Jiangxi Elementary School explosion prompted the Congress of the United 
States to look more closely at U.S.-China trade relations. In a letter to secretary of Labor 
Elaine Chao, Representatives George Miller and Nancy Pelosi wrote, “what has emerged is 
a very disturbing picture of systematic forced labor by very young children that requires a 
thorough review by the Department of Labor and, if corroborated, immediate action in con-
formity with legal restrictions against the importation of products manufactured under such 
conditions.”23 Besides the obvious concern for the welfare of the Chinese people, Congress-
man Miller and Congresswoman Pelosi also were worried that fireworks made by the students 
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could wind up in the United States. In other words, Chinese blood would be on U.S. hands. 
Some reports suggest, sadly, that some of the firecrackers were used during Independence Day 
celebrations.24
 It does appear that international pressure has forced China to take the issue of human 
rights more seriously. The Chinese government regularly cites publicly that ensuring human 
rights is a top priority. Early in his July 27, 2005 address to the National Committee on United 
States-China Relations in Washington D.C., Tang Jiaxuan, State Councilor of the People’s 
Republic of China, said, “In March last year [2004], China’s National People’s Congress met 
to write ‘the State respects and safeguards human rights’ into the Constitution. China has 
acceded to 21 international human rights instruments, and conducted human rights dialogue 
with many countries, the U.S. included, on the basis of equality and mutual respect.”25
 Just a couple of months ago, on September 22, 2005, the Chinese Ambassador to the 
United States, H.E. Zhou Wenzhong, in a speech to the Asia Society in New York, outlined 
five important things for the future of China-U.S. relations: 1) an evaluation of China-U.S. 
over the past 26 years, 2) broad mutual interests on strategic and security issues to serve as 
the bedrock of our cooperation, 3) a mutually beneficial or “win-win” situation is completely 
feasible, 4) people-to-people exchanges offer vast potential, and 5) create a more unified 
approach to differences over such questions as Taiwan, [human rights] and religion.26 Spe-
cifically, Zhou stated, “The Chinese government attaches high importance to the protection 
and advancement of human rights. The people in China are enjoying more substantial human 
rights than ever before.”27 Zhou admits, “we have not done perfectly. There is still room for 
improvement. But we are striving for constant progress.”28
 What Zhou says appears to be true, at least in East Asia in general. For example, 
one Hong Kong School for expatriate children now teaches students about child labor and the 
United Nations Commission on the Rights of the Child as part of its curriculum in an effort 
to “cultivate internationalism and respect for other cultures.”29 One fourth-grader said about 
child carpet-weavers, “It’s not very pleasant, it’s very dark…You can get hurt by the danger-
ous materials.”30
PART III. CHINA’S DEFINITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
 In the U.S., our concept of human rights mostly derives from our notion of unalien-
able rights as defined by the Founding Fathers in the Declaration of Independence; that is, 
those of “life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.” In reality, however, “the widening and deep-
ening of the human rights idea owes itself to a variety of factors.”31 Foot states, 
[It] must include revulsion against genocidal practices during the Second 
World War, racial discrimination, and the propping up of repressive regimes 
in the cold-war era. Important too has been the shifting balance of voting 
power or bargaining power in the U.N. bodies or state bureaucracies; the 
changing of legislative and bureaucratic procedures, the consequences of 
which were only partially realized beforehand, and which demonstrate the 
independent power of institutional arrangements; and a kind of tit-for-tat 
targeting by adversaries that in the context of fluctuating voting power often 
served to make less partisan and more global the effects of new initiatives.32
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The Chinese differentiate between due rights (legal rights) and “natural rights.”33 In China, 
human rights are more closely related to “due rights” than “natural rights,” whereas in the 
West, human rights are considered “natural rights,” and laws are made in order to protect 
them. Furthermore, the Chinese concept of human rights mostly derives from a mixture of 
ancient Confucianism and modern Marxism. It might appear as if these two concepts—Confu-
cianism and Marxism—are diametrically opposed; after all, Confucius wrote about individual 
morality and ethics, while Marxism stresses the community, not the individual. However, 
the two philosophies do have at least one similarity. The Confucian value “Chung” teaches 
loyalty to the state. Loyalty to the state, albeit a misinterpretation of Marx’s and Engels’ 
philosophy, is considered by many an important tenet in modern Chinese Communism. To the 
Chinese, then, the phrase “human rights,” is inherently community related. One can only have 
human rights if it benefits the community. If the community suffers because of an individual, 
then the individual’s rights are revoked in favor of community harmony.
 Nevertheless, citizens like Wei Jingsheng, one of the activists imprisoned after the 
Democracy movement, are forcing the Chinese government to rethink their definition of hu-
man rights. In a letter written from prison in June 1991, Wei declared, “The lack of human 
rights is the principle cause for many of the concrete problems confronting Chinese society.”34 
He lists six fallacies regarding the Chinese theory of human rights:
FALLACY ONE: Human rights are the internal affairs of a country, and 
foreign governments and organizations have no right to interfere…
FALLACY TWO: There are different standards of human rights. Different 
standards apply to different countries, nations, cultural traditions, and social 
systems and people should be content with the human rights standards 
stipulated in the laws of their country…
FALLACY THREE: It is permissible to discuss the issue of human rights 
and carry out international human rights, but it is an “abnormal phenom-
enon” to preach specific values, ideologies, and models…
FALLACY FOUR: It is permissible to discuss and even protect human 
rights, but no international pressure will be tolerated. Emancipation of hu-
man rights under a dictatorship can only come about through the dictator-
ship’s “own choice.”…
FALLACY FIVE: “We have managed to feed and meet the subsistence 
needs of over one billion people” and “this is the greatest human right”…
FALLACY SIX: “Looking after the interests of the majority of the people is 
our major point of departure on human rights.”35
Wei’s letter was very influential, and the “White Paper on Human Rights in China” was issued 
later that year (November 1991).
Conclusion
 China has a long way to go in proving its commitment to protecting human rights. In 
July 2005, the South China Morning Post reported, “Children as young as 13 years old were 
sent to work in sweatshop factories in Dongguan, Guandong under ‘summer jobs’ schemes 
backed by their parents and their schools.”36 Teachers and factory bosses involved were un-
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concerned. They “claimed that they were merely helping the children financially by arranging 
the apprenticeships.”37 Until the Chinese government reconciles the disparity between urban 
and rural income, the problem of poverty, and cracks down on child labor abuses, the foreign 
community must remain vigilant in its demands for human rights improvements. 
(Endnotes)
1. United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (New York: 10 December 1948) 
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html  (7 November 2005).
2. John Pomfret and Phillip P. Pan, “Blast Kills 37 Students in China,” Washington Post 
Foreign Service, 8 March 2001.
3. Frontline: Is Wal-Mart Good for America? Dir. Rich Young, ed. Carol Slatkin, 60 min., 
WGBH Educational Foundation, Boston, Mass., 2004, videocassette.
4. “UNICEF expresses regret, outrage over school explosion,” U.S. Fund for UNICEF, 7 
March 2001, http://www.unicefusa.ord/site/aps/nl/content2.asp?c=duLRI8oOH&b=106519&c
t=127382 (28 October 2005).
5. Fireworks blamed for China school deaths,” BBC World: Asia-Pacific, 7 March 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/11206665.stm (28 October 2005).
6. Ibid.
7. Pomfret and Pan, “Blast Kills 37.”
8. “Anger of ‘firework school’ parents,” BBC World: Asia-Pacific, 7 March 2001, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1207215.stm   (28 October 2005).
9. Ibid. 
10. “China school explosion kills 41,” The Taipei Times, 8 March 2001, 1.
11. Rob Gifford, interview by Lisa Simeone. Weekend All Things Considered, National Public 
Radio, 11 March 2001.
12. Rosemary Foot, Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over 
Human Rights in China (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 256.
13. “Chinese blast school forced students to make fireworks in the past,” Agence France 
Presse, 15 March 2001.
14. Kirk Troy, “Village upset about government stories,” United Press International, 9 March 
2001.
15. “Truth Behind School Explosion Known,” People’s Daily, China Internet Information 
Center, 9 March 2001, http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/show_text?info_id=8791&p_qry=
2001%20and%20fireworks (28 October 2005).
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid. 
19. “Chinese blast,” Agence France Presse.
20. “Full Text of Premier Zhu’s Press Conference (II),” People’s Daily, China Internet 
Information Center, 16 March 2001, http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_text?info_
id=9256&p_qry=2001%20and%20fireworks (28 October 2005).
21. U.S. Department of State, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau) (Washington D.C.: GPO, 2002), 31.
22. “Chinese blast,” Agence France Presse.
23. George Miller and Nancy Pelosi, letter to Elaine L. Chao, 26 June 2001
ae
gis 2
0
0
6
8
0
m
ayn
ard
24. George Miller and Nancy Pelosi, letter to Charles W. Winwood, 26 June 2001.
25. Tang Jiaxuan, “Address at Welcome Luncheon by National Committee on U.S.-China 
Relations and U.S.-China Business Council,” National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 
Washington D.C., 27 July 2005. 
26. H.E. Zhou Wenzhong, “The Future of China-U.S. Relations,” Asia Society, New York, 22 
September 2005.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
29. “Planting the seeds of human rights,” Financial Times Information, 30 May 2005.
30. Ibid. 
31. Foot, Rights Beyond Borders, 57.
32. Ibid. 
33. Stephen C. Angle and Marina Svensson, ed. The Chinese Human Rights Reader: 
Documents and Commentary 1900-2000 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 34.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Minnie Chan, “Children forced to work in factories,” South China Morning Post Ltd., 30 
July 2005, 4.
37. Ibid. 
Bibliography
“Anger of ‘firework school’ parents,” BBC World: Asia-Pacific, 7 March 2001, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1207215.stm (28 October 2005).
Angle, Stephen C. and Marina Svensson.. The Chinese Human Rights Reader: Documents 
and Commentary 1900-2000 (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 34.
Chan, Minnie.  “Children forced to work in factories,” South China Morning Post Ltd., 30 
July 2005, 4
“China school explosion kills 41,” The Taipei Times, 8 March 2001, p. 1.
“Chinese blast school forced students to make fireworks in the past,” Agence France Presse, 
15 March 2001.
“Fireworks blamed for China school deaths,” BBC World: Asia-Pacific, 7 March 2001, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/11206665.stm (28 October 2005).
Foot, Rosemary. Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over 
Human Rights in China. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. 
Frontline: Is Wal-Mart Good for America? Dir. Rich Young, ed. Carol Slatkin, 60 min., 
WGBH Educational Foundation, Boston, Mass., 2004, videocassette.
“Full Text of Premier Zhu’s Press Conference (II),” People’s Daily, China Internet 
Information Center, 16 March 2001, http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/Show_
text?info_id=9256&p_qry=2001%20and%20fireworks (28 October 2005).
Gifford, Rob. “Analysis: Explosion in a rural schoolhouse in China last Tuesday is believed to 
have been caused by children making fireworks to supplement income of teachers,” 
interview by Lisa Simeone. Weekend All Things Considered, National Public Radio, 
8
1
ae
gi
s 
2
0
0
6
m
ay
n
ar
d
11 March 2001.
Jiaxuan, Tang.  “Address at Welcome Luncheon by National Committee on U.S.-China 
Relations and U.S.-China Business Council,” National Committee on U.S.-China 
Relations, Washington D.C., 27 July 2005. 
Miller, George and Nancy Pelosi, letter to Charles W. Winwood, 26 June 2001.
Miller, George and Nancy Pelosi, letter to Elaine L. Chao, 26 June 2001.
“Planting the seeds of human rights,” Financial Times Information, 30 May 2005.
 Pomfret, John and Phillip P. Pan, “Blast Kills 37 Students in China,” Washington Post 
Foreign Service, 8 March 2001.
 Troy, Kirk. “Village upset about government stories,” United Press International, 9 March 
2001.
“Truth Behind School Explosion Known,” People’s Daily, China Internet Information Center, 
9 March 2001, http://service.china.org.cn/link/wcm/show_text?info_id=8791&p_qry
=2001%20and%20fireworks (28 October 2005).
“UNICEF expresses regret, outrage over school explosion,” U.S. Fund for UNICEF, 7 March 
2001, http://www.unicefusa.ord/site/aps/nl/content2.asp?c=duLRI8oOH&b=106519
&ct=127382 (28 October 2005).
U.S. Department of State, 2001 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in China 
(includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau). Washington D.C.: GPO, 2002.
 Wenzhong, H.E. Zhou.  “The Future of China-U.S. Relations,” Asia Society, New York, 22 
September 2005.
ae
gis 2
0
0
6
8
2
ro
b
e
rts
A Woman’s Religion: How Ann Lee 
Broke Through the Patriarchy
Jennifer Roberts
In the last few decades, feminists have been looking to the Shakers as both a model 
for women’s equality in religious leadership and as a model of an ideal utopian society. Ann 
Lee, founder of the American Shaker religion, provided the building blocks for future Shakers 
to codify and expound on the laws set forth by this enigmatic visionary, which would lead the 
Shakers toward an egalitarian society. However, a few scholars have exposed what they see as 
contradictory ideas of gender equality that permeate Ann Lee’s philosophy, as well as that of 
the later Shakers. Debates rage over the later Shakers gendered labor division and Lee’s sup-
posed enforcement of the patriarchy as proof that Lee was not an advocate for women. Others, 
in Lee’s defense, claim that her belief in a female counterpart to Christ coupled with her lead-
ership role is proof enough that she was in many respects a feminist.  Though the argument is 
sound, it does not go far enough. One must look at Lee in the context of her own time and not 
through twenty-first century eyes. One must look behind the curtain, behind the patriarchal 
hierarchy, to understand how Lee worked within the only system available to women to affect 
wide-scale change and make the Shakers a “women’s religion.”1 
Though Lee was the founder of a new religious sect, Lee recognized that she would 
need to work within the patriarchal framework of both society and Christianity, and manipu-
late the hierarchal system to further the standing of women within a religious community. To 
understand how Lee manipulated her position and the confines of such, and to fully under-
stand the significance of Lee’s ideology of religion and how it has informed feminism today, 
we must first explore her history. Lee’s experiences as a young girl, a wife, a mother, and a 
leader of an influential religion will help clarify the rationale behind the dichotomy of her 
teachings. 
Lee’s childhood and upbringing are critical to the understanding of how she shaped 
the Shaker religion. Lee, born into a working class family in 1736 in Manchester, England, 
had no formal schooling. In fact, Lee remained illiterate her entire life. Luckily, her oral 
teachings were written down in some of the Shaker’s most important religious texts: The 
Divine Book of Holy and Eternal Wisdom, and Compendium. Often, these texts are referred to 
as “Mother’s Wisdom,” which laid the foundation for the belief system of the early Shakers. 
Within the teachings we discover the ideas on the role of women that supports Lee’s stand-
ing as a feminist visionary and champion of women. The natural progression of the Shakers 
into an era of positive attitude toward women in their society and liturgy was a direct result of 
Lee’s influence from within the system.
Through Lee’s oral teachings we get a clear account of her childhood and inclination 
for religious duty. Lee, an enigmatic child, exhibited quite an interest in religious mysticism. 
She had visions of a godly nature from a young age. She was dedicated to God and keenly 
aware of her own sinfulness. Lee’s preoccupation with her own impurity seemed to torture 
her: “I labored in nights; continually crying for my own redemption, and in the daytime I put 
my hands to work and my heart to God. My sufferings were so great that my flesh consumed 
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upon my bones and I became as helpless as an infant.”2 Lee’s religious fervor and awareness 
of her shortcomings as a mortal not only attracted the attention of those around her, but also 
set her up for a life of purpose.
Lee’s religious awareness and propensity toward mysticism left her open to explore 
a new religion being formed in 1747. The Quaker religion split, with one sect becoming the 
Shaking Quakers, so named for their “highly emotional services, during which members sang, 
shouted, danced, spoke in tongues, and literally shook with emotion.”3 After her conversion in 
1758, Lee’s personality and vitality enabled her rapid rise to leadership.
Though married, Lee would advocate celibacy and a sibling mentality among the 
believers, having them refer to each other, married or not, as brother and sister. It has been 
speculated that four difficult childbirths and the deaths of all four children influenced Lee in 
developing this particular tenet of the Shakers.4 In an essay “Blessed Mother Ann, Holy Moth-
er Wisdom: Gender and Divinity in Shaker Life and Belief,” Marjorie Procter-Smith helps us 
draw the conclusion that childbirth did indeed have an effect on Lee’s religious philosophy. 
Procter-Smith highlights Lee’s account of a religious experience in which Lee uses wording 
that parallels her own experience of giving birth:
Thus I labored, in strong cries and groans to God, day and night, til my flesh 
wasted away, and I became like a skeleton, and a kind of down came upon 
my skin, until my soul broke forth to God; which I felt as sensibly as ever a 
woman did a child, when she delivered of it.5
The metaphorical use of labor and birth mark Lee’s recognition of the oppressiveness of the 
female body in relation to reproduction and child rearing. Equating birth to something other 
than natural and normal was radical and would help deconstruct the theory that a woman’s 
worth laid only within her womb. It would be this philosophy that would open the doors 
for women in the Shaker community to look beyond motherhood as their only option.  Lee 
demonstrated that women could also consider leadership roles in liturgy and become active 
participates in the economy and community.    
Lee was not afraid to challenge societal and religious norms. In England in 1770, 
while Lee was imprisoned for breaking the Sabbath, she claimed to have had visions that 
confirmed for her that celibacy was the only path to God because “lust was the original 
sin…[O]nly by giving up intercourse entirely…could humankind be reconciled with God.”6 
It can be argued that Lee’s success in proclaiming celibacy as the only avenue to salvation 
helped lead the natural progression toward equality in the church and society for women. By 
removing the oppression of child bearing, women were able to “develop and exercise both 
[their] male and female attributes.”7  Lee recognized that if a woman’s role was defined only 
in relationship to motherhood—a woman’s purpose is for reproduction only—then women 
would not be able to advance into other social, religious, and economic arenas.   
  Lee’s voice broke through for women in a multitude of ways, but none held 
on stronger than the belief in the duality of Christ. During her imprisonment in England in 
1770 in which she had her visions that established celibacy as the only way to God, she had 
another vision that would further solidify the importance and equality of women in the Shaker 
society. Lee’s vision revealed to her that there was no holy trinity connected to Christ, but 
instead, a duality—male and female.  Lee stated that Christ, in his first coming, represented 
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only the male counterpart, referred to as the “second Adam.” The vision also informed Lee 
that Christ’s second coming would be appearing in the female form, known as the “second 
Eve.”  Setting up an equality of female-ness and male-ness in Christ would spill over into the 
equality of women in the Shaker community. The Shakers reverence for Ann, as well as her 
dynamic leadership ability, led them to think she, Mother Ann, was the female godhead of 
Christ.8 The visions would assist the move toward utopian ideals and set women up for future 
equality in liturgy.
Though having strong recognition in a female deity that was “essential to woman’s 
social and religious emancipation,”9 the Shakers juxtaposed positive female imagery against 
conventional societal ideals about women. Procter-Smith explains that the “greater sinfulness 
of women necessitated, in part, the Second Coming of Christ in female form.”10 Lee herself 
would propagate the conventional rhetoric on women’s inferiority both spiritually and 
domestically.
Lee felt that there was a feminine component to Christ, yet she also believed that 
men were heads of household. Her stance on women’s roles as wives and mothers would 
stand in contradiction to the equality of Christ’s gender. In the sacred text Divine Book of Holy 
and Eternal Wisdom, Lee dictates a conventional gendered role for women in the household: 
“Rise early, and look well to your household affairs; go forth in cheerfulness and good humor, 
and perform well your part which is allotted to you.”11 The path allotted for women, as Lee 
saw it, was still a path secondary to the role of man:
As in nature it requires a man and a woman to produce children, the man 
is first and the woman is second in the government of the family; he is the 
father, and she the mother; and the male and female children must be subject 
to their parents, and the woman subject to her husband, who is the first. 12 
Lee’s position on family structure was in apparent opposition to her role as leader 
in the Shaker community, which did not go unnoticed by some. Suzanne R. Thurman, in 
her book O Sisters Ain’t You Happy, explores the androgynous model of the Shakers by 
highlighting the difficulties Ann Lee had in her challenged, untraditional role as apostle and 
public speaker. Thurman recounts a challenge by John Meacham, future leader of the Shakers, 
in which he questioned Lee about “the propriety of her public speaking and visible leadership 
role,” which does not obey Paul’s admonishment against women speaking up in church.13 
Lee responded and carried further the previous quote on women’s and men’s roles by saying, 
“[W]hen the man is gone, the right of government does not belong to the children, but to the 
wife.”14 Lee was justifying her position while advocating gender hierarchy in an attempt to 
blend the two roles.  
The question of whether there was a female head of church in the Shaker community 
was asked and answered differently on another occasion. When confronted again about the 
position of a female leader, there was slick denial: “No; Christ is the head of the church.”15 
Whereas this first answer relegates the woman to leader only in the absence of her husband, 
the second removes her from leadership completely and puts it in the hands of God. Still, 
“Lee was the undisputed center of the community,”16 and the environment that she created 
would encourage later Shaker leaders such as John Meacham to expound on the ideal utopian 
existence.     
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We need look no further than Lee’s own words in arguing that Mother Ann 
influenced future generations to lean toward equality in women’s rights within the community 
despite the contradictions. The mere fact that Lee founded and ran the Shakers in early 
America gave women a positive role model. Regardless of Meacham’s challenge to her visible 
leadership, and Lee’s own views on men as heads of household, “belief in Lee as a female 
godhead served later generations of Shakers with a theological basis for their espousal of 
equal rights for women.”17 All the building blocks were in place for a natural progression into 
what is now argued as a utopian and feminist society and religion.    
 Following Ann Lee’s death in 1784, Shaker leaders began to head in a new direction 
by creating separate but equal orders for men and women and fully developing communal 
living. The natural progression of the Shakers into communal living in large part may have 
come about from Lee’s success in acquiring converts during her nine years in America. 
Churches and communities threatened by Lee and the Shakers’ success became violent. Mobs 
consistently terrorized the Shaker’s pacifist community. The need to huddle closer together 
for protection is one of the primary reasons communal living may have developed among 
the Shakers in the last decade of the eighteenth century. 18 Along with communal living and 
socialist policies (i.e. communal property, etc.), sexual segregation had evolved.  
The development of separate religious orders was another step toward a post-Lee 
Shaker ideology. Each order was split into male/female orders. The orders were then headed 
by two men for the male order and two women for the female order; both sets of leaders 
would have equal say and rule over the society. In this way, equality in liturgy became a 
cornerstone in Shaker religion, influencing the outside world.  
However, this brings up the question of whether separate but equal is truly equal. 
Thurman may say yes, but Procter-Smith would argue that it does not. Procter-Smith points 
out that the effects of instituting sexual segregation “relegate[d] women to the “back room” 
not only for worship, but during public speaking and debate as well.”19 She goes on to explain 
that public speaking was strictly assigned to men. The fact that Ann Lee was an exception to 
this rule was explained away by her elevated status as a prophet and that “ordinary women” 
were not expected to emulate her.”20   
Another reason some think the Shakers were not feminist lies in their gendered labor 
division. Labor in the Shaker society was divided between the sexes and mirrored the same 
divisions found in the outside world: men were in the public sphere, while a women’s place 
was in the home, the private, unseen sphere. Procter-Smith argues that the Shakers viewed 
the traditional work done by women to be of “divine origin,” and that “Shaker women were 
advised that true freedom for them lay in remaining within the ‘woman’s sphere.’”21 However, 
Thurman argues against reaching the conclusion that gendered labor division should be cited 
as evidence against the Shaker’s women-friendly community; she states that one must take 
into account the nature of the times and how rural Shaker women differed from rural women 
in general. With the advent of industrialization, division of labor became more oppressive for 
women, but the same does not hold true for the rural Shaker woman: “[T]heir positive view 
of physical labor, their emphasis on skilled work, their views on gender, and the conflations 
of the public and private spheres in their community made women’s work highly valued in 
Shaker society.”22 Thurman stresses the fact that the Shaker women’s work was less tedious 
and less divisional  than that of other rural woman because of their “practice of labor rotation, 
communal work, and use of technology.”23  Thurman goes on to say that the Shakers did not 
ae
gis 2
0
0
6
8
6
ro
b
e
rts
devalue women’s work and instead suggests that the gendered labor distribution in the Shaker 
community was an acceptable practice that did not take away from their ideology of equality 
among women and men.24 
The argument for and against the Shakers as exemplars of an ideal society can 
continue to be debated with cases being made on either side. What is clear, though, is that 
Ann Lee’s theology and theory, however contradictory, created an environment that fostered 
changes within the religion that would push women’s equality closer to the forefront of 
discussion. It was through her leadership and teachings that the next generation saw the 
opportunities to inhabit an idealistic community that prized perfection and hard work in order 
to be closer to God. After Lee’s death, the Shakers divided their housing into celibate, equal 
dormitories; appointed a female and male leader to minister the religion and society in shared, 
equal power distribution; and instituted equal possession of property. Through Lee’s struggles 
within the patriarchy of society and the Christian religion, the Shakers would come the closest 
in creating a utopian society, a society that was the model for a perfect social and religious 
organization comprised of gender equality, economic equality, and religious equality. 
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The Art of Revolution: Feminist Art and 
the Women’s Liberation Movement
Jennifer Wall
Feminist art of the 1960s and 1970s, like the Women’s Liberation Movement of the 
same era, represented a radical new beginning. The women of both movements wanted to 
change views about gender, and create equality and recognition that women had long been de-
nied. The momentum and force of the Women’s Liberation Movement generated new subjects 
and inspiration for a new type of female artist, who then used art to advance her cause and 
inform the public sphere. Judy Chicago and her associates best expressed an example of this 
interplay. They contributed to the women’s movement in two ways: they used the techniques 
of the women’s movement to awaken younger women artists, while using their own work and 
teaching to advance the larger cause of women’s liberation.  
Critics, historians, and even other artists ignored women artists throughout art his-
tory. During some eras, women artists were punished for simply trying to express themselves. 
The New Deal and the Works Progress Administration (WPA) helped open the door for 
women all over America. The WPA allowed for women to find a place not just in factories 
and the job market, but in the fine arts world. The WPA gave jobs to artists, and for the first 
time these artists included women. Photographers like Dorthea Lange and painters like Lee 
Krasner found work through the WPA. 
The New Deal art projects, however, offered both opportunities and repression. 
Women artists found themselves still having to draw a line between expressing and repressing 
their femininity in a male-dominated society.1 Although forty percent of self-declared artists 
in the 1930s census were women, many were still caught in the fold of trying to decide where 
their loyalties lay. It was not as simple as being a professional; being a woman was always 
tied to whatever they did. Thus in the 1930s, though women were becoming more “modern” 
and the ability to work outside the home was more accepted, the challenges of social value 
or what was thought to be the “the women’s place,” and equal opportunity in the workplace 
hindered many women.2 
The WPA afforded women artists an unprecedented opportunity for professional 
employment, through which they could form an identity. Although this identity was still 
limited socially and the assumption was that the only experience worth recording was the 
male experience, they found a door they could begin to push through.3 However, this narrow 
passageway for women artists was closed with the end of World War II. It was assumed that 
women, who had now experienced success and employment, would want nothing more then 
to return to the role of wife and mother. The women artists of the WPA found themselves in a 
similar situation. 
Women artists were automatically denied access to the Abstract Expressionist move-
ment because of its macho mystique. Abstract Expressionism was defined as action painting. 
It encompassed many different styles but was defined by the male mystique and the move-
ment of action. The Abstract Expressionist group was a “boy’s club” of womanizers and 
alcoholics.4 Lee Krasner, who had begun to find a voice through WPA projects, found herself 
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simply being defined as Jackson Pollock’s wife and nothing more. Hans Hofmann, a highly 
regarded teacher and artist, said that Krasner’s work was so good one would not have thought 
it was done by a woman.5 Krasner found herself supporting Pollock’s career. She promoted 
him and his work, while still attempting to create her own. Her work, however, was not to find 
fame until the Women’s Liberation movement. When feminist art was to be “rediscovered,” 
Krasner would move out of the shadow of her husband.6
Some women did gain some recognition in the 1950s art world. Krasner and Elaine 
de Kooning gained some recognition through their husbands. Critics thought they were naïve 
women simply following the path set for them by men. No critic would admit that it was 
Krasner, not Pollock, who was the first Abstract Expressionist. It was also not admitted that it 
was Krasner who did Pollock’s interviews and set his schedule. 
Women in the 1950s and earlier faced isolation, not only from each other but in the 
case of women artists, from their own history.7 H.W. Janson’s influential textbook, History of 
Art, was first published in 1962.8 It contained neither the works nor name of a single woman 
artist. Janson justified this by saying he had yet to find a woman who clearly belonged in any 
volume of art history.9 He was simply following a path set before him by other art historians. 
Similar to the factory or the work place, art was not regarded as women’s work. The factory 
and the job place were for men. Women were to be mothers, wives, and homemakers, but not 
professionals and certainly not artists. With the National Women’s Organization (NOW) and 
Women’s Liberation, these images that society pushed on women were about to change and it 
was they who were going to change them. 
NOW was formed to obtain equal employment, and professional women wanted to 
be treated as equals based on qualification. Women’s Liberation moved with NOW but went 
farther; they wanted abortion rights and sexual liberation. NOW and Women’s Liberation 
brought forth not only a new type of artist but new subject matter. Women artists were finding 
in the women’s rights movement a voice for which they had been longing. The women art-
ists of the 1960s and 1970s were determined not only to find a place within the art world for 
themselves, but to use their art to speak against discrimination for the benefit of all women. 
One artist in particular took it upon herself to speak for women. Judy Gerowitz 
took the name Judy Chicago in 1969 as a way to escape the isolation and move away from 
all things imposed on her by a male social dominance. She wanted to choose freely her own 
name.10 Chicago was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1939.11 Her father was an important presence 
in her life and from an early age, she wanted to be just like him. Her father was an intelli-
gent and charismatic man whom Chicago deeply admired. Through her Women’s Liberation 
readings and her associations with other activists, she discovered that one’s sex, according to 
society, determines one’s personality, interests and options. She believed for a long time that 
she was wrong in wanting to be a person separate from her sex.12 Typical of other women art-
ists before the movement, Chicago gave up art for a number of years because she, like many 
others, grew wary of always having to justify her work and her femininity. Just as many other 
women within the Liberation movement, Chicago found herself truly alienated. She realized 
that the art community as it was could not provide her what she needed to realize herself as a 
person and as an artist. With this realization, she found an alternative and devoted herself to 
the women’s movement.13
Early in her art career, Chicago got married and during this time, she stopped work-
ing. It was still uncommon for women to work once they married. She became depressed, 
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but then in the late 1960s, Chicago began to use abstract, formal images to express herself as 
a woman;14 she had found her voice again. She found little support in the art world because 
instead of trying to hide that she was a woman, Chicago put herself, her experiences, and her 
womanhood into her work. Chicago read Valerie Solanas’ The Scum Manifesto and everything 
changed. She saw an alternative to isolation, rejection, and repressed anger.15 In the Women’s 
Liberation movement and NOW, Chicago found a community and support system. She began 
to create work that expressed not only herself as a woman, but the experience she had gone 
through in a male-dominated society. When Chicago was isolated from the art world, she 
found an alternative at Fresno State College in Los Angeles.  It was here that Chicago began 
to challenge not only the art world but society.16 
Fresno was founded as an experimental college that offered courses in Marxist 
politics, African American studies, and women’s studies. Courses in these studies were very 
rare.  Chicago approached the Art Department head and wanted to hold a women’s art class 
that would challenge the women in it as artists and as women. She wanted the class held off 
campus away from the male population. In previous teaching experiences, Chicago had found 
that women on campus in male-dominated classes tended to be passive and withdrawn. She 
herself had experienced isolation in male-dominated settings and she believed it had stunted 
her growth as an artist and as a woman. In the gender segregated art classes, she found that 
the female students were assertive, eager, and angry.17
A space was rented in a run-down area of Los Angeles and each student in the pro-
gram gave twenty-five dollars to pay rent for a seven-month period. By working off campus, 
the group surpassed normal academic time and space, sometimes working beyond the normal 
academic day. The space was located in an urban area where they became a community with 
resources and research areas, which encompassed urban markets, malls, and swap meets. 
Relying on methods used by women in the Liberation movement, the group included con-
sciousness raising, reading, discussion, and activities that built up the skills of a modern artist. 
Chicago’s classes focused on what NOW and Women’s Liberation were speaking about. 
They looked at traditional gender roles and the repression of women’s desires, experiences, 
ambitions, and fears. The unspoken curriculum was learning to contend with manifestations 
of power, both political and social.18 Chicago believed that she had been robbed of knowing 
her own heritage in art history, so a large part of the group’s work went into research about 
women in history.19 It was Chicago’s contention that these women had the right to know what 
women’s literature was available. She used Women’s Liberation literature and ideas on wom-
an’s roles to engage and inform.20 These feminists criticized the ideologies and discourses of 
traditional art history.  As artists and women, they wanted to know their own history. Feminist 
historians and activists wanted to marginalize themselves from art as it had been practiced and 
recorded. Thus, they rejected the gendered nature of access to cultural production, the ques-
tions of representation and gender, and the differential treatment of men and women’s art by 
critics, galleries, museums, and historians.21
Chicago found something that was prevalent within all of the women’s movements. 
She had known she wanted to be an artist and once set in her struggle she had let nothing stop 
her. The women in her classes had never had anything expected of them, nor had they ever 
been asked what they wanted to do. Chicago soon found out that no one had demanded that 
these women reach their potential.22 Many of them had been pressured by parents to get good 
grades, but establishing personal goals and identity was another story. In some ways, Chicago 
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found herself having to teach these women to make demands of each other by exchanging and 
expressing their thoughts, feelings, and ideas.23
Along with many women in the liberation movement, Chicago’s students found 
themselves confused. They could not work consistently on their art, as they had personal con-
flicts in the relationships of boyfriends and husbands. However, the idea that one did not have 
to have a boyfriend to be successful soon filtered into Chicago’s class. Gradually these women 
became conscious of their situation as independent women in society and culture. This in turn 
forced them to become involved not only in their art but in promoting NOW and Women’s 
Liberation. They realized that it was no longer acceptable just to cope with society as it was. 
The challenge had to come from within and they accepted that there was nothing wrong with 
them for wanting more.24
By 1971, Chicago felt that her time at Fresno had been productive. She herself had 
grown in the liberation movement. Her work was blatantly referencing Women’s Liberation 
and its contexts. Chicago went to join the Feminist Art Program at California Institute of the 
Arts (CalArts), where artist and liberation activist Miriam Schapiro worked.25 There she and 
Schapiro began work on a building that became very important in the feminist movement.26 
Located in urban Los Angeles, Womanhouse provided a collaborative art environment that ad-
dressed the universal experiences of women.27 Unlike Fresno where the students’ art had little 
exposure, Womanhouse was given national attention that spurred on the ideas of sexuality and 
discrimination against women. 
Womanhouse not only encouraged young artists; it generated a new subject mat-
ter, as well. The seventeen rooms of Womanhouse presented the relationship between gender 
and social roles, in a direct and obvious way. Most of the rooms replicated conventional 
aspects of a home. The activities in each room, however, challenged the traditional images of 
women through creative exaggeration. The house literally brought to life Betty Friedan’s 1963 
Feminine Mystique. Womanhouse gave a visual image to “the problem with no name.”28 Not 
only did the rooms of the house give a face to the problem with no name, it also provided new 
imagery for the public, along with performance pieces done by women artists each night the 
house was open. The images showed the public that it was not just a select group of women 
that felt as NOW and Women’s Liberation did, but rather an issue of growing concern to 
women more generally. Women wanted to be seen as a presence in society and not just in the 
kitchen and nursery. These performances brought life and reality to the imagery in the house 
and many of them went far against the grain of what was acceptable for a woman to talk about 
in public. They addressed sex, homosexuality, and went against traditional roles of women. 
These were not issues about which women were supposed to express ideas or have opinions.29
 Before the women’s movement, women were pictured in art as mothers, wives, pros-
titutes, or servants.30 Women as subject matter was only seen as appropriate if it were done by 
males. Thus, one could usually only find women in art portrayed only as the virgin, a mother, 
a happy wife, or the extreme opposite, the sinner, temptress, and whore. In later art history 
women were seen as emasculators or the objects of rape and lust. Women were rarely shown 
nude unless it was degrading or in line with the male gaze. Suddenly women artists were tak-
ing ideas from the women’s movement. 
In its manifesto, NOW not only provided an outline for working towards equality for 
women in the workplace, but they also addressed the idea that false images of women should 
be protested and changed in the interest of the human dignity of women. Members of NOW 
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felt that these false images fostered self-denigration, dependence, and doubt.31 Even the new 
Radical Feminist in New York spoke out against the images of women in media and advertis-
ing. They felt women were being paraded around and that a double standard of what a women 
was to be was being given to young women all over America. The feminist artists of this time 
took up this new subject matter and presented the public with a visual to go along with the 
words of NOW and other women’s movements. 
Women artists were looking at the idea of universal women’s experience. They 
began to take apart the stereotyping of women in society as homemakers and mothers with 
no sexuality or personal choice. Images of sexuality and sex experience began to filter into 
the art world, as well as images of women’s issues that would never have been discussed in 
public, like rape and menstruation. In Womanhouse, Chicago created a Menstruation Bath-
room that challenged the traditional notion of shame society placed on a woman when she 
entered puberty (Appendix A). Chicago’s bathroom was pristine white, with feminine hygiene 
products double wrapped. The bathroom was shrouded in silence and became a metaphor for 
the unspeakable.32
The artists of Womanhouse began to use their bodies not only as references in images 
but as performance art. The idea of a women being a sexual being with desires of her own was 
given visual imagery. No longer could critics of the movement say that only a few neurotic 
women had those feelings, because throughout America, many found themselves relating 
to the desires and fears expressed in the imagery being produced by the feminist artists of 
Womanhouse. Women outside the art world could relate to the imagery of the feminist artists 
even if they had not had the same experiences as the artists. Other women artists outside of 
Womanhouse found themselves being drawn into the feminist movement. They began to con-
nect the vagina, labia and flowers, quilts, weaving, and body art as obvious subject matter and 
imagery.33 They longed to transcend out of gendered identity through their work.34
In the Women’s Liberation movement, feminist artists found a door through which 
they could voice the universal issues of women. They found new subject matter as well as 
an art world that could no longer ignore their presence or their art. They provided the visual 
images through which the Liberation movement could inform the public. As the number of 
feminist artists grew so did the movement as a whole. Progressively more women found 
themselves relating to the images of universal experience and many utilized, supported, or 
contributed to the movement. Women were now taking a stand for themselves both vocally 
and visually. By taking a stand, these women did accomplish change. Chicago herself went 
on to do several series of work on or about the universal woman’s experience. Feminist art 
provided visual imagery for Women’s Liberation, giving women everywhere an image to go 
with “the problem with no name.”
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Judy Chicago’s Menstruation Bathroom, 1972.35
Reprinted by permission of Through the Flower
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Hirohito: Dunce or Duplicitous Leader?
Michelle Yost
Introduction
 At the conclusion of World War II, American occupation forces faced a tough deci-
sion: remove the Showa Emperor Hirohito and charge him with war crimes, or leave him as 
the symbolic leader of a defeated nation. To this end, General MacArthur chose to ease the 
occupation of Japan by allowing Hirohito to remain in the position of Emperor (now largely 
impotent) and helped to reform the image of the Emperor in the new democratic government. 
Hirohito was not up front about his role in the war, and MacArthur did not press for details. 
Previous historical works have portrayed the Showa Emperor as a background figure who 
bore very little responsibility for Japan’s actions. With new sources released by the royal 
family, Herbert Bix makes the argument in his book, Hirohito and the Making of Modern 
Japan (2000), that the Emperor was not a passive figure controlled by militaristic forces, but 
an active director of World War II. History is always changing in accordance to new popular 
interpretations, and Hirohito’s war history has changed significantly in the last forty years.
 To this end, I will compare the position of Bix’s book with four published before 
his between 1966 and 1998. Leonard Mosley’s Hirohito: Emperor of Japan is the oldest, 
published in 1966, and by far the most sympathetic to Hirohito. In 1971 there was David 
Bergamini’s Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, blowing onto the historical scene with allegations 
of a cover-up about Hirohito’s true involvement in the war. However, his book was not well 
received (as will be seen in the reviews) and he did not have access to all of the documents 
that Bix used. Edward Behr, author of Hirohito: Behind the Myth (1989), balanced the posi-
tion of Mosley and Bergamini, asserting that in the person of Hirohito there was “a shrewd 
and skillful manipulator as work, who knew what was going on.”1 In 1998, Peter Wetzler pub-
lished Hirohito and War, which makes the argument that while Hirohito was well informed 
about military maneuvers, his participation in the decision-making process was driven by his 
desire to maintain Japanese policy and the image of the imperial household. Wetzler summa-
rizes, “The emperor was not the ultimate or the only decision maker; he was part of the deci-
sion-making process.”2 The image of Hirohito’s guiltless ignorance was crumbling away, but 
reviewers and fellow historians don’t seem to have come to full acceptance of the Emperor’s 
war responsibility until Bix’s book.
Beginning with the Meiji Restoration in 1867, the position of Emperor of Japan was 
moved from a marginal religious figure to the center of the government. However, the cabinet 
(headed by the genro at first) held real control. Military leaders were given powerful positions 
in the cabinet, and the cabinet often appointed prime ministers independent of public elec-
tions. With this history, it is not impossible to image Hirohito as “a helpless puppet of “the 
militarists”,”3 but new documentation points a guilty finger at him as a well informed schemer 
who helped to guide Japan’s war course. Herbert Bix asserts, 
From the very outset Hirohito was a dynamic emperor, but paradoxically 
also one who projected the defensive image of a passive monarch. While 
the rest of the world dissociated him from any meaningful personal role 
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in the decision-making process and insisted on seeing him as an important 
figurehead lacking notable intellectual endowments, he was actually smarter 
and shrewder than most people gave him credit for…
From late 1937 onward Hirohito gradually became a real war leader, 
influencing the planning, strategy, and conduct of operations in China and 
participating in the appointment and promotion of the highest generals and 
admirals.4
If this is the case, then it was not an uncontrolled military and cabinet making all of the deci-
sions while the Emperor did nothing. At the least he is guilty of appointing those who carried 
out the war crimes. Indeed, Generals Tojo (appointed prime minister), Itagaki, Kimura, 
Doihara, Matsui and Muto were all executed, though they avoided pointing the finger at the 
Emperor at risk to themselves. 
Old perceptions of Hirohito
The final surrender of Japan was delayed because of their insistence on maintain-
ing the Emperor’s position, but with the atomic attacks and American ships blockading the 
country, Hirohito (his voice being heard by the public for the first time) announced Japan’s 
unconditional surrender on August 15, 1945. He specifically surrendered to American forces, 
which were now responsible for rebuilding the devastated nation. General Douglas MacArthur 
did not take long in deciding to exempt Hirohito from charges of war crimes and to leave the 
monarchy in tact, if powerless, because MacArthur needed Hirohito as a symbol to help keep 
the occupied Japan under control. To this end, “Hirohito had to furnish an account exculpating 
his action as the sovereign head of the Japanese state over the previous twenty years…And he 
had to do so secretly, for his self-defense necessarily entailed assigning responsibility for war 
and defeat to some of his most loyal subjects.”5 This deliberately crafted history of Hirohito 
was mostly accepted by scholars until recently. 
Leonard Mosley’s sympathetic book, Hirohito: Emperor of Japan, introduces the 
Showa Emperor as “a gentle introvert, scholarly and civilized man of peace who found 
himself Emperor of a nation bent on war and conquest…[H]e found the courage and the 
resources, in spite of military fanatics and palace conspiracies, to outwit the plotters and end 
the war.”6  Mosley doesn’t deny that Hirohito gave the approval for the Imperial Conference 
to go ahead with a declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain, though it 
was done with long deliberation and hesitation. However, Mosley states, “For almost eighteen 
months after Pearl Harbor, Hirohito ceased to play any part in the affairs of his nation, except 
as a symbol.”7 Mosley summarizes Hirohito’s passing of the war as dull, not doing much 
besides issuing rescripts to the people to keep fighting. As it became more apparent that Japan 
could not win, Mosley believes, “The more the Allies advanced, the more the Army sought to 
involve Hirohito. It was as if they were determined that, if they were smashed, the Emperor 
be smashed too.”8 Hirohito supposedly went to General MacArthur on September 26 to offer 
himself up for judgment, and MacArthur was so touched that he told Washington that Hirohito 
could not be arrested for war crimes, which Truman grudgingly accepted. 
Mosley’s book received less-than-stellar reviews. F.C. Jones, in the English Histori-
cal Review, wrote that it “is not a book for the serious student of Japanese history…Mr. Mos-
ley relies very largely on stories about the emperor and his relatives told by officials or ex-of-
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ficials of the imperial court…The most that can be said for this book is that the portrayal of 
the emperor as a modest, retired, and peacefully inclined monarch who has made his name as 
a marine biologist, is one which is generally accepted.”9 This review does at least confirm the 
period’s recognition of Hirohito’s war responsibility as negligible. Charles D. Sheldon, in the 
Journal of Asian Studies, writes of Mosley, “He runs into trouble when he attempts…to assess 
the role of the Emperor and his advisors in the decisions which led to the war in China and in 
the Pacific…This reviewer is not at all convinced, for example, when Mosley argues that the 
Emperor, with a little encouragement from his advisors, could have reversed the whole trend 
toward war with the United States.”10 Though not a well executed history, Hirohito: Emperor 
of Japan fell into line with the old belief that the Showa Emperor had no control over the 
events of World War II.
The earliest dissenter from the tradition of Hirohito-as-innocent-bystander was 
David Bergamini’s Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy. He claims to have read thousands of pages 
of previously un-translated documents in Japan proving Hirohito’s culpability (including the 
Saionji-Harada Memoirs and the journals of Generals Honjo and Sugiyama). Sir William 
Flood Webb sat as a judge on the Tokyo War Crimes tribunals and wrote the introduction to 
the book, stating, “Mr. Bergamini presents a strong case for believing that Hirohito schemed 
and plotted to lead Japan to the conquest of Asia.”11 The premise of this extremely long text is 
that there was a deliberate plan for war, and a well executed cover-up to keep Hirohito from 
being accused of any wrongdoings, which included burning official documents and senior of-
ficers lying about the Emperor’s conduct. Bergamini himself states, “I perceived that Hirohito, 
at the very least, was not the passive dupe of history that he had been made out to be…Until 
1945 he was said to have kept up with every detail of government, to have consulted con-
stantly with officials of all sorts…”12 A month before the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hirohito was 
going over Admiral Yamamoto’s Order Number One, which outlined the pre-emptive strike 
on America. This wasn’t something Hirohito was shown at the last minute to rubber stamp, 
and Bergamini believes this is only one of many examples of Hirohito’s complicity. Bix re-
peats much of what he says, but it would take three more decades for Bergamini’s ideas to be 
accepted, except Bix would get a Pulitzer for it. 
Bergamini’s Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy suffered terrible criticism, and Edward 
Behr explains why in his introduction to Hirohito: Behind the Myth:
The only major English-Language “revisionist” book to question the accept-
ed view of Hirohito as a peace-loving, powerless prisoner of his entourage, 
David Bergamini’s Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy, was so violently attacked 
by a cohort of academic experts that Bergamini became a pariah, reviled, 
ridiculed and driven to an early death by the weight of negative critical 
abuse. Bergamini’s error was to attempt to discover a conspiracy pattern 
in Hirohito’s behavior, from his earliest years as crown prince, and to try 
to prove that he had deliberately placed a handful of key supporters in top 
positions in order to plan Japan’s militaristic expansionism…It was a flawed 
view, for Bargamini failed to grasp the difference between the emperor’s 
formal, “abstract” powers and their practical limits, and this failure was 
compounded by erratic scholarship, an attempt to twist all the available 
facts to prove his theory.13
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This is an exceptionally harsh critique of Bergamini, especially considering now that he may 
not have been completely wrong in his assertions that Hirohito directed the Second World 
War, and then played dumb when the Americans arrived. Bix has not helped Bergamini to 
prove a far-reaching conspiracy, though. In The Journal of Asian Studies, reviewer Shumpei 
Okamoto states, “Despite its quasi-scholarly paraphernalia, Mr. Bergamini’s book has little 
value as a serious historical study.”14 Apparently, the diaries that Bergamini used were not 
considered to be scholarly enough at the time and hw is accused of using them out of context 
to prove his point. He is also accused of using his experience of internment by the Japanese in 
the Philippines as slanting his view on history. 
 Not so wildly paranoid about conspiracies, but still holding the Emperor some-
what accountable for the war, Edward Behr’s Hirohito: Behind the Myth doesn’t go as far as 
Bergamini. On the one hand Behr states in his introduction, “The view that Hirohito was a 
war criminal…has since become shockingly unfashionable, and even to raise the subject is 
enough to provoke a storm of indignation…Nowadays, any hint that Emperor Hirohito may 
deserve even a small portion of the blame for the events that led to Pearl Harbor…is regarded 
as unwarrantable.”15  But on the other hand, Behr admits, “The ‘official’ Japanese line that 
Hirohito could not be held responsible for any of the steps that led to World War II because he 
was unaware of what was going on behind the scenes and was, in any case, lacking any real 
power, seems to me incredible.”16 Behr still finds that Hirohito was extremely uneasy about 
the military bringing the conflict into Indochina and the Pacific, but that he set these events 
in motion with his quiet acceptance of the military’s unauthorized conflict in Manchuria and 
China. Hirohito was “a sovereign trapped into following an irrevocable course of action…un-
willing to accept the consequences of his past decisions, unable to put his war machine into 
reverse…”17 Hirohito was responsible for starting World War II, according to Behr, if for no 
other reason than he had put events into motion that he could not stop. 
 However, critics were still not accepting Hirohito’s war responsibility. Stated in the 
Journal of Japanese Studies by reviewer Stephen Large, “Behr consistently ignores impor-
tant evidence, and many studies that use this evidence, which disagrees with his interpreta-
tion…for Behr to argue the case for his war responsibility through inference, insinuation, and 
guilt by indirect association is neither good investigative journalism nor good history.”18 The 
barriers guarding Hirohito were starting to crumble (Behr was not banished from the historical 
community for his views the way Bergamini was) and Bix’s large tome would finally allow 
for popular acceptance of Hirohito’s war guilt.
 The most recent work before Bix’s book was Peter Wetzler’s Hirohito and War, in 
which he proposed, “Hirohito’s advocacy of Western scientific learning and constitutional 
monarchy was fundamental to the perpetuation of Japan’s imperial line, its supposed unique 
polity…The same can be said for his participation in pre-war military decisions.”19 Hirohito 
does not have the entire blame for war laid on his shoulders for three reasons: 1) His main 
concern was with the continuation of the imperial family and its position in politics; 2) He 
was consulted about war plans, “but was not able to dictate plans or basic strategy;”20 and 3) 
His education was meant to imprint upon him the importance of the imperial line. Wetzler 
makes a point of emphasizing Hirohito’s legal responsibility in accordance with the Meiji 
constitution, but that MacArthur promoted the image of a figurehead emperor in order to bet-
ter facilitate the American occupation of Japan. In the end, Wetzler concludes, “Because the 
emperor did not wish to risk destruction of the social and political order he headed, the ques-
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tion of vetoing the war never arose.”21 Wetzler does not give Hirohito the role of an individual 
who helped to plan the bombing of Pearl Harbor, nor does he give Hirohito any way out of the 
war. To this end, the emperor is still excused for actions of the military.
 Wetzler’s book is praised for being readable, but there are several flaws that reviews 
enjoy pointing out. Stephen Large says in The American Historical Review, “There are many 
instances where the author’s avowed desire to revise our picture of Hirohito causes him to 
make too much of the obvious, to put an interpretive spin on events that is at best highly 
dubious, to rely on thin evidence while omitting material that might challenge his claims…”22 
However, not everyone is so critical of how Wetzler approaches Hirohito. Peter Duus, for 
example, asserts, “Wetzler may be completely wrong about the Showa emperor’s motives 
but we will probably never know…But as Wetzler amply demonstrates, evidence for the 
emperor’s complicity in the decision to go to war with the United States is abundant and un-
ambiguous.”23 This moderate approach to Hirohito, as complicit but not solely to blame, was 
well received. But Bix will not allow Hirohito to keep any excuses about family or passive 
acceptance with regards to his was responsibility.
Recent perceptions of Hirohito
 Herbert Bix’s Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan does not solely focus on 
the Showa Emperor’s war guilt, but aims instead “to study precisely those formative events 
and ideologies that underlay, deeply or near the surface, Hirohito as a monarch and a man. It 
focuses on the forces that shaped his thoughts and actions...It seeks to describe his actual role 
in policy making when he was the center of events.”24 Hirohito did not object to the Army’s 
unauthorized maneuvers in Manchuria in 1931 because the effort was successful in expand-
ing Japanese territory. Bix asserts that Hirohito “knew who had planned it, who had ordered 
it and who had carried it out. He was totally aware that several senior officers had violated 
the army’s own penal law.”25 The military had not pulled the wool over the Emperor’s eyes, 
and he allowed the conflict in Manchuria and China to progress. He did suffer some anxiety 
about an out-of-control army causing a ruckus at home and abroad, and he spent several years 
getting them under control, expressing his full authority by crushing the military uprising in 
1936. Hirohito was not a military puppet. 
Leading up to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, “Hirohito’s command prerogatives were 
changing quickly, and he was about to become a commander in chief in every sense of the 
word.”26 As opposed to Mosley’s assertion that the cabinet composed the declaration of war 
against the US and merely gave it to the Emperor for his signature, Bix states that Hirohito 
began composing the war rescript in October, going through several drafts with the help of 
military and civilian advisors. Nor, as Mosley believed, was Hirohito just sitting around in the 
dark while the war raged with the U.S.:“Hirohito routinely received drafts of developing war 
plans and full explanations of operations…Battle reports and situation reports were delivered 
to the palace daily.”27  Hirohito went so far as to send aides out to various battle zones to check 
the accuracy of these reports. These actions cannot be mistaken as careless or uniformed. 
Hirohito knew exactly what was going on throughout the war. 
So why was Hirohito not called to answer for his willing role in World War II? Gen-
eral MacArthur had several reasons; one was that he was instructed to work “through Japan’s 
existing government structures and mechanisms, including the emperor.”28 But there was also 
a psychological component meant to keep the Japanese docile under occupational rule:
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Japanese military leaders alone bore responsibility for the war, and the 
emperor, “the moderates” around the throne, and the people had been totally 
deceived by them...Code-named Operation Blacklist, the plan turned on 
separating Hirohito from the militarists, retaining him as a constitutional 
monarch but only as a figurehead, and using him to bring about a great 
spiritual transformation of the Japanese people. Because retaining the em-
peror was crucial to ensuring control over the population, the occupational 
forces aimed to immunize him from war responsibility, never debase him or 
demean his authority…29
This means that from the outset, Hirohito was not in great danger of being charged with 
war crimes (even if he did not know it right away). The United States needed the figure of 
the Showa Emperor too badly, and instead laid the burden of guilt on those leaders around 
Hirohito. MacArthur secured Hirohito’s position, and Bix asserts, “in defending the Emperor, 
GHQ and the conservative elites were also promoting their respective version of Japan’s 
lost war. GHQ succeeded in establishing only the militarists as aggressors, not the emperor 
who had commanded them.”30 To preserve his image in the eyes of the people, Hirohito was 
encouraged by MacArthur and the General Head Quarters to be seen by traveling around and 
distributing money and supplies. For the first time he was becoming connected to the people 
of his nation as a man instead of a god.
 Bix’s book was not universally accepted though, and two Japanese reviewers in 
Japan Echo had quite a bit to say about Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan: “Because 
he limits himself to analyzing the emperor and his entourage, Bix inevitably ends up overstat-
ing the emperor’s role in events. The key to what was going on in Japan at that time was the 
unchallenged power of the military. But Bix makes almost no attempt to analyze the military’s 
role and influence.”31 They are critical of his use of mostly secondary sources published by 
Japanese researchers. At the same time, though, they do not completely dispute Bix’s asser-
tions about Hirohito’s guilt involving World War II, especially in Japan, but that Americans, 
for the most part, “have adopted a moderate stance, treating Emperor Showa as a constitution-
al monarch who had misgivings about a military run amok but who ultimately had no choice 
but to declare was on the United States.”  They go on to note, “One exception to was a book 
published in 1971 entitled Japan’s Imperial Conspiracy…Bergamini argued that Emperor 
Showa was a dictator on a par with Hitler and Mussolini and that he was the main instigator 
of Japanese aggression during his reign. But he presented a weak case, offering little in the 
way of supporting documentation.”32 Bergamini’s book may have been dismissed as unaccept-
able scholarship, but it was not forgotten simply because it dared to question the MacArthur 
construction of Hirohito. Bix started from this perspective – that there was no question of the 
Emperor’s war guilt – but replaced premeditated conspiracy with a ruler caught up in the ex-
citement of territorial and economic expansion, and presented his findings in such a convinc-
ing manner as to be awarded the Pulitzer Prize, signifying the final acceptance of Hirohito’s 
knowing involvement in World War II.
Conclusion
Scholars of Japanese history are not going to be able to return to the old views of 
a quiet, scholarly Emperor being held captive by a military bent on world conquest. It has 
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taken decades for this artificial construct of the emperor’s involvement to be changed, and his 
war guilt is now accepted at least to some degree. Bix laments that “[p]rotecting the emperor 
and remaking his image were complex political undertakings that could be achieved only 
by grossly exaggerating the threat of social upheaval in Japan, rigging testimony, destroying 
evidence, and distorting history.”33 The passing of time has allowed too many new documents 
to come to light, and despite the rampant destruction of imperial records before MacArthur’s 
arrival, personal memoirs and diaries provide a record of Hirohito’s personal involvement 
in the war. Still, this is a question that may never be fully answered due to the incineration 
of so many documents, and there are more that the imperial family and the US government 
have refused to release. Even in death Hirohito’s actions are continually being examined and 
revised, and Bix’s work cannot be seen as the conclusion to decades of historical inquiry into 
the Emperor’s war responsibility.
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Lazar, David.  The Body of Brooklyn. Iowa City: 
University of Iowa Press, 2003. 180 pp.
Jennifer Roberts
With obvious homage to Montaigne, Orwell, and Hazlitt, writer David Lazar brings 
the formal essay back to contemporary readers. Lazar’s The Body of Brooklyn is a compila-
tion of personal essays, a series of witty, personal, and digressive self-studies of Lazar’s youth 
in Brooklyn during the 60s and 70s. The reader is treated to everything from juicy tidbits of 
sexual awakening to the uncomfortable and wrenching trials of being an overweight child, to 
confessions so raw and honest that one would think them too embarrassing to admit. 
      The title essay of Lazar’s book deals directly with the body and its betrayals. Lazar 
states that he was husky—a word used to soften the reality of his obesity—and “weaned 
absurdly late,” not being fully potty trained until six (27-28).  Once Lazar lost weight, the 
troubles with his body did not cease, but only shift into a disloyalty of another shape.  Lazar 
explains his complicated relationship to his body as, “being possessed by aliens, who had 
stepped in to fill the vacuum left by my not-so-dear departed fat cells” (27), and lamenting 
that “[y]ears of therapy, years of thinness, years of spending time, romantically or sexually, 
with highly attractive women, have had, in some ways, little effect on my body’s mind” (29).  
      Lazar’s confessions are not tempered but intensified by his skillful writing tech-
niques. Through dense sentences and prolonged reflections, Lazar brings the reader on a jour-
ney into his memory as he explores the mind’s ever-confusing remembrances and attempts to 
make some sense out of his life. Lazar’s philosophy that sentences should be structured with 
the “density of poetry” is evident and consistent throughout each essay. In one of his essays,  
“Movies Are A Mother To Me,” Lazar relies on the metaphor to pull the reader into a dramatic 
and poetic remembrance of his mother:
We returned from the hardware store and the air was as heavy as it 
gets—when it seems one is carrying it place to place only to lay it on top of 
another heavy layer of air that one must carry someplace else, as though we 
were trying to build castles in the air with cinder blocks or were the grain 
to the air’s millstone…[t]he sky flashed on the dark day as if a cosmic light 
switch were clicking on and off, and the rain came down in sheets for five 
minutes. (86).
Lazar’s unhurried sentences require the reader to slow down, to savor each word for its bitter 
or its sweet fullness. 
      Coupled with Lazar’s love for dense sentences is his apparent love of digression. 
At times Lazar trumpets his digression, and at other times the reader finds herself deeply 
immersed in new territory before even realizing it. One such essay, “Further Father: Remem-
bering John Waterman,” deals with Lazar’s relationship to his father by examining one of 
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his father’s pseudonyms, John Waterman. Waterman was Protestant persona developed for 
business purposes. Lazar writes:
My father particularly liked invoking some variant of the flat Mid-west-
ern or generically Southern accent for Waterman…As I grew older, I 
would sometimes wince at what seemd so accentually stereotypical as to 
be unbelievable. And I wondered at my father’s inner workings, what the 
accent internally, when he invoked this floating persona and the voices that 
accompanied it. (74)
The reader wonders, too, about the importance of the pseudonym, what it means for a Jew to 
create a perceived banal, non-ethnic persona to conduct business, what it means for a father 
and son. But, we have to wait as Lazar sprinkles the essay with digressions into reflections on 
his grandmother, his Brooklyn accent, his multi-ethnic neighborhood where Protestants were 
considered “freaky,” before tying it all back to John Waterman.  Though there are times when 
the digressive technique lingers too long, and the reader starts to wonder if she were reading a 
new essay, for the most part, Lazar executes digression expertly, bringing the reader through 
the muckiness of memory and back to where she started with new insight into the author and 
his subject.   
  I liken the need for digression to the embracing of the dust that spots our memory. 
Digression is needed to work around the dusty memories, see through them. When asked 
about the pictures in his photographic essay “Some Images: Toward a Photographic Mishnah” 
that ends The Body of Brooklyn, Lazar announced that he doesn’t mind dust and particles 
spotting old photographs. “Dust represents time.” Dust is memory. Digression is the attempt 
to understand memory.  
      Readers beware: for those who wish to read a straightforward, point-A-to-point-B 
story, The Body of Brooklyn could prove frustrating.  Density, and a style that can languish in 
digression for a lengthy period of time may not be for everyone. One reader of The Body of 
Brooklyn announced that Lazar’s book was one of the first that she could not read while watch-
ing television, though I imagine Lazar would find the comment a compliment; Lazar’s writing 
demands one’s full attention as well as an encyclopedia, dictionary, and a classic movie guide.
      Lazar is a smart read. That said, his love of movies permeates each essay. With ref-
erences to Orson Welles, Arabian Nights, The Marx Brothers, Danny Kaye in The Secret Life 
of Walter Mitty, George Maharis of Route 66, and Jean Hagen from Singing in the Rain, all 
contained in one essay, one begins to think she has missed out on important cultural experi-
ences. The reader can either leave drained and overwhelmed or ambitious and head out to the 
local video store for the complete collection of classics beginning with Horsefeathers.
      Lest you think that Lazar takes himself too seriously, there is certainly enough 
cheekiness and irony, a distinct New York Jewish humor that prevails throughout each essay. 
As he explains in the introduction, “A book of autobiographical essays without irony is like 
a swimmer without sun block. Too much uninhibited exposure” (xii). Lazar is unafraid to 
expose us to relived embarrassments, analyzed relationships, and a life full of ruthless irony. 
Mostly, Lazar is unafraid to challenge his reader, urging her to live vicariously through his 
reflections, laugh at his shtick, and reach for her compilation of reference books.  The Body of 
Brooklyn is a book meant to be read and reread with patience.
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Huntington, Samuel P.  The Clash of Civilizations 
and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1996. 368 pp.
Zack Reat
 Samuel Huntington’s article entitled “The Clash of Civilizations?” was published 
in Foreign Affairs journal in the summer of 1993. In that article he proposed a theory on the 
future organization of world politics in the post-Cold War period. In brief, his thesis was that 
the the primary source of conflict in the world would be cultural, not economic or ideologi-
cal.1 Furthermore, the dividing lines of conflict would be along borders between nations that 
exist on civil boundaries. This theory for post-Cold War development ran directly counter to 
the more optimistic “‘end of history’ thesis advanced by Francis Fukuyama,” and thus, created 
a great deal of controversy in the field.2 The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World 
Order is Huntington’s response to the questions and critiques raised by the original article.
 In this book Huntington argues that the civilizations of the world will not naturally 
congregate behind one system of government and get along in relative peace and harmony in 
the post-Cold War world. Instead, civilizations will come into conflict over matters that are 
not economic or ideological, but cultural. Huntington’s thesis rests on the assertion that “cul-
ture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping 
the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world.”3 Through-
out the five sections of the book Huntington expands on this main thesis and comes to many 
conclusions about the future of civilizations and their part in global politics.
 The first section presents Huntington’s argument on the organization of civiliza-
tions on the global scale. The seven main civilizations presented in the first part of the book 
are as follows: Sinic, Japanese, Hindu, Islamic, Western, Latin America, and African. It is in 
this section that the make-up and relationships between these civilizations are revealed and 
discussed in the context of a universal civilization in the wake of modernization and Western-
ization.
 Section 2 addresses “The Shifting Balance of Civilizations”4 by beginning with an 
explanation of the West’s decline in power on the global scale. Huntington offers a quantita-
tive analysis of Western civilization’s power in comparison with the world’s other civiliza-
tions. From the data Huntington provides it is clear that the West is in a state of decline as 
other civilizations gain more power and influence throughout the world. The most impressive 
challenges to Western domination come from Islamic and Asian civilizations. According to 
Huntington these civilizations stand alone in defying the West as their culture is expanding 
without deference to the standards of Western civilization. In fact, “Both Asians and Muslims 
stress the superiority of their cultures to Western culture.”5
 The next section of the book deals with the grouping of civilizations around the 
world, and the effects that those groupings have on conflict. Huntington explains that in the 
post-Cold War world, “Countries relate to civilizations as member states, core, states, lone 
countries, cleft countries, and torn countries.”6 These countries are classified in such a way 
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based on the culture’s present and their relations with each other. The next section of the book 
looks at how the civilizations come into conflict with each other in the contested nations.
 The first chapter of section 4 once again deals with the dominance of Western civili-
zation in modern times. It discusses the spread of democracy as a result of Western influence 
throughout all major civilizations of the world, but reminds the reader that “the changing 
balance of power among civilizations makes it more and more difficult for the West to achieve 
its goals…”.7 Furthermore, the rise in power of other civilizations has given rise to a new kind 
of warfare based not on ideology, but culture. Huntington claims that the wars of the future 
will be based on ethnic conflict, and occur along fault lines existing between civilizations. 
In the final chapter of this section Huntington discusses the nature of these fault line wars, 
describing them as wars that result from years of unresolved tension exploding on cultural, 
civilizational boundary lines. Huntington rounds out his discussion of the “clash” with some 
conclusions on the nature of civilizations in the world and some prediction for the future.
 Overall, this book was a very interesting read that made some eye-opening insights 
into the nature of relations between groups of humans. In reading this theory I was often dis-
heartened by the picture being painted, but never did I feel that the picture was unreasonable. 
At times the reading became quite dense and sorting through all of the facts became tedious, 
but the book did have a nice through line to follow when I got lost. I would recommend this 
book to students studying the nature of global political relations, but I would not suggest it for 
a pleasure read.
Notes 
1. Samuel P. Huntington. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs. Summer 1993, v72, 
n3, 22. Access on http://www.alamut.com/subj/economics/misc.html 5/22/2005.
2. Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. (Si-
mon & Schuster: New York, NY, 1996), 31.
3. Ibid., 20.
4. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 81.
5. Ibid., 102.
6. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 135
7. Ibid., 206
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Diamond, Jared. Collapse: How Socieies Choose to 
Fail or Succeed. New Yor: Penguin, 2005. 592 pp.
Cassi Smith
 After his Pulitzer Prize winning book Guns, Germs, and Steel, author Jared Diamond 
addresses environmental and social issues in his latest work, Collapse: How Societies Choose 
to Fail or Succeed.  From studying fallen civilizations such as the remains of Easter Island, 
Diamond develops a five point framework explaining why these societies fell and applies 
them to current situations.  According to Diamond, this five point framework (damage people 
inadvertently inflict upon environment, climate change, hostile neighbors, decreased support 
from friendly neighbors, and society’s response to these problems) applies to places such as 
Rwanda, Australia, Haiti, China, and the Bitterroot Valley in Montana.  
 Diamond pulls the issues close to home fast as he first explains the current situation 
in a part of the world he personally holds dear, the Bitterroot Valley in Montana.  This first 
chapter includes an explanation the author’s personal attachment, the history of Montana’s 
development, and an explanation of the state’s environmental problems.  Toxic waste from 
the mining business is seeping into the water system.  Salinization from agricultural practices 
is ruining the soil.  Road construction, irrigation, logging, and forest fires are damaging the 
streams; as a result the native fish species are declining. Also, an introduced pest is harming 
the elk and deer population.  
 Dealing with these problems, however, contains an interesting twist.  In 1996 a 2,600 
acre farm was bought and developed into a playground for the wealthy.  Lot buyers build 
“cabins” starting at $800,000 (34).  But these wealthy homeowners do not contribute finan-
cially to the state.  “Rich out-of-state homeowners are careful to stay in Montana for less than 
180 days per year, in order to avoid having to pay Montana income tax and thereby to contrib-
ute to the cost of local government and schools” (61).  Those who own lots at the farm simply 
use the land, adding to the environmental problems, and stick the locals with the bill.  This 
using of the land, with people focusing on social gains rather than environmental welfare, is a 
pattern of poor human behavior that has been going on throughout history.   
 A great example of this behavior is Easter Island.  It was not the building of ex-
pensive cabins that caused Easter Island’s eerie fate.  Instead, it was the very statues that the 
island is famous for. Nearly four hundred of these statues are between fifteen and seventy feet 
tall and weigh from ten to two hundred and seventy tons (79).  But there are no trees and very 
little vegetation on the island, while all other Pacific islands are tropically lush in vegetation.  
Without any resources to construct moving materials how could these large statues be built 
by simple men?  According to Diamond, because the statues progressively get larger in size, 
these statues were the result of a building contest among the eleven or twelve territories on the 
island.  It is thought that the island was deforested in order to create building supplies to erect 
the statues.  Instead of working together to keep the resources abundant, the Easter Island 
people worked and competed against each other which lead to the destroying of their island.  
The parallel can easily be noticed between the situation in Montana and Easter Island, a lack 
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of cooperation among groups to keep the environment healthy.
 Another such civilization that demonstrates this poor pattern of behavior is Australia. 
The building of statutes was an inappropriate value for the people of Easter Island; similarly, 
the first Australians did not have their priorities in order.  “Five sets of cultural values were 
particularly important: those involving sheep, rabbits and foxes, native Australian vegetation, 
land values, and British identity” (390).  Like the focus on statues mentioned previously, the 
British settlers held their cultural values higher than the environmental needs of the land.  Part 
of Britain’s national pride involved sheep, rabbits and foxes.  As a result the Australian land 
is overrun with rabbits and fox, while the sheep farming causes soil erosion.  The problem 
with agricultural practice down under is that the land mass is not suited for agriculture.  As a 
result it costs farmers much more to farm than the profit they make from farming. Thus many 
abandoned farms dot the landscape as their owners face bankruptcy.  This disregard for the 
Australian land is an example of that poor behavior that has caused previous civilizations to 
go extinct.
 Similar to Easter Island’s residents, Australian citizens are constantly clearing the 
land for purposes not suited for surviving on the land:  
I mentioned above that the Australian government formerly required tenants 
leasing government land to clear native vegetation.  While that requirement 
has now been dropped, Australia still clears more native vegetation per 
year than any other First World country…Most of Australia’s current land 
clearance is going on in the state of Queensland for the purpose of creat-
ing pasture land for beef cattle.  Queensland government has announced 
that it will phase out large-scale clearing, but not until 2006.  The resulting 
damage to Australia includes land degradation through dryland salinization 
and soil erosion, impairment of water quality by runoff of salt and sediment, 
loss of agricultural productivity and land values, and damage to the Great 
Barrier Reef. (399)  
The amount of vegetation clearing has obvious similarities to the clearing Easter Island un-
derwent during the sculpture building competition.  The constant soil erosion will further hurt 
the Australian farmer’s ability to make money off of his investment.  Will Australia one day 
become abandoned because the land is so damaged from overuse and the introduction of non-
native animals like the rabbit and the fox?  
While Diamond does not venture to physically present this question to his readers, 
he does make the parallels among past collapsed civilizations and the civilizations of today 
so strikingly clear that the question need not be asked, only fathomed.  Diamond presents 
his ideas and questions in an easy to understand language.  He does not preach in his book, 
only tells the story and presents the issues.  His tone is of concern, and sometimes sorrow, not 
blame or hatred.  The book is organized well as each sentence provides another simple fact to 
build Diamond’s point that all societies can collapse if their behavior is not somehow changed 
to a proactive attitude for improvement rather than ignoring the problems.  
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McCourt, Frank. Teacher Man. New York: Scribner 
Book Company, 2005.  258 pp.
Christina Amato
 Anyone familiar with the writing of Frank McCourt will welcome his latest chapter in 
the story that continues to fascinate and inspire readers: the chronicles of McCourt’s own life, 
both his moving personal trials in Ireland and the United States, and his struggles to break the 
emotional shackles of crushing childhood poverty. Teacher Man will not disappoint, as Mc-
Court’s insight and comic wit shine in this account of his thirty years as a high school English 
teachers. McCourt seems to pick up where he left off in Angela’s Ashes and ‘Tis, framing his 
teaching experience in the public schools of New York City with the same colorful, vibrant nar-
rative that won him acclaim and a Pulitzer Prize. In Teacher Man, McCourt explains why he was 
a “late-bloomer, a johnny-come-lately” to literary renown and fortune (he was sixty-six when 
Angela’s Ashes was published); he answers the persistent questions of critics and fans, who 
demand to know where McCourt was all of the years he was not sharing his amazing story with 
the world. He replies simply, “I was teaching, that’s what took me so long.”
 From there, Teacher Man soars with McCourt’s reflections on the rewards, complexi-
ties, intricacies, limitations and at times chaos of the “downstairs maid of professions,” teach-
ing. McCourt’s narrative is born of firsthand experience in the trenches, from his first teaching 
position in an elite public high school. His first years as an educator are riddled with the agonies 
and occasional joys of being embroiled in the world of adolescents. He vividly recounts his 
struggles to coexist peacefully with the hundreds of hormonal, temperamental teenagers that he 
is assigned to educate daily, the children of mechanics and dock workers who exhibit little inter-
est in Chaucer and Shakespeare. Because he wrests little control from the unruly students in the 
classroom, McCourt lapses into his true art, storytelling. All through the remaining years of his 
teaching career, McCourt’s students beg for stories of his wretched childhood in Ireland, pacified 
only when he exhausts his stories of miseries and misfortune. McCourt teaches at four differ-
ent public schools in New York during his career, ranging from the poorest, most under-funded 
facilities, to the famed Stuyvesant High School, where both McCourt and the students are 
encouraged to let their creativity flourish. Whatever school McCourt teaches at, one similarity 
resonates: his students recognize him for the expert storyteller he is. McCourt’s tales become the 
thread of connection binding him to these teenagers; they learn to respect him for his persever-
ance, his triumph over unfathomable poverty, and they capitulate when McCourt asks them in 
exchange to open their minds to the study of literature and creative writing.
 The lives of McCourt’s students both inside and outside the walls of his classroom 
come to life and radiate with the author’s empathy, insight and keen eye for humor even in the 
most unusual circumstances. McCourt relates one instance in which he paraded his literature 
class, consisting of twenty-nine unruly girls and two boys, from McKee Vocational High School 
in the Bronx, to Long Island in order to see a college production of Hamlet. His students had 
demanded they be allowed on the field trip, after seeing flyers that other classes were attending. 
None of his students had ever seen a live performance before, and became so terrified, excited 
and disorderly at the sight of Hamlet’s ghost father, that the student actor had to remove his 
hat to show that he was in stage makeup and just an ordinary college student. The twenty-nine 
girls of McCourt’s class then “gasped and complained the whole play was a trick especially that 
phony ghost up there and they promised they’d never go to a phony play like this again.”
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 On another occasion, McCourt inspires his English students by accident through food. 
On a less than successful teaching day, a student offered him a piece of homemade marzipan. 
When McCourt praised the treat, his class exploded into a flurry of offers for homemade special-
ties: kreplach and matzos, lasagna, meatloaf, kimchee (Korean hot cabbage) and various other 
family recipes and ethnic delicacies. The students convened class the next day in a park by the 
school, with a spread that attracted park goers, joggers, the homeless and even police. McCourt 
then turned the buffet into a class exercise by asking each of his students to bring in a family 
cookbook. They read exotic recipes aloud together, and eventually students brought in musical 
instruments and sang the recipes to the class. McCourt’s creative writing class came alive: “They 
tell one another this is wild, the very idea of reading recipes, reciting recipes, singing recipes with 
Michael adjusting his flute to French, English, Spanish, Jewish, Irish, Chinese recipes.” McCourt 
reflects on the days of diversion that the cookbook exercise dominated, but ultimately decides 
that those days were worth the small distraction from Mark Twain and F. Scott Fitzgerald.
 McCourt shares more than humorous anecdotes about his life in the classroom, though. 
He reflects on the moments of deeper connection and friendship he is occasionally rewarded with 
in students present and past. He recounts the story of a Jewish student, Bob Stein, an eccentric, 
original character in McCourt’s classroom, frequently prone to philosophical outbursts in the 
middle of a lecture. Secretly, McCourt admired his uniqueness, but must deflect these long-
winded monologues during precious class time. One afternoon, Bob announces to the class he 
would like to be a farmer, much to the chagrin of his prominent Jewish parents. Bob’s father, a 
rabbi, eventually paid McCourt a visit and entreated the teacher to side with him, to remind Bob 
of the disgrace he’d bring upon the family by choosing a career as a farmer, “living with pigs 
every day.” McCourt deftly avoided conflict with the father, apologized for his unhappiness, and 
Bob quickly faded from his view after graduation. When McCourt bumps into his old student 
six years later, the young man asked, “Mr. McCourt, you never liked me, did you?” McCourt 
struggled to tell Bob what he really thought, his ever-running inner monologue urging him to be 
honest, to “tell him how he brightened your days, how you told your friends about him, what an 
original he was, how you admired his style, his good humor, his honesty, his courage, how you 
would have given your soul for a son like him.” Mc Court related all of this to Bob, and “the high 
school teacher and the large Jewish Future Farmer of America” embraced there on Lower Broad-
way.
 Teacher Man is as much a tale of McCourt’s questioning, critical internal dialogue and 
struggle for self-validation as it is a chronicle of the trails and tribulations of teaching literature 
to high school students. Throughout the book, McCourt asks hard questions of his own life, 
plumbing the depths of his own insecurities and shortcomings, from his failed first marriage 
to an unsuccessful bid for a Ph.D. He is an expert, as he observes, at “the ability to examine 
my conscious…the gift of finding myself wanting and defective.” McCourt is painfully self-
doubting as a young man in his first years of teaching, and questions of legitimacy nag him as 
he stands in front of hundreds of quizzical faces each day. In these early years of his teaching 
career, McCourt learns that he is not only the educator, but the educated. His students teach him 
and guide him as well, pushing him, challenging him, and at times even encouraging him. These 
students are, at times in his life, McCourt’s only source of validation or worth. He reflects that 
while some days the teenagers infuriate him, at other times they are the only reason for getting 
up in the morning. It is this push and pull between frustration, disappointment and kinship and 
human connection that defines the world of teaching for McCourt.
 Teacher Man emerges as a beautiful mosaic of McCourt’s life and profession, and the 
lives of his students and the classroom; it is impossible to tell where one begins and the other 
ends. This book celebrates the teacher and the student, with McCourt donning both masks. 
McCourt’s energy, passion and humor spill off the pages of Teacher Man, materializing into a 
worthy read.
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Fishman, Ted C. China, Inc.: How the Rise of the 
Next Superpower Challenges America and the World. 
New York: Scribner Book Company, 2005.  352 pp.
 In the midst of America’s global war on terror, and the constant violence in Iraq, it is 
easy to forget about the other issues that America as a nation must face in our generation. The 
one issue that looms above all others is the rise to economic dominance that is now occurring in 
China. Aspects of this problem penetrate the news. Reports of outsourcing, of factories closing, 
of global corporate giants such as Wal-Mart using Chinese workers as cheap labor, are blips on 
the non-stop news crawl of the 24 hour networks. The full picture, however, of what China’s rise 
implicates is almost never addressed, and other than politicians using outsourcing as part of their 
stump speeches, solutions to the “China problem” are not often discussed. Ted C. Fishman’s 
book, China, Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World, 
aims to change the lack of knowledge and discussion about how China affects the American 
economy, and America’s standing in the global power structure.
 To even begin contemplating all of the ways in which China is growing and thriving, 
one needs to understand that China has, at a low estimate, 1.3 billion people living there. There 
are most likely many more people, perhaps up to 1.7 billion people, but they live in rural areas 
where a census may not reach them. This, I believe, is the key factor in understanding the enor-
mity of China’s potential. The amount of skilled and unskilled labor at the disposal of Chinese 
companies, and American and other corporations operating within China, is staggering. It is not 
that the Chinese are the lowest paid workers in the world (they aren’t) that makes them so entic-
ing to business interests, but rather, that “China…sits in a relatively stable part of the globe and 
offers the world’s manufacturers a reliable, docile, and capable industrial workforce, groomed 
by government enforced discipline.” The sheer amount of people, combined with the largest 
urban migration seen in the history of the world (90-300 million people have left China’s farm 
lands for the cities), and the fact that America, and the rest of the world, are addicted to cheap 
merchandise to buy, is creating an economic juggernaut unlike any ever seen.
 The more money that is poured into China, the more we and the world facilitate 
China’s power. The reason why American manufacturers, along with Europeans and every 
other country, are being beat by the Chinese is because they have a docile workforce that learns 
to craft tools, ornaments, cars, etc., with precise skill by hand. It is cheaper to pay a laborer in 
China to craft a car part, or machine part, than it is to buy a multimillion dollar machine and 
computer system to do the same job. As the Chinese begin to infiltrate and expand on each 
potential job market, their skill and quality of work increases. Chinese electronics, clothes, com-
puters, DVDs, and everything else are made cheaper, and of equal if not better quality. Mean-
while, China as a nation has enough people to create the largest crop of technical and science 
students and workers ever seen. Not only is science and engineering the ideal field for many 
young Chinese students, the Chinese are also sending out students across the globe, learning 
from the top institutes, and returning to China, where investment and work opportunities eclipse 
those available anywhere else. In essence, there is a lot of potential for recruitment of scientists 
and engineers in China, but the non-Chinese world is losing the opportunity to use them. Rather, 
we educate them with the best technology, and then lose them back to their home country.
 The problem is this: America and the world are now bound together with China. To 
attempt to stunt the growth of China by not investing in it would not stop its economy. Not 
only does America and the world depend on Chinese products (cheap in price, not in quality) 
to be able to spend and consume as much as we do, but we are also bound to China by China’s 
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reinvestment in American debt. China is the largest buyer of American bonds. Essentially, 
China is financing our consumer spending spree. It is because China is buying our debt that 
we can have low interest rates. And so on. Conversely, China needs us to spend and be in debt 
so that it can continue to build a city the size of Houston every month, and continue to buy 
military technology. What if foreign investments were to suddenly disappear? Fishman writes,
When Asians pull out of our markets, Americans may discover abruptly that 
interest rates climb and the value of assets…declines…in the worst scenario, 
the United States’ willingness to fritter away its national wealth to finance 
private consumption and unproductive government spending would extract a 
permanent price on the economy.
It is possible that this won’t happen. It would be necessary for Americans to reduce their con-
sumption, to invest in more savings, and for the government to reduce its spending. Combine 
this with the Chinese slowly moving their currency, the Yuan, away from its ties to the dollar, 
and things could equalize. However, it seems to me that at this continued pace, the Chinese 
investing in real estate, American businesses, etc., and Americans needing cheap merchandise 
to buy, thereby increasing their debt, that this is an unbreakable cycle. This could be good, 
or bad. Good, because America and China are tied together, and therefore each is dependent 
upon the other’s continued success to maintain the standards of living and prosperity of its 
citizens. Bad, because for either to collapse means a negative economic impact on a global 
scale the likes of which have never been seen.
 As one reads this book, a feeling of unease and dread overcomes the mind. The 
sheer amount of statistics, money, and logistics that has become the Chinese juggernaut 
seems unstoppable. Mr. Fishman does not do much to allay these feelings. The one area that 
he stresses we must become better in is education. Without drastically altering and investing 
in the education system there will be no chance to stay competitive with China. One would 
think that with the amount of money going into China, that there would be a push amongst 
American high schools to introduce Chinese language programs. However, “a recent count of 
Chinese-language students in American high schools came up with just fifty thousand, while 
in China there are nearly as many people learning English as a second language as there are 
people who speak English as a first language in the United States, Canada, and Great Britain 
combined.” The math skills and science skills of American kids in high school and college is 
not much better. There needs to be a push towards science and math education along the lines 
of the Sputnik era, one that will pave the way for new science and math education standards. 
This idea is nothing new in our public discourse, but perhaps the threat of China could finally 
force some real movement on the issue. 
 Unfortunately, assuming that these new standards would happen, I do not think that 
it would be enough to maintain the status quo of our global power. In the end, it comes down 
to sheer numbers; they have a billion more people in their country than we have in ours. And 
their population only continues to grow as the economy does. As Fishman observes, “[I]f 
per capita incomes in China…were to double overnight, the size of China’s economy would 
instantly top the U.S. economy…If, however, the incomes of the Chinese up a mere half of 
those in the United States, a standard of living that the Chinese someday aspire to, China’s 
economy would be two and a half times as large as America’s.” This simple statistic sums up 
what our generation of American citizens must come to grips with, and deal with. If things 
continue at this pace, we will essentially be renters in this world, owing our debt, and our 
products, to foreign whims, our new landlords. Steps need to be taken to stem the tide of 
spending, and focus needs to be put on new trade agreements, and education. This will allow 
us to at least remain the competitive, if not the economic, force we once were.
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In Brief
Levitt, Steven D. & Stephen J. Dubner. Freakonomics: 
A Rogue Economist Explores the Hidden Side of 
Everything. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 2005.  242 pp.
Steven Levitt is an economist who asks unusual questions: “Which is more 
dangerous, a gun or a swimming pool?” and “Why do drug dealers still live 
with their moms?” Stephen Dubner, a New York Times writer, helped Levitt put the answers 
into a fascinating and entertaining narrative. The introduction sets forth a simple explanation 
for the genesis of this book, stating “if morality represents how people would like the world 
to work, then economics shows how it actually does work.” This is followed by Levitt’s 
examination of the decrease in violent crimes during the early 1990’s, which were not due to 
any political or police action, but came about because the ancient criminals were never born. 
He contends that the Roe vs. Wade decision stopped a new generation of unwanted hooligans 
from taking to the streets. The chapters that ensue address other interesting correlations, such 
as how Sumo wrestling scores and school test scores can be analyzed for cheating by looking 
for scoring patterns. As to the drug dealers still living with their mothers, this data comes from 
several notebooks collected from a gang in Chicago called the Black Disciples. These legers 
revealed an organization as highly structured as any international corporation, with pricing 
for drugs, extortion dues, weapons purchases and even death benefits for the families of gang 
members who were murdered. In reality, the average street dealer only made $3.30 an hour; 
only those in the top of the gang structure took home any significant amount of money. Even 
parenting is called into question, using test score data collected by the US Department of 
Education to show that certain assumptions, such as a child having an intact family or a stay 
at home mother, does not make the child a better student. Freakonomics is not a dull lesson in 
economics and statistics, but a delightful read that is both engaging and humorous.    
~Michelle Yost
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Gladwell, Malcolm. Blink: The Power of Thinking 
Without Thinking. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 
2005.  277 pp.
Malcolm Gladwell is a staff writer for The New Yorker, but his book Blink is 
a fantastic exploration of the powers of the human mind, a part of the mind 
few people are really in touch with. He makes his point quite clearly: “Blink is concerned with 
the very smallest components of our everyday lives – the content and origin of those instanta-
neous impressions and conclusions that spontaneously arise whenever we meet a new person 
or confront a complex situation…” The introduction is about a Greek kouros statue purchased 
by the Getty Museum in California; it did not look right. All the scientists who carbon-dated 
it and the geologists who examined its marble content said the kouros was authentic; but 
every specialist in the field of Ancient Greek art had an instantaneous revulsion to the statue. 
Though none of them could articulate what was wrong, they knew the kouros was a fake. 
From here, Gladwell goes on to explain how the human brain makes thousands of uncon-
scious calculations based upon experiences, which he calls “thin-slicing.” The psychologist 
John Gottman from the University of Washington can successfully predict if a couple will re-
main married after fifteen years with an accuracy of 95 percent just by watching the husband 
and wife converse, measuring slight attitude changes such as disgust or sadness. Or, there is 
the example of Vic Braden, one of the world’s top tennis coaches, who knew when a player 
was going to double-fault on a serve. Braden had no idea why he could do this, but Gladwell 
discusses how this coach’s brain, based upon his years of experience, could make dozens of 
calculations about a player’s serving form in the blink of an eye and know where the tennis 
ball would go. There is still a moral to the story that Gladwell wants the reader to come away 
with: recognition of the power of the unconscious mind, and acknowledgment that we should 
not be resigned to accepting the prejudices of snap judgment. This book is a wonderful exami-
nation of who we are and why we think the way we do, with compelling examples and stories. 
~Michelle Yost
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McCarthy, Cormac. No Country for Old Men. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. 309 pp.
“If God meant to interfere in the degeneracy of mankind, would he not have 
done so by now?”  Cormac McCarthy raised this question in 1985 in what 
is largely considered his masterpiece, Blood Meridian.  Twenty years later 
McCarthy explores this meditation in his first novel since Cities of the Plain 
concluded the Border Trilogy seven years ago.  In his ninth novel, No Country For Old Men, 
we are confronted with an array of characters that are desperately trying to make sense of life 
in a world that has long ago abandoned Christ.  Anyone familiar with McCarthy’s work will 
recognize this as a recurrent theme, but in his newest offering McCarthy switches the focus of 
his style that has designated him as the literary descendant of Faulkner.  Set in 1980 in south-
west Texas, No Country introduces us to Llewlyn Moss, a young Vietnam vet that stumbles 
upon a botched heroin deal in the desert of southwest Texas on a hunting trip.  What Moss 
confronts—drugs, the aftermath of a violent killing spree, money—is at the heart of a novel 
that explores the often blurred line between choice, providence, and salvation.  Moss’ choice 
is one that sets McCarthy’s protagonist on the run from the law—most notably aging law-
men Sheriff Bell—and the devil incarnate—Anton Chigurgh, a cattle gun wielding psycho-
path—which leads to a continual rumination that links all three characters on the question of, 
“how does a man decide in what order to abandon his life?”  Bell’s role is twofold: he plays a 
surrogate father to Moss’ “runaway son” motif, while he faces his own ineptitude in a world 
that has passed him by—a role that Chigurgh provides.  Bell is both courageous and cowardly, 
a fact that has defined his entire adult life stemming from the Bronze Star he was awarded in 
W.W. II for an act mistaken for bravery.  Chigurgh’s sadistic idea of moral justice drives most 
of the novel’s action and eventually leads to the crossroads of America’s most ardent fascina-
tions—violence and religion.  While past novels of McCarthy’s have been largely balanced 
between these two camps in what have spawned essentially dark morality tales, this new 
novel heavily favors the fervent violence and fast paced dialogue that has warranted many to 
view this latest offering as mere pulp.  This assessment is much too easy and largely ignores 
the bigger thematic complexity that—unlike his earlier novels—doesn’t expressly surface 
for the reader to justify McCarthy’s ardent spirit towards violent expression.  The quality of 
writing though prevails and once the hunt begins McCarthy’s sparse prose hits you like a 
dose of heroin in the vein of minimalism.  Sentences are short, terse, and provide an effect 
that sweeps its readers along in the fashion of a dime-store thriller.  While sparse, McCarthy’s 
prose continues to reflect his mastery of dialect, conversation, and word use that has become 
his greatest contribution to American letters.  While the debate continues to rage amongst 
critics, it is certainly safe to say that either camp examining this novel will conclude it is a 
minor addition to the author’s body of work.  John Henry Newman once said, “It is a rule of 
God’s providence that we succeed by failure.”  This quote proves applicable to the novel’s 
characters that are caught between the past and the future, but destined to act and make their 
life’s decisions in the present.  To go one step further Newman’s words are perhaps even more 
poignant when applied to McCarthy himself.  While certainly far from his best, McCarthy has 
succeeded in giving his audience at worst, a striking reward for the reader’s restless night.   
~ Adam Cottrel
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Tan, Amy. Saving Fish from Drowning. New York:  
Putnam, 2005.  474 pp.
The story of twelve blundering American tourists trekking through the jungles 
of Myanmar certainly marks a radical departure for author Amy Tan. Indeed, 
Saving Fish from Drowning may initially disappoint diehard fans of Tan, 
who have come to anticipate her engaging stories about Chinese-American 
mothers, daughters and “aunties,” and their family struggles to bridge the age 
and culture divide separating them. While Saving Fish from Drowning does immerse readers 
in unfamiliar territory (quite literally), the novel possesses Tan’s signature complexity, rich 
storylines and twisting subplots, and her typical flair for wildly humorous sarcasm. When 
art curator and gallery owner Bibi Chen decides to lead twelve of her wealthy, self-indul-
gent, amateur art-loving American friends on a Buddhist art expedition through China and 
Myanmar, she cannot possibly imagine the chaos and misfortune that will ensue. Two weeks 
before the trip, Bibi is killed under mysterious circumstances in her art gallery, setting off a 
chain of events that dooms the unfortunate expedition before it ever begins. Bibi’s friends 
decide to embark on the trip as planned, and hire a tour guide painfully ill-equipped to deal 
with both the bumbling group of tourists and the wonders and mysteries of the Buddhist art 
Bibi planned to explore. Bibi’s spirit continues to narrate the story to the readers from beyond 
the grave, woefully filling us in as her friends bungle their way through the trip, commit-
ting every offense from unwittingly defiling an ancient Chinese shrine by urinating on it, to 
contracting raging cases of dysentery by disregarding Bibi’s original dining itinerary. Though 
it seems impossible that the clumsy group of Americans could find their way into even worse 
trouble upon entering Myanmar, a morning boat trip gone awry launches the group into the 
international spotlight. When Bibi’s charges fail to return from the ill-fated Christmas morn-
ing cruise, chaos, disorder and surprising plot twists ensue. As Tan weaves the outrageous, 
tangled explanation for the tourists’ disappearance and ultimate fate, she engages in what she 
does best: lively, versatile storytelling. The twisting of the plot, the complexity of the char-
acters and the attention to historical detail makes this captivating story difficult to classify. 
Saving Fish from Drowning is equal parts comedy, satire, political commentary, social critique 
and history lesson. One criticism readers might raise is Tan’s insistence on portraying the 
American tourists as ill-mannered, disrespectful, and ignorant as travelers in a foreign coun-
try. While the antics and gaffes of the tourists do become tiring, it is hard to argue that Tan 
embellishes in her depiction of Americans abroad, her characters do not slip into being one-
dimensional parodies of “typical” Americans; instead they are well-rounded, believable and 
unfortunately, naïve world-travelers. Overall, Saving Fish from Drowning makes a successful 
departure from Tan’s past novels and serves as an entertaining, worthy read.     
~Christina Amato
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Rajiva, Lila. The Language of Empire: Abu Ghraib and 
the American Media. New York:  Monthly Review Press, 
2005. 224 pp.
Throughout the Iraq war, the ultimate goal of liberation and democracy for 
the Iraqi people has suffered numerous setbacks. We have heard of isolated 
cases of U.S. soldiers shooting unarmed civilians as well as other atrocities. 
It is a common belief that these are the actions of a few soldiers whose judgment has been 
blurred by the brutality of war. The free press has molded our perspective on these events and 
the war in general. We have come to expect the media to report on the atrocities of war, even 
if they are committed by a few U.S. soldiers operating outside of protocol. However, in her 
book Language of Empire: Abu Ghraib and the American Media, Lila Rajiva argues that the 
human rights violations that took place in the Abu Ghraib detainment center were not the acts 
of a few rogue Marines, but were part of a much larger campaign against Islam—a campaign 
that was ignored by the American media.  Rajiva investigates the events of Abu Ghraib and 
the American media’s treatment of it by analyzing the language of the media. What could the 
language of the Bush administration and the reporters covering the Abu Ghraib scandal tell 
us? Why were thousands of Iraqis illegally detained, abused and systematically tortured? Why 
was Abu Ghraib swept under the rug by the American media? Rajiva’s investigation into these 
issues lends a powerful perspective to the growing debate over the validity of the Iraq war.
 Rajiva’s investigation first delves into the events that took place within Abu Ghraib. 
She follows the paper trail of various hearings, testimonies and internal communications within 
the Bush administration. Her analysis of the media’s treatment of the story points to the fact 
that the administration had known of the abuses and had orchestrated a cover-up. Testimonies 
of high ranking officials are littered with phrases like “to the best of my knowledge,” and “I am 
not aware.” Rajiva’s research leads us to ask “what did the Bush administration and the Marine 
top officials know and when did they know it?” Further, why didn’t the American media jump 
on the story and reveal the atrocities in a timely manner? Rajiva argues that there were several 
reasons for the lack of accountability. First, the Bush administration limited access to docu-
ments and locations that were essential to uncovering the truth about the scandal. Second, 
many reporters were intimidated by the task of taking an anti-war stance and reporting the facts 
in their entirety. Third, Rajiva asserts there were many reporters who simply could not view the 
war from outside their own biased perspective.  Many people in the media could not or would 
not report the fact that U.S. Marines had committed an act of terrorism. At the core of Rajiva’s 
argument is the notion that the torture, and subsequent lack of accountability, is the result of a 
deep seeded racial and religious bias held by those in the government, as well as in the Ameri-
can media.
 In Language of Empire, Rajiva presents an enlightening new perspective on just 
one of the attacks on human rights to take place in the Iraq war. She presents evidence such 
as internal communications and various communications in the media to present an argu-
ment that shakes our beliefs about what America represents to the rest of the world. Are we 
liberating a nation of impoverished people who desperately needed American intervention, or 
simply satisfying our imperialistic desires fueled by our notion of Western, Christian superior-
ity? With hundreds of civilians dying every month in Iraq, are we pursuing the preservation of 
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human rights or trampling on them? Most profoundly, are we defeating the terrorists or are we 
becoming a terrorist state? Rajiva presents a convincing argument that forces us to examine 
our nation’s identity and our motives.  Ultimately, Rajiva argues that those in the government, 
military and the media must learn to think and act outside of a scope shaped by religious and 
racial bias. Once this is achieved, America will truly be the provider of freedom and liberty 
for all. The Language of Empire: Abu Ghraib and the American Media stands as an important 
contribution to the national dialogue about the Iraq war, and America’s identity within the 
Middle East. 
 ~Nick Miller
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 Christina Amato: A senior English major with a concentration 
in Literary Studies, she plans to pursue her masters/doctorate in English while exploring 
(read: moving every three years) the country with her Air Force husband.  The people 
she would like to thank would be: Dr. Margaret Koehler for her encouragement and 
inspirational material, Dr. Paul Eisenstein for applying a much-needed critical eye, and 
her amazing husband, for patiently listening to long-winded diatribes on the subject of 
Haiti.
 Adam Cottrel: Born helpless, nude, and unable to provide for 
himself in Trenton, New Jersey, he was eventually able to overcome these handicaps to 
become a student of English and American literature at Otterbein College. Adam would 
like to thank Dr. Paul Eisenstein and Dr. Norman Chaney for providing unparalleled 
examples of Academic professionalism and humanity. Adam would also like to thank 
his parents, Christopher and Gayl, who may have had something to do with overcoming 
those handicaps mentioned above.
 Jason Thomas Craig: A junior at Otterbein with a double 
major in Philosophy and Islamic Studies, his goal in life is to never “yoke the winds 
of indifference heavenward,” and to apply to grad schools next year. He would like to 
thank Dr. Andrew Mills, Dr. Paul Eisenstein, and everyone else who put up with reading 
all of his drafts. They were always there and always supportive.  He would like to thank 
his parent for being there emotionally and financially, and Adam Cottrel for not being 
naked anymore. 
 Edward Gunn: A Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT) candidate, 
Edward will graduate June 2006.  He has a bachelor’s degree from Franklin University, 
and is going into teaching (Middle School language arts and social studies) as a career 
change.  For over 20 years Edward has been the manager of a greenhouse operation.
 Rhonda Maynard: A senior History major in Continuing 
Studies, she was the co-recipient of the Department of History and Political Science’s 
Pierre Frederick & Louise M. Rosselot Memorial Award in 2003. Rhonda finished her 
final quarter at Otterbein from Cambridge, Massachusetts, where she works as an ad-
ministrative assistant at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, while continuing her 
studies at Harvard University. In addition to her degree from Otterbein, Rhonda holds a 
B.S. in Secondary Education from The Ohio State University.
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 Nick Miller:  A senior history major at Otterbein.  
 Larsa Ramsini: A freshman at Otterbein College this year,  Larsa 
is double majoring in Mathematics and Philosophy and minoring in French.  She’d 
like to thank Dr. Andrew Mills for being an awesome professor, and a tremendous help 
whenever she had questions about her paper.  She also appreciated the encouraging 
words from Jason Craig throughout their entire Greek Philosophy class, especially when 
she started out having absolutely no idea how to go about writing the final paper.  She is 
still undecided as to what career path she would like to follow, but for now she is lean-
ing towards either graduate school in mathematics or law school.
 Zach Reat:  Zach Reat graduated from Otterbein College in 2005 with 
a Bachelor of Arts degree in History.  He is currently serving as an Americorps*VISTA 
volunteer with the Columbus Coalition for the Homeless where he uses the skills he 
acquired at Otterbein to advocate for positive social change.  Zach Reat’s essay entitled 
From Another Time and Place: Oral Testimony and the Holocaust was published in last 
year’s Aegis.
 Jen Roberts: A junior double major in Women’s Studies and Eng-
lish, with a concentration in Creative Writing, she plans, after graduation, to establish a 
writer’s colony Summer 2007 in beautiful Hocking Hills with her friend “Hard Knox” 
(every fair-skinned white women needs a gangster nickname), and would encourage all 
writers to seek out some solitude (for a reasonable price, of course). Jennifer would like 
to thank her husband and daughter for their enduring patience and unceasing support. 
She’d like to also thank the Otterbein community for offering her a space to grow, but 
specifically want to mention a few professors who have had a profound (yes, profound) 
effect on her life: Tammy Birk, Norman Chaney, Sarah Fatherly, and Shannon Lakanen. 
Each has influenced her in unimaginable ways, and she thanks them all. 
 Cassi Smith: A junior psychology and political science major, she is 
a member of the Honors Program and the Otterbein Women’s Golf team.  After college 
Cassi plans on pursuing a Masters Degree in psychology. 
 
 Jen Wall: Jen is a senior double major in history and art with concentra-
tions in drawing and photography, along with a minor in art history. While her current 
focus is getting her senior show together, Jen would like to continue her education in 
grad school. For his constant affections and abundance of hairballs, Jen would like to 
offer her heartfelt thanks to Loki. 
co
n
tr
ib
u
to
rs
ae
gis 2
0
0
6
1
2
2
co
n
trib
u
to
rs
 Michelle Yost: A senior at Otterbein with a double major in History and 
English, Michelle will be graduating in June of 2006. After that, she plans to pursue graduate 
school, though she does not know in which field of study. She would like to thank her parents 
for their constant love and support (and provisions of clothing) as well as all of the fantastic 
professors at Otterbein who have made these last four years such a wonderful learning experi-
ence. Ad Astra.

An Examination of Richard Kraut’s Liberalization of Socrates’ 
Political Philosophy
Would King Drink the Hemlock?: Socrates’ Views on King
The Not-So “Invisible Hand”: America’s Role in Haiti’s 
Endemic Poverty 
Philosophizing Disgrace: Anatomy and Analysis of Dylan’s 
“Hard Rain” 
A Priest of the Portrait as a Young Man: The Path to Stephen 
Dedalus’s Artistic Baptism 
The Moral Dilemma of Atomic Warfare
Jaingxi Elementary School Explosion: A Look at Human Rights 
Abuse in China
A Woman’s Religion: How Ann Lee Broke Through the Patriarchy
Art of Revolution 
Hirohito: Dunce or Duplicitous Leader? 
In this edition
and more
